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This study seeks to understand the relationships between opposition political parties, 
internal party democracy within them, and democratisation in Zimbabwe. It has done 
so through an in-depth study of the internecine struggles within the Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) that led to it splitting five times ever-since its formation in 
1999. The premise of the study is that factionalism is the main cause of the opposition 
party’s inability to gain power. The study investigates the influence of and the 
relationships among five factors contributing to the MDC's factionalism. These are: 
ethnic politics; relations with civil society; the influence of external political actors 
ranging from ‘the west’ to South Africa; ruling party efforts to destabilise the MDC; and 
problems within party leadership (including generational conflict). These have been 
related to the MDC's decline and the diminishing qualities of democracy, historically 
contextualised, in Zimbabwe more generally. The study was exploratory in design as 
it sought to unveil subjective interpretations and understandings. It employed 
qualitative research methodology. Data was collected through semi-structured 
interviews and documentary search. MDC emerged as the only opposition political 
party in Zimbabwe’s history to bring the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union- 
Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to the brink of electoral loss. The thesis concludes that 
though there is a plethora of factors that led to the MDC’s disintegration, the root cause 























INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Introduction 
The objective of this research is to understand the relationships between opposition 
political parties, internal party democracy within them, and democratisation in 
Zimbabwe. It has done so through an in-depth study of the internecine struggles within 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC)1 that led to it splitting five times ever-
since its formation in 1999. A survey of the literature on internal party democracy and 
democratisation in Zimbabwe reveals five fault-lines that have led to the split of the 
MDC. The study investigates the influence of and the relationships among five factors 
contributing to the MDC's factionalism: 1) ethnic politics; 2) relations with civil society; 
3) the influence of external political actors ranging from ‘the west’ to South Africa; 4) 
ruling party efforts to destabilise the MDC; and 5) problems within party leadership 
(including generational conflict), relating these to the MDC's decline especially from 
2004 to 2018 and the diminishing qualities of democracy, historically contextualised, 
in Zimbabwe more generally.  
Democracy has been an important element of development discourse since its 
emergence post World War II (Apter, 1987). The end of the Cold War era promised 
the revival of liberal democracy, in abeyance during the super-power battles and the 
rise of the one-party state in Africa (Moore, 2016: 205). The 1990s witnessed the 
reawakening of multi-party politics in Africa, amidst the consolidation of structural 
adjustment and introduction of ‘good governance’ programmes with democratic tenets 
as conditions contributing to this shift (Abrahamsen, 1999, 2000). It was assumed that 
“democracy would materialise across the third world in the same way as it had 
emerged in conjunction with capitalism and the process of industrialisation in the West” 
(Abrahamsen, 2000: 27). However, democracy’s promise of the free and fair choice of 
political leaders and prosperity has failed to materialise. Even after three decades in 
the post-Cold War era of democratic attempts, many African countries have 
experienced complications and conflict in the democratic realm.  
                                                          
1The MDC, in existence since late 1999, has been the only political party in Zimbabwe’s history to mount a notable opposition 
to the ruling party. It has undergone many splits – which are the main emphasis of this thesis. The larger faction became 
MDC-T or Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (after its leader, Morgan Tsvangirai). This paper’s use of the 
abbreviation “MDC” will refer to the largest segment of the original MDC, i.e. the one under the leadership of Morgan 




Most of the studies on democratisation in Africa are comparative (Basedau 
et.al, 2007; Lindberg, 2007), focusing on the omnipresent and authoritarian state or 
those parties in power (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Manning, 2005; Moore, 
2016). However there are limited in-depth studies on internal party democracy and 
democratisation (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2007; Solomon, 2011). Thus, this 
research adds to the existing body of literature on the topic. The study also contributes 
to the understanding of debates on democratisation in Africa. 
Zimbabwe’s main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change 
(MDC-T), led by Morgan Tsvangirai, was officially formed on 11 September 1999 in 
the midst of and emerging from long civil society struggles for economic justice in the 
trade unions, combined with those for constitutional change. It emerged as the only 
opposition political party in Zimbabwe’s history to bring the ruling Zimbabwe African 
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) to the brink of electoral loss. Almost a 
decade and half later, the July 2013 elections shocked many due to the MDC’s poor 
performance, which was ‘constructed’ by the ruling party. This paper argues that the 
fragility of the MDC-T has a longer heritage, although its factionalism was exposed 
most deeply as it proceeded to splinter into many new parties. This thesis argues that 
factionalism (which is defined and explained in the next chapter) is the main cause of 
the MDC’s inability to gain political power, and is the main theory by which I evaluate 
its effectiveness in Zimbabwe’s political arena. 
 
Research Methodology 
The study adopted qualitative research methodology as its mode of inquiry as it allows 
for in-depth understanding. The study was exploratory in design as it sought to unveil 
subjective interpretations and understandings. Documentary searches, including 
books, journals articles, NGO reports, newspapers, and party documents, were used 
in gathering written primary and secondary material. Semi-structured interviews were 
also used in data collection. Selection of the specific research participants was 
conducted through purposive sampling technique. The population sample was drawn 
from politicians (especially MDC party members), academics, businessman, civil 
servants and those in the private sector or Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). 
Their strong involvement in Zimbabwean politics (particularly MDC-T) qualified their 
inclusion in the research. Five participants were drawn from each group, which added 
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up to a total of 25 participants. A digital voice-recorder was used, and later transcribed. 
A field diary of interview sessions was also used as a backup system.  
 The data was examined using thematic analysis. The method allows the 
researcher to carefully check and review collected data. This was guided by the 
objectives of the study, which are indicated above. Triangulation and reflexivity were 
used as measures of ensuring rigour and trustworthiness. I was born in Zimbabwe and 




Respondents were provided with consent forms highlighting the aim of the research 
and informing them of its confidentiality. They were also advised that they could 
withdraw at any time. The data was stored in a password-protected facility. 
 
Limitations 
The major limitation to the research was obtaining consent from the potential 
participants. Some informants would agree to meet but later claimed to be busy and 
some would ignore any further contact. Tsvangirai was sick, Biti and Ncube, who are 
now deputy presidents of the unified MDC Alliance were out of the country and 
Chamisa, the current president of the same party claimed to be busy with a court case. 
However, I managed to get a number of senior members in the MDC, NGOs and other 
opposition parties such as People’s Democratic Party (PDP) and Renewal Democrats 
of Zimbabwe (RDZ). I made my intentions known as strictly academic and extracted 
answers from questions the interviewee was comfortable in answering. The 
researcher also provided the participants with an official letter from the supervisor, 
which helped in building rapport and confidence. 
 
Structure of the Study 
This thesis is comprised of six chapters. The current one is an introduction, elucidating 
the problem statement, rationale, goals and objectives of the study, and highlighting 
the background to and context of the problem. It also indicates the research 
methodology and limitations of the study. Chapter One discusses the recent 
developments in the Zimbabwe political arena and the MDC-Alliance. Chapter Two 
presents an overview of democratic development in Africa in general, theories of 
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factionalism, the political history of Zimbabwe, and the rise of the MDC. Chapter Three 
critically analyses the literature on the five dependent variables of the study: ethnic 
relations, leadership challenges, ruling party strategies, civil society and the donors 
supporting it, and external political actors (from ‘the west’ to South Africa). Chapter 
Four analyses findings from the fieldwork in line with the study’s objectives to assess 
the significance and linkages of the five variables to the MDC’s factionalism and its 
impact on Zimbabwe’s democratization. It specifically focuses on the 2005 split. 
Chapter Five examines the influence of the five variables on the 2014 split and the 
subsequent breakaways, which led to the formation of the MDC-Renewal by the Biti 
and Mangoma faction. Chapter Six presents the conclusions of the study and the way 






























A number of changes occurred in the political arena of Zimbabwe from 2015 to 2019. 
Uprisings or protests against the economic decline and Mugabe regime were 
recorded. In November 2017 Robert Mugabe was ousted through a coup orchestrated 
by the current President Emmerson Mnangagwa and his deputy Constantine 
Chiwenga. In the opposition camp, the MDC tried to re-unite under the MDC-Alliance 
banner. However, the passing away of opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai in 
February 2018 deepened the divisions in the party. The chaos was particularly in the 
area of succession, which had not been clear. However, Nelson Chamisa outwitted 
the other two vice-presidents - Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri. His ascension to 
power was hotly contested. On the 31st July 2018 presidential and parliamentary 
elections were held and were followed by violence ensuring from MDC-Alliance 
inspired protests about slow ballot counting, on the 1st of August, when six people 
were shot dead by the army. The presidential election results, which announced ZANU 
PF presidential candidate, Emmerson Mnangagwa, as the winner, were contested by 
the MDC-Alliance. The dispute was settled in the Constitutional Court. By end of May 
2019 the MDC-Alliance held its congress, Chamisa was elected president of the party, 
and other opposition leaders who had re-joined the party got positions. However, the 
party experienced serious squabbles prior to the congress.  Presently, power wrangles 
are still prevalent in the opposition party. I discuss these events in this chapter. 
 
1.2 Protests 
In 2016 (from April to September), Zimbabwe experienced a number of protests. Most 
of them were organised through social media platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, 
Twitter, YouTube and newspapers (Sabao and Chikara, 2018: 20). In an interview, an 
MDC activist (RspH) argued that the lack or shrinking of democratic space in the MDC 
was not only displayed through splits, but also through protests. “The protests were a 
clear indication of frustration by people who previously believed in the opposition, they 
did not feel accommodated”, she stated. These protests were to some a source of 
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hope for change in the political and economic arena. They reawakened the voices of 
Zimbabweans.   
 Most of the protests were damp squibs. These events included Occupy Africa 
Unity Square (OAUS), #ThisFlag, #ThisGown and #Tajamuka/Sesijikile (we have 
rebelled, in Shona and Ndebele). Itai Dzamara founded the OAUS in 2014. In 2015 he 
was abducted by unknown men (suspected to be state security agents). His brother 
Patson Dzamara continued with other members to protest. They are still using the 
Africa Unity Square in Harare as their venue. In June 2016 about fifteen of its members 
were arrested by the police (Musarurwa, 2016, 2). Another event was #ThisGown. It 
was made up of disgruntled university graduates who were unemployed. They 
demonstrated through playing soccer in the streets with their gowns. 
 The most prominent group action was #ThisFlag, which was led by a youthful 
cleric called Evan Mawarire. Through a recorded video, which went viral on the social 
media he received widespread attention. In his recording he expressed discontent with 
the country’s political and socio-economic problems (Gukurume, 2017: 50). He 
continued posting several videos, which triggered protests in major cities across the 
country. The major event led by this movement was a national shut down or stay away 
on the 6th of July 2016. It was code-named #ShutDownZimbabwe2016. By the time 
this shutdown occurred the environment was ripe for a major demonstration as several 
protests had occurred. These included the protest against the import ban in Beitbridge, 
which had occurred in June, and the teachers’ strikes. This environment of protests 
made the national shutdown a big success. Besides following the trend and amplifying 
it, the majority of the citizens were frustrated with the economic downturn in the 
country. After the event, Mawarire was arrested and charged with treason. Over a 
hundred lawyers volunteered to represent him, and he won the case. He then fled to 
USA; when he came back, he faded away. The struggle continued under the 
Tajamuka/Sesijikile campaign. 
 Tajamuka outlined ten reasons for demonstrating. These were: an abolition of 
bond notes2, an end to corruption, return of the missing US$15 billion diamond 
revenue, and the missing US$10 million for a youth fund, government to resolve the 
cash crisis, returning Itai Dzamara, an end to disappearances and illegal arrests, 
                                                          
2 A quasi-currency released by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) in 2016. At its introduction it was pegged 
equally to the U.S dollar but now 1USD is equivalent to 120 Bond. 
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improvement of service delivery, devolution of power, and an end to the recitation of 
the national pledge in schools (Musarurwa, 2016: 1). Tajamuka campaign initiated a 
few protests across the country, which were always dispersed by the police (BBC, 
2018).  
The government responded with harsh measures. Mugabe introduced a new 
ministry of cyber-security, assigned to Patrick Chinamasa. A cyber-security law was 
also enacted. It criminalised the use of the social media in Zimbabwe (but the 
government does not have much control of the social media platforms, especially as 
it concerns Zimbabweans in the diaspora). The selling of Zimbabwean flags was 
banned since they had become a symbol of anti-Mugabe and ZANU PF (Dodo, 2016: 
1). The old rhetoric of the protesters being funded by the West was reiterated by 
Mugabe on several occasions (BBC News, 2018).  
 
1.3 Exit Mugabe, Enter Mnangagwa 
Post 2013 elections, ZANU-PF experienced serious power struggles. Part of the 
internal problems was the entrance into politics of Grace Mugabe, the wife of the then 
President Robert Mugabe. After the 2013 elections she became more active in politics. 
Her power emanated from her feared husband. In 2014 she influenced the expulsion 
of Joyce Mujuru, who was the deputy president. She then replaced Mujuru in leading 
ZANU-PF’s women’s league. Her next obstacle to the highest office was Vice-
president Emmerson Mnangagwa. Thus, the ZANU-PF intra-party conflict was now 
between the G40 (Generation 40, i.e relatively youthful members) and Mnangagwa’s 
faction (dubbed the Lacoste) (Hlongwana, 2018: 94). Through her Youth Interface 
rallies, she denounced Mnangagwa and other ZANU-PF’s heavy-weights perceived to 
be in his camp. The relationship between Mugabe and Mnangagwa deteriorated. In 
October 2017, Mnangagwa survived ice-cream poisoning, which he ate at a rally, and 
he was forced to deny that it was arranged by the first family (ENCA, 2017). The crisis 
burst when Mugabe fired Mnangagwa and expelled him from ZANU-PF. He fled the 
country to South Africa, stating that he had received threats. Mnangagwa had been 
allied to the Zimbabwe Liberation War Veterans Association (ZLWVA) and the military. 
Following Mnangagwa’s ouster, the army got heavily involved in the ouster of 
Mugabe. The then head of all armed forces Constantino Chiwenga made a statement 
calling for an end to the purge of party members who participated in the liberation 
struggle, and warned that the army would intervene (Pigou, 2017: 1). Within the same 
8 
 
week, the first family was placed under house arrest by the military. On the 15th of 
November the army took control of Harare, with troops and tanks. The military action 
was dubbed Operation Restore Legacy. This type of coup has been given different 
names, including ‘military coup’, ‘soft coup’, ‘slow-motion coup’ and ‘guardian coup’ 
(Hlongwana, 2018: 95; Moretti, 2017: 20). It was a celebrated coup d'état. Due to the 
widespread marches and threats of impeachment the nonagenarian was compelled to 
step down. He and his wife Grace were banned for life from the ruling party. The 
regional and international community did not condemn the coup. It seemed that 
nobody wanted Mugabe since he had become a liability both locally and 
internationally.  
Mnangagwa became the interim president, although some law experts argue 
that his ascendency was unconstitutional (Matyszak, 2018b). However, Mnangagwa 
inherited a lot of problems, from a desperate economy to intra-party struggles. He 
introduced a new mantra, “Zimbabwe is open for business”, in order to attract foreign 
direct investment. Nevertheless, the economic crisis has been proving 
insurmountable. Furthermore, divisions in the party and the state were too many to 
deal with. Mugabe still had support from some of the ZANU-PF’s strongholds, such as 
in Mashonaland province. Members of the G40 faction were disgruntled with the way 
Mugabe was deposed as they were the prime beneficiaries of the indigenisation policy 
under his rule, which entailed 51 percent ownership of foreign-owned companies by 
indigenous Zimbabweans. They went on to form the New Patriotic Front (NPF) party, 
which had Mugabe’s backing, but it did not do well in the 2018 election (Zimbabwe 
Independent, 2018). More battles were in the security sector. The police were not 
happy with the way their traffic department was clamped down, which gave them so 
much money on the roadblocks. They were also unhappy for being controlled by the 
army. Some members within the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) were still loyal 
to Mugabe, which led to them being purged (Zimbabwe Independent, 2018).  
The most serious rift has reportedly been between Mnangagwa and his vice-
president Chiwenga. Some scholars term it the civilian versus military conflict 
(Matyszak, 2018: 1). However, Matyszak is circumspect of the existence of the real 
conflict. Chiwenga, who led the coup felt he was the king-maker. Rumours were that 
Chiwenga’s political ambitions were thwarted by Mnangagwa and that Chiwenga 
wanted to remove Mnangagwa before the 2018 elections and stand as the candidate 
or cancel the elections. Zimbabwe is famous for rumours. In most cases they are 
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orchestrated from the upper echelons of the society to create an illusion, diverting the 
attention of the general populace from the prevailing socio-economic issues.  
Currently, according to a number of media reports the conflict is still present and may 
escalate to another coup or split (Zimbabwe Independent, 2018; The Standard, 2019). 
 
1.4 Chamisa’s Ascendancy and the MDC-Alliance 
On the 14th of February 2018, two months after Mugabe’s ouster, Tsvangirai 
succumbed to cancer at the age of 65. Whilst he was still receiving treatment in South 
Africa, his subordinates got involved in malicious fights. His choice to set up three vice-
presidents as well as his long absence created a leadership vacuum (Mungwari, 2018: 
1). By the time of his death there was no clear successor. This led to succession 
battles in the party. Each of the three vice-presidents claimed to be the acting 
president. Khupe claimed that the 2011 constitution provided for one vice-president 
elected by the party’s congress (Matyszak, 2018a: 1). Khupe was the only deputy 
elected at the 2014 congress while the other two - Mudzuri (Warren Park Member of 
Parliament) and Chamisa (an ordinary card carrying member of the party, who had 
lost the secretary-general post to Mwonzora in the 2014 congress) were appointed by 
Tsvangirai in July 2016 unconstitutionally. Thus according to the constitution she was 
supposed to be the acting president until an extra-ordinary congress had been 
convened. A detailed account of the way the MDC’s constitution was manhandled in 
order for Tsvangirai to appoint two vice-presidents and Khupe’s split from the party is 
discussed in chapter five.  
It is important to note that the relationship between Tsvangirai and Khupe 
started to deteriorate when he appointed the other two deputies. His appointments 
gave the impression that he had no confidence in Khupe. Thus Khupe felt that 
Tsvangirai had done so to neutralise or undermine her authority. In 2017, Khupe 
together with Lovemore Moyo, Obert Gutu, Abednego Bhebhe and others disagreed 
with Tsvangirai in regards to the formation of the MDC-Alliance, a grand coalition of 
seven political parties, most of them splinters from the original MDC and all male-led 
(Dendere, 2017: 2). Opportunity, convenience and history played a key role in its 
formation (Chirimambowa, 2019). A united opposition became very important to take 
on ZANU-PF, since smaller opposition parties used to split the votes. Donor funding 
was also dwindling, so there were calls for a united front for them to get support 
(Interview with Rspj, 13 July 2017). However, Khupe’s faction was unhappy with the 
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way parliamentary seats were shared in the alliance. They felt that the smaller parties 
in the coalition were given too many seats (Mungwari and Vhutuza, 2017: 6). The 
return of Biti and Ncube, who were senior members before they broke away, also 
threatened her position as the vice-president. 
Upon Tsvangirai’s death, Chamisa presented himself as the acting president. 
Chamisa called for a national council meeting, which he chaired and was declared the 
acting president for the next twelve months (Matyszak, 2018: 2). Khupe’s claim was 
cast off. The meeting itself was highly charged. At Tsvangirai’s funeral, held at his rural 
home a week later, Chamisa used the event to bolster his support for the top position. 
He tried to defend the legality of his ascendancy to acting president. He told the 
attendants that the national council, as the supreme decision-making body between 
congresses, had the power to appoint an acting president in such a scenario. He also 
added that there was no time and money to convene an extra-ordinary congress as 
the elections were five months away. At the funeral a violent mob perceived to be 
Chamisa’s supporters attacked Khupe and attempted to set her ablaze in a hut where 
she had taken refuge. They only failed because of the damp weather and some 
members of the civil society came to her rescue (Voice of America interview with 
Khupe, 2018). Efforts to negotiate with Khupe after the event were fruitless. She 
responded by breaking away, so the national council sealed it by expelling her and her 
allies. She retained the MDC-T name. Chamisa’s faction won the structures and the 
soul of the party (Chirimambowa, 2019). However, his power grab damaged the 
chances of the opposition in the elections. Matyszak (2018a) argues that Chamisa did 
it the ZANU-PF way because it was in contradiction to the party’s guiding principles, 
which are adherence to constitutionalism, rule of law, and non-violence. 
 
1.5 2018 Elections 
On the 30th of July 2018 Zimbabwe held its first election without Mugabe since its 
independence and without Tsvangirai since the formation of the MDC. Twenty-two 
presidential candidates put themselves forward to contest in the harmonised elections: 
the largest number of candidates contesting for the president’s position since 
independence. However, the major fight was between the 77-year old Emmerson 
Dambudzo Mnangagwa, popularly shortened as E.D and nicknamed Ngwena (the 
Crocodile), and the 40-year old Nelson Chamisa (nicknamed Nero or Cobra). The 
elections were going to answer the question of legitimacy. E.D presented himself as a 
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reformer (Mbatha, 2018). He maintained that he was committed to free and fair 
elections. He also invited Western observers, who had been banned in the previous 
three elections. 
 Chamisa’s MDC-Alliance presented its manifesto entitled “Sustainable and 
Modernisation Agenda for Real Transformation (SMART)”. ZANU-PF’s manifesto was 
labelled ‘Unite, Fight Corruption, Develop, Re-engage, Create Jobs’ (Lewanika, 2018: 
2). However, most of Chamisa’s promises were wild and unbelievable, for example, 
promising people bullet trains from their houses, construction of intertwined roads that 
resemble a plate of spaghetti, and lying that Donald Trump promised him billions 
should his party win the 2018 elections (Matyszak, 2018c: 1). Despite MDC-Alliance’s 
limited resources due to donor support withdrawal, it managed to do door-to-door 
campaigns and mega-rallies across the country. A convincing amount of evidence 
suggests that it got funding at the last minute from G-40 (City Press, 2018). ZANU-
PF’s rallies were well oiled, with entertainment and party regalia distributed to 
everyone. Mnangagwa, though not as charismatic as his predecessor, tried to appeal 
through performance legitimacy (Lewanika, 2018: 3). He was focusing more on doing 
his job so that it would be used as evidence for his capacity. Besides his advantage of 
incumbency, he had a reliable political machine and a large number of opposition 
parties, which split the votes. However, his black marks were his association with 
Gukurahundi, being Mugabe’s henchman for over 38 years, corruption, and limited 
charisma. 
 On the 3rd of August 2018 – two days after the soldiers killed protestors and 
innocent bystanders in Harare – the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) 
chairperson, Justice Priscilla Chigumba announced the results. Mnangagwa won by 
50.8 percent, a fraction more than the required number to avoid a re-run. Chamisa 
had 44.3 percent. The other twenty candidates got the remaining balance. In the 
National Assembly ZANU-PF had 144 of the 210 seats while the MDC-Alliance had 
64 (Cohen and Latham, 2018). The other three seats were won by the independent 
Temba Mliswa, NPF, and another opposition party. 
 Regional blocs such as AU and SADC endorsed the results: as usual they 
seldom criticise their member states. The European Union (EU) and local NGOs cited 
a number of flaws. Most opposition political parties, especially the MDC-Alliance also 
criticised the elections. ZEC was blamed for not being independent, but partisan in 
favour of ZANU-PF. The commission has been accused of manipulating the voters’ 
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roll and the ballot papers as it refused to be transparent in how the whole voting 
process was conducted (Moss, 2018: 1). The involvement of the military in transporting 
ballot boxes was also cited as a major concern. Moreover, there was a common belief 
that the military would not stage a coup to be in power for only eight months. 
Allegations of Russia’s meddling in the election were also mentioned (Maslov and 
Zaytsev, 2018). Media reported that about sixty-four Russians were operating in 
Harare to assist in Mnangagwa’s electoral campaign and advising ZEC (BBC, 2018; 
Meyer, Arkhipov, and Rahagalala, 2018). In regards to fair access to media, the major 
broadcasting channels continued to spread propaganda. Chamisa was portrayed as 
not mature and upright. His lies were magnified and allegations of him having two 
‘small houses’ (extra-marital affairs) were mentioned to undermine him. Though the 
pre-election environment was peaceful, European Union observers reported an 
increase in intimidation by ZANU-PF. References to the history of violence were made 
by some candidates and supporters at campaign rallies, stirring fears among the 
population about state sponsored post-election violence, for example by referring to 
the mayhem and murder surrounding the 2008 run-off presidential elections 
(European Union Election Observation Mission, 2018: 8). This was noted at ZANU-PF 
rallies in Matebeleland South, Mashonaland Central, Masvingo and Manicaland. 
EUEOM also mentioned the August 1 killings, which undermined the elections’ 
credibility and exposed Mnangagwa not to be a reformer.  
 The MDC-Alliance challenged the results in the Constitutional Court, claiming 
that the elections were rigged. It has been the tradition of the opposition to contest the 
outcome of every election since 2000, but they have not won any case. The alliance 
had a panel of lawyers, mostly from South Africa. However, they were not permitted 
by the minister of Home Affairs the right to participate in the Zimbabwean courts. 
ZANU-PF also had its legal team led by the party’s secretary Paul Mangwana. In its 
application, the alliance alleged gross mathematical errors (Mail and Guardian, 2018). 
They also criticised the ruling party and the electoral commission for employing various 
rigging schemes. The opposition coalition claimed that it had the V11 forms, which did 
not tally with ZEC’s results, and that some results were not posted outside the polling 
station. Over the period of counting ZEC adjusted the results three times. 
Mnangagwa’s percentage was reduced to 50.6, and Chamisa’s percentage was 
increased to 44.39 (Daily News, 2018a). Such a flaw indicated to some that it could 
be a tip of the iceberg. However, the court dismissed the case with costs. Chief Justice 
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Malaba, who presided over the nine judges, argued that MDC-Alliance had no proof 
of irregularities by ZEC. The courts have been historically tilted towards the ruling 
party, especially from 2000. Thus, their independence has been questioned and 
blamed for bias by the MDC-Alliance. 
 
1.6 Post-election Violence 
Following the election, protests broke out on the 1st of August in Harare. The 
protesters were demanding the release of the presidential election results. The 
Zimbabwe National Army (ZNA) was deployed into the streets, shooting and 
assaulting the protesters (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2018: 2). Six people 
were shot dead and thirty-five were injured. The majority of Zimbabweans believe that 
Chiwenga, the deputy-president, gave the orders, though the constitution of Zimbabwe 
only allows the president to deploy the army (Sunday Times, 2018). ZANU-PF 
criminalised Chamisa and Biti for claiming victory before the announcement of the final 
results by ZEC. Biti attempted to take refuge in Zambia following threats of prosecution 
(Fabricus, 2018). 
Mnangagwa set up a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the post-election 
violence. The commission was led by former South African President Kgalema 
Motlanthe. It released the report on the December 18. Its findings have been widely 
criticised as general and a waste of resources (Matyszak, 2019: 1). It claims that the 
protests, which became violent and caused extensive destruction to property had been 
impelled, pre-planned, and organised by the MDC-Alliance. However, the report does 
not point out who deployed the military with orders to shoot. The report also contradicts 
itself. It first argues that the deployment was justified and in compliance with the law. 
The commissioners accepted a series of letters from the security chiefs, stating that 
they had followed the public order legislation and obtained the necessary presidential 
authority (Matyszak, 2019: 1). However, it states that POSA was not complied with in 
the way the soldiers were deployed, therefore the deployment was unlawful (Motlanthe 
Report, 2018: 46). The post-election violence was widely condemned by regional and 
international organisations, and became a hindrance to the legitimacy the ruling party 
aimed for.  
Early 2019, violent protests escalated again after the government decided to 
increase fuel prices. The government responded by shutting down the internet and 
social media, and clamping down the protesters. This resulted in the death of twelve 
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people, over seventy-eight injured, and at least 240 tortured (Moore, 2019). More than 
406 were detained and some fled to safer places. The opposition has maintained that 
‘Mugabe the system’ is still present, which some have termed ‘old wine in old bottles.’ 
 
1.7 The MDC Congress 
The intra-party struggles prevalent in the MDC-Alliance can be traced back to the 
ascendancy of Chamisa and the events leading to the party’s national congress. The 
party’s constitution allowed for someone to act as president up to a maximum of twelve 
months. Chamisa took power in February 2018; therefore a congress should have 
been convened before the end of February 2019 (Mabhena, 2018: 1). Chamisa 
avoided or delayed the congress due to lack of sufficient funds and other events 
beyond his control but, an interview with QrC, the former Director-General in the MDC 
(26 June, 2017) revealed that it was only because Chamisa was afraid of losing. Some 
concerns were raised regarding the way he managed the party. The same allegations 
against Tsvangirai are often cited. These include nepotism, violation of the 
constitution, corruption, use of violence, and firing his opponents in the party. An 
example is his firing and imposition of mayors, which has been interpreted as a 
scheme to build his camp (interview with RspU, Politics lecturer at UJ, 13 May, 2017). 
 The two senior members who seemed to challenge Chamisa at the congress 
were the deputy president Elias Mudzuri and the secretary-general Douglas 
Mwonzora, widely said to be too close to ZANU-PF.  The divisions played out in the 
open when Chamisa’s allies Charlton Hwende and Murisi Zwizwai confronted Mudzuri 
for attending a meeting at the state house, where he met Mnangagwa (Daily News, 
2018d). They were of the view that attending a meeting with Mnangagwa at the state 
house was endorsing him and his rigged election. Other opposition officials had 
boycotted the presentation. Mudzuri argued that he was responding to the invite by 
the Senate President as the presiding officer to represent the party in parliament’s 
business (Nehanda Radio, 2018). The party’s youths also called for Mudzuri’s 
expulsion. When he attended the party’s demonstration against the ruling party at 
Africa’s Unity Square in Harare he was booed and accused of being a sell-out. (Pindula 
News, 2018). 
 Mwonzora was also under attack and was increasingly being isolated. In the 
2014 congress he defeated Chamisa, thus he seemed to pose a serious challenge to 
Chamisa in the 2019 congress. Mwonzora and Mudzuri were criticised by Chamisa’s 
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supporters for apologising to the Chief Justice Malaba (Newsday, 2018b). The two 
were accused of approaching Malaba to ask for forgiveness after he was jeered by the 
MDC parliamentarians during the swearing in of the speaker of parliament. There were 
allegations that they could have been associating with the ruling party. This was further 
fuelled after the war-veterans association pushed Mwonzora to challenge Chamisa for 
the president position (Daily News, 2018b). In addition, Chamisa’s supporters have 
accused him of sponsoring lawsuits against the party, issuing press statements 
without the party’s approval and his minimal contribution in the run-up to the elections 
(Daily News, 2018c). 
 In May 2019 the MDC-Alliance held its elective congress in Gweru. The biggest 
casualty was Douglas Mwonzora (Pindula News, 27/03/2019). Mwonzora initially 
wanted to contest for the party’s leadership at the congress but failed to get the 
nominations in the provinces. This left Chamisa uncontested. Mwonzora reverted to 
seeking to retain his position as the secretary general against Chalrton Hwende, a 
close Chamisa ally, and Fortune Mololeke. Hwende won the position. Tendai Biti, 
Welshman Ncube and Lynette Kore were elected as vice-presidents. David Coltart 
was elected the new treasurer and Thabitha Khumalo the chairman, deputised by Job 
Sikhala. It appears that at the time of writing the MDC-Alliance has emerged with a 
unified structure as it incorporated all the leaders of the smaller MDCs, with the 
exception of Khupe, who broke away and maintained the MDC-T name. However, 
questions are still being asked about whether the congress has solidified this party. 
Soon after the congress, the former Secretary-General stated that “the game is not 
yet over, the fight is still on” (Interview with former SG- QrV, 2 June 2019). It appears 
he still has hopes to be the next leader. RspN argued that it is Chamisa as an individual 
who came out of the congress, not an institution (Interview with RspN – an NGO 
official, 3 Dec 2018). He further stated that the unions and NCA are not back in the 
party, thus the party is not yet united as it was at its formation.  
 
1.8 Conclusion 
Despite the new wave of democracy, which swept across Zimbabwe, the country still 
has a mammoth task to achieve democracy and economic growth. The opposition is 
still operating in an authoritarian environment. The regime has not changed the 
chicanery of the election game. The Chamisa led MDC-Alliance, which emerged as 
the strongest opposition party, has not proved to be better than the old MDC. It seems 
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factionalism is rearing its head around leadership style and the research findings 
allude to heavy infiltration of the MDC by ZANU-PF elements. This may lead to another 
split if it is not managed well. The following chapter discusses the theoretical 





































This chapter covers the theoretical framework and historical context for the study. It 
interrogates the literature on factionalism and the nature of political parties in Africa. 
This chapter also sets out the broad conceptual analysis on the nature of opposition 
political parties in Africa and perspectives on the causes of factionalism in post-
colonial Africa. Then the chapter will narrow its focus to the nature of the regime and 
socio-economic crisis in Zimbabwe, which contributed a great deal to the genesis of 
the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in the late 1990s. 
 
2.2 Factionalism and Factions 
The term ‘factionalism’ has many different interpretations, ranging from an 
examination of various power blocs in an organisation to a deep explanation relating 
factions to patronage. Basedau and Kollner (2005: 7) defined it as dissension within a 
group. Rastogi (1967: 17) defined factionalism as competition or antagonism between 
cliques for power and resources. In the context of political parties, the competition 
among different groups concerns access to the helm of the party. They are driven by 
different ideologies or identities and interests. Sartori (2005: 68) identifies ideologies, 
which can be left wing or right wing, as the main aspect causing these groups to form. 
Ideology means ideals that shape interests, motives and principles as well as 
informing party policy positions. Sartori stresses that one factor may be a camouflage 
for another, making it problematic to determine the real variables when studying intra-
party conflicts. The variables are linked contingently. For example, an argument over 
strategy can be a proxy for or lead to a leadership struggle (Carty, 2004: 20). 
Factionalism is ubiquitous and manifests itself in different forms (Heller, 2008: 
304). It is a complex phenomenon, changing over time in response to the shifting 
motivations of the actors involved. Boucek (2009: 469-78) identifies three main types 
of factionalism: cooperative, competitive and degenerative; he argues that the process 
of change may happen in a cycle that contributes to the disintegration of a party. In 
describing cooperative factionalism Boucek states that a factional structure can 
increase the aggregate capacity of parties and can enhance intra-party cooperation 
where centripetal incentives exist. By providing a structure of cooperation between 
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separate intra-party groups, factionalism can diversify party appeals and accelerate 
party integration. Competitive factionalism is the division caused by diverse 
preferences and disagreements or institutional incentives or both. It indicates 
fragmentation and splits. Degenerative factionalism is when incentives and 
malpractices lead to actions that destroy the party and results in splits. This occurs 
when there is a variance of factions that are characterised by self-seeking tendencies 
and operate mainly as channels for the distribution of patronage.  
Boucek’s three aforementioned categorisations of factionalism will delineate the 
nature of factions as they occurred in the case of the MDC. 
Factions are a significant feature of political competition (Belloni and Beller, 
1978: 13). Thus, it is crucial to explain the concept of faction in detail. Most studies 
portray factions as groups within parties. Laswell in the Encyclopaedia of the Social 
Sciences (1931: 49) defined ‘faction’ as a term that is normally used to label any 
constituent group of a bigger entity, which aims at advancing particular policies or 
people. Zariski provided a wider definition. He defined it as “any intra-party clique or 
combination with members who share a sense of common identity and purpose and 
are organised to act jointly as a distinct syndicate within the party - to accomplish their 
goals” (Zariski 1960: 33). However, no group is totally united, as it is always difficult 
for two people to agree on anything. A faction normally arises from power struggles 
and the division it represents is more on ways of application than on principles.  
Factions are dynamic and loosely organised. The leader is normally not very 
visible, but emerges clearly during inter-faction tensions. The faction members are 
usually recruited personally by a leader who has ties with the followers, and followers 
also recruit others. Membership shifts as the interests of the individuals change and 
as the complexion of the particular situation alters (Rastogi, 1967: 17). Thus, factions 
are impermanent and unstable. Factions can exist at all levels - from local to regional. 
They can affect the whole party or can be restricted to the elite. According to James 
Madison the nature of men and liberty makes factions inevitable (Madison, 1787: 2). 
Factions are present in most, if not all political parties, because of personal differences 
and the multiplicity of opinions regarding strategies, party policies, leadership style, 
gender representation, age, and fighting over the spoils inter-alia. However, these 
aspects become a concern once they reach a tipping point, thus becoming “antithetical 
to the achievement of common goals” (Dewan and Squintani, 2015: 3). They can 
weaken the effectiveness and cohesion of political parties. According to Kollner and 
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Basedau (2005: 13) intra-party factionalism leads to distrust on the part of the voters 
and destabilises the party system. It weakens the integrity and moral authority of 
political parties. Factionalism can hinder intra-party debates due to inter-factional 
power wrangles; then decisions will be based on factional affiliation and not on merit. 
Thus, it becomes difficult for a party to enter coalitions and run effective campaigns. 
Essentially, factionalism provides a split-enabling condition, and can ultimately 
disintegrate a party to an irreconcilable degree. 
However, some scholars argue that factionalism may have positive effects on 
parties (Verge and Gomez, 2012: 671, Boucek, 2009: 476). It is conducive for renewal. 
It strengthens internal party practices, enables the party to appeal to a broader 
constituency, moderates party leaders’ responses to issues, contributes to improved 
decision-making, and integrates diverse views into manifestos. Factionalism also 
serves as an ‘early warning system’ to hidden conflicts (Kollner and Basedau, 2005: 
14). Thus, party disintegration can be predicted and resolved. 
 
2.3 Factionalism in Africa 
Factionalism in African society has its roots in the pre-colonial era, when many 
societies were divided deeply into tribes and clans. Though the idea of ‘tribes’ has 
been a contested concept, many scholars acknowledge it (Spear, 2003; Mafeje, 1971). 
Stronger tribes dominated weaker tribes. The colonial powers embraced the 
arrangement for political expediency. They used it to divide and rule the natives. 
According to Mafeje (1971: 253) colonialism brought with it certain ways of 
reconstructing the African reality. It regarded African societies as tribal, which made it 
difficult for those associated with the system to view these societies in any other light. 
During Africa’s struggle for liberation from the colonial rule, factionalism in the 
liberation movements was identified as a major problem (Sithole, 1979). It was largely 
along strategy, education, generation and ethnicity. Many liberation movements that 
won the liberation struggle turned into political parties and governments after 
independence. They continued to reproduce factionalism. Tribal affiliation and 
ethnicity are dominant tools, still being used to a great extent for political mobilisation, 
and many Africans vote along these lines (LeBas, 2011: 11). 
Many political parties in Africa are products of factionalism, splits and power 
wrangles within the former liberation movements. Intra-party scuffles remain in almost 
all parties. The problem is that most of African political parties are not ideology-driven, 
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but personality-driven, combined with patronage (Pitcher, Moran and Johnston, 2009: 
130; Mkandawire, 2015). Based on research and dialogue with political parties in thirty 
African countries Matlosa and Sello (2007) cited personality politics and leadership 
tussles as the major causes of factional fights in Africa. Exclusive power is 
concentrated in the party leader or president. Such leaders create parallel structures 
alongside the party to entrench some loyalists in party positions. It should be noted 
that clientelism is a significant aspect of personal rule (Ekeh, 1975: 92). The leader 
wields authority through rewards that he gives to his clients. It could be in terms of 
terms of office or prebends or what van de Walle calls rent seeking (van de Walle, 
1994: 134; Gyimah Boadi, 2007: 29). Van de Walle argues that political clientelism is 
often prebendal in nature. He further contends that in post-colonial Africa, political 
leaders rely more on prebends than patronage and a prebendalised system is 
inherently unstable. Thus corruption thrives in a system of personal rule because 
resources are illegally mobilised to reward clients. It also becomes critical to retain a 
political position since it is a source and avenue for rent seeking. This has far-reaching 
destabilisation effects in the African political society.  
Other sources of divisions and the factionalism in African political parties – with 
consequences that could extend to state systems in their entirety – include external 
‘anti-regime’ forces with intentions to garner support for their oppositional activities. 
The assumption of this argument is that factionalism in Africa is influenced by the 
choices and perceptions initiated in the international community (Lemarchand, 1987: 
150). Their choices affect the internal functioning of political parties in Africa. Many 
African governments bowed to external pressure and adopted Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), which provided conditional lending (Thomson, 2010: 197). It was 
conditional in that governments receiving assistance and debt relief were to liberalise 
and privatise their economy. The external actors’ developmental goals were highly 
political. In some parties and governments they generated dissent.  
Overall, factions are a result of various factors and thus cannot be explained in 
a uni-causal way or using a singular political theory. Causes of factionalism range from 
ethnic politics, ideological differences, personal clashes, and external influence. As 
Kollner and Basedau (2005) recount, factionalism destabilises political parties, their 
institutionalisation practices, and their legitimacy. Though factionalism is ubiquitous, 
in Africa it has been rampant. It challenges the consolidation of democracy due to the 
multi-ethnic makeup, and political and socio-economic history of the continent. In the 
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next chapters, the thesis interrogates the tendencies leading to the MDC’s factionalism 
and fragmentation along the five axes of ethnicity or ethnic politics, leadership style 
and generational conflict, the ability of the ruling party to ‘divide and rule’ (as well as 
use of violence), the role of civil society organisations, and global and regional actors’ 
influence. 
 
2.4 Nature of Political Parties in Africa  
The nature of political parties is determined by a number of factors; these include the 
socio-economic conditions, the history and constitution of the country, ideology, and 
the number of political parties and the electoral system (Cross and Katz, 2013: 5). Due 
to the fact that political parties exist in differing forms and various political systems, a 
number of scholars define political parties in terms of their common goals, roles and 
functions in the society (Almond, 1956; Easton, 1965). For example, Maliyamkono and 
Kanyangolo (2003: 41) defined a political party as “an organised association of people 
working together to acquire and exercise political power.” Political parties’ foremost 
aim is to get into power and stay in it (Schumpeter, 1961: 279). This goal distinguishes 
political parties from other groups in the society, although the distinction is not clear at 
times. Heywood (2002: 248) puts forward that political parties encourage vibrant 
competition on policy and ideological choices. They are crucial in collating diverse 
interests, recruiting candidates and placing them in government, though this can be 
done in non-liberal as well as liberal ways (IDEA, 2007: 5). Thus, they work as a bridge 
between the society and the government. 
However, there is vast literature on the shortfalls of political parties in emerging 
democracies. Carothers (2006: 4) described the ‘standard lament.’ He exaggerates 
the critics and re-iterates that:  
Political parties are corrupt, self-interested organisations dominated by power-hungry elites 
who pursue their own interests or those of their wealthy backers, and not those of ordinary 
citizens; they do not stand for anything, their policies are vague and insubstantial; they spend 
too much time in meaningless squabbles with one another for political advantage rather than 
addressing real problems; they only become active at election time when they are seeking 
votes; and they are ill-prepared for running the country and do a bad job at it. 
 
These shortcomings have some resonance in African countries. Corruption in Africa 
is hindering political and socio-economic development. Whilst there has been 
appreciable progress in some countries, meaningful participatory democracy is still 
low and human rights are often not respected. Most political parties in Africa receive 
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externally induced solutions and assistance, which contributes to the poor 
representation of the citizens’ interests because donor interests take precedence 
above all and they do not always align with grassroots needs. In addition, political 
parties are largely not a product of social interests but formed by individuals whose 
main interest is access to power. Factionalism also seems to be prevalent in both 
ruling and opposition parties, which often results in splits, coups and sometimes civil 
strife. However, Carothers - a thoughtful missionary who had a lot to do with the 
flowering of African political parties in the post-cold war era, concludes that though 
problematic, political parties are necessary and inevitable in building new democracies 
in the third world. 
 In Africa, political parties operate in a challenging environment for liberal 
perspectives given the multi-ethnic setting and socio-economic disorders of their 
countries (Lindberg, 2007). They emerged in the quest for independence from the 
colonial rule. The colonial regime was based on the brutal use of force and the 
cultivation of an educated elite that was not usually business oriented. (Kaya and Van 
Wyk, 2017: 125). Thus, the history of African countries needs to be put into perspective 
in relation to colonisation (Kagoro, 2003), when the indigenous majority was ruled by 
a foreign minority or newly emerging elites combined with some pliable chiefs inter-
alia (Alexander, 2018). Many of the structures of colonial despotism – including what 
Mamdani refers to as ‘rural’ remain (Mamdani, 1996). Now, state-sponsored terror, 
assassination, arbitrary incarceration and torture are common in post-colonial African 
politics and party competition (Prah, 2003: 3), although the number of fatalities has 
slowly declined over time (Cilliers, 2018: 5). Many regimes have moved towards 
competitive or electoral authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way, 2002: 52). Though formal 
democratic institutions exist, they are widely used to gain power and exercise political 
authority as opposed to openness, transparency and fairness expected from them. 
The rules are violated to a point where the regime fails to meet the minimum standards 
for liberal democracy. More so, some scholars have argued that neo-colonialism has 
also contributed to the many problems present on the African continent (Lange and 
Dawson, 2009). Postcolonial theorists argue that the current crisis emanates from the 
reality of modernity, which created “modern problems for which there are no modern 
solutions” (Escobar, 1995: 5). Therefore, colonial rule and neo-colonialism have a 
significant effect on the political parties in Africa. 
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  Following the third wave of democratisation in Africa in the early 1990s, which 
entailed transitions to democratic tenets, there were hopes that a new era of liberal 
democracy would be ushered in. Unfortunately, immense economic, political and 
social challenges marked Africa at the end of the 1990s. Causes included failed 
structural adjustment programs. These were free market economic policies developed 
by the Bretton Woods institutions and the Western donors as conditions for more loans 
and debt cancellation. They started in the 1980s (although Zimbabwe did not enter the 
structural adjustment phase until the 1990s). Global economic recession, a rise in 
authoritarianism, and looting of public resources also contributed to the many 
challenges that Africa faced since the end of the cold war era (Manning, 2005). Thus 
a number of scholars argue that post-colonial histories of Africa’s new states have 
been marked by disorder, economic disarray and conflict (Van der Walle 2003; 
Bratton, 2014). 
A large body of literature analyses the particular nature of the African state, 
especially its neo-patrimonial or clientelistic nature (Chabal and Daloz 1999, Bayart, 
1993). According to Bratton and Van de Walle (1997: 277) “the distinctive institutional 
hallmark of African regimes is neo-patrimonialism.” The patrons are the public office 
bearers who misuse office by distributing public resources along party lines for loyalty 
and support. The three features exhibited by neo-patrimonialism are the “systematic 
concentration of political power”, which Coleman (1960: 551) termed “personalism” 
(the tendency of political parties grouping in support of strong personal leaders), the 
“award of personal favours”, and the use of state resources for “political legitimation” 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997: 63). Political positions are often based on patron-
client relations. The clients serve at the call of the political ‘grande patron’ (Prah, 2003: 
3). The clients also pay a sort of ‘rent’ for the positions. For example, during Mugabe’s 
last term in office the police had to take bribes from the public in order to pay their 
superiors: the trail went all the way up to Grace Mugabe. However, Mkandawire (2015: 
32) argues that while neo-patrimonialism is descriptive of the social practices of the 
states and individuals that occupy different positions within African societies, the 
concept of neopatrimonialism has little analytical content and no predictive value with 
respect to economic policy and performance. 
Authoritarian leaders who have overstayed their welcome and have established 
autocratic regimes are key hindrances to the development of democracy in Africa. 
Such autocratic regimes do not respond to the demands of the majority. Abrahamsen 
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(2000: 132) terms these “exclusionary democracies” or “fragile democracies.” They 
are also known as “hybrid regimes”, “pseudo-democracies”, “electoral authoritarian 
states”, “transitional democracies”, “illiberal democracies” and so on (Bratton and Van 
de Walle, 1997: 6). LeBas (2003: 5) described hybrid regimes as regimes in which 
authoritarian and democratic traditions seem to mix. This kind of democracy is not only 
limited to ruling parties. Opposition parties seem to assimilate and reproduce some of 
the undemocratic cultures they are attempting to challenge. The next chapters discuss 
this extensively, regarding the case of Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change. 
 
2.6 Opposition Parties in Africa 
Dolo (2006: 2) defined opposition parties as “partisan political institutions that are 
intentionally designed to temper the ruling party’s excesses while still pursuing both 
legislative and presidential offices.” Opposition parties’ role in a democracy is to check 
and balance, with the hope to replace the incumbent party. They are referred to as 
‘governments in waiting’ (Osei-Hwedie, 2001: 57). Thus, opposition parties are central 
to any democracy. LeBas (2003: 2) posits that “a strong opposition may be the most 
effective means of creating checks and accountability in authoritarian regimes and, 
therefore, the most important prerequisite for democratic deepening.” However, in the 
context of Africa, they are super-imposed on a society in which the underpinnings are 
not right, thus their effectiveness is limited. 
 In the early years of post-colonial Africa (1960s to 1980s), most countries 
tended to be one-party states. Opposition parties were banned as they were blamed 
for undermining national cohesion (Gellar, 2002: 45). It is germane to note that the 
United States and the West supported these countries because they feared opposition 
parties would attract Soviet backing. For instance, during the Angolan civil war the US 
favoured Mobutu because he supported the National Liberation Front of Angola 
(FNLA) that was against the Soviet-backed People's Movement for the Liberation of 
Angola (MPLA) (Afoaku, 1997: 69). However, the tendency towards the single party 
system can also be attributed to the liberation movements. A majority of parties that 
took power post-independence were liberation movements. As a result, ‘the party-
state system’ became the standard (Wondsen, 2009: 1625). Authoritarian rule affected 
the development of opposition parties a great deal. The only option the opposition had 




 As mentioned earlier, the end of the Cold-War era, beginning of the 1990s, 
witnessed a return to multi-party systems and other liberalised forms of politics in most 
African countries (Olukoshi, 1998: 11). The continent underwent a radical change, 
which created an environment conducive to internal political reforms. These reforms 
centred on competitive elections, restoration of basic freedoms, dismantling of de-
facto one-party states, and termination of military-led governments. This new 
democratisation wave pushed opposition parties into the limelight. It is also important 
to note that concerted effort from liberal idealists in the West, especially after the 
demise of the USSR and the growth of donors and NGOs in the 1990s that supported 
democracy, and the rise of human rights discourse, especially the first generation 
helped in exerting more pressure on African governments to democratise.  
 Olukoshi (1998: 12) attributes the rise of opposition parties in Africa to the 
market-based structural adjustment programmes. African governments had to adhere 
to these domestically unpopular neo-liberal monetarist ideas as a framework in pursuit 
of economic recovery. Although the World Bank was initially reluctant about requiring 
political reforms, the bi-laterals such as USAID placed emphasis on them and this 
sometimes became part of the conditions of donor support. The programme’s failure 
to reverse economic decline led to widespread opposition and agitation for more 
political reforms. Moreover, multi-partyism did not translate into concrete democratic 
gains (Nkiwane, 1998: 91). It failed to address, in a sustainable way, deeper questions 
of democratic change and consolidation in the continent. 
 Scholars have attempted to examine the character of opposition parties in 
Africa. A striking characteristic is their weakness (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009: 3). 
The weaknesses include low level of institutionalisation, weak organisation, and weak 
relations with the society they are supposed to represent (Van de Walle and Butler, 
1999: 15). Among a plethora of weaknesses of opposition parties in African 
democracies, Mathisen and Svasand (2002: 2) cited fragmentation or factionalism as 
the major one. This factionalism has strengthened the power of the incumbents. 
Howard and Roessler (2006: 49) note that ruling parties intentionally employ a ‘divide 
and rule’ ploy to weaken and split the opposition. Gentili (2005: 11) argues that the 
emergence of many parties with the opening of democratisation demonstrates 
fragmentation, not increased participation. According to Rakner and Van de Walle 
(2009: 3), the growing number of independent candidates contesting for presidential 
and parliamentary seats is a sign of fragmentation. A majority of them were not elected 
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to be candidates or lost in the party’s primary elections. Thus, they leave the party and 
run as candidates with the belief that their chance to negotiate a deal after winning will 
be enhanced. 
 Among a myriad of Africa’s opposition parties’ weaknesses, cult personality has 
also been cited by a number of scholars as a critical factor (Chabal and Daloz, 1999: 
151; Ake, 1996: 70; Lewis, 2018: 17). A majority of the opposition parties are formed 
around individual personalities, and they emerge as a response to internal power 
struggles or contradictions. Wondsen (2009: 1627) reinforced this finding. He argued 
that the downside of multipartyism in Africa is the opening of “political floodgates, 
swamping countries with scores of political parties, mostly narrow ethnic and personal 
power-machines and a lot of power contenders.” Subsequently, these personalised 
opposition parties habitually split when one individual decides to challenge the party 
leader or the founder. 
 Wondsen (2009) discusses other weaknesses of opposition parties in Africa. 
These include ethnicity, weak financial positions, failures to produce alternative policy, 
lack of long history and experience, frequent uncoordinated election boycotts, and 
limited women’s membership. Most of the opposition parties also appear to be active 
during an election only, thus they lack a strong base to vote for them. However, these 
weaknesses are to a great extent shaped by the incumbents’ hostile policies, mostly 
aimed at crumbling the opposition parties. 
 
2.8 Socio-economic Crisis and the Rise of MDC 
The meltdown of the Zimbabwean economy can be traced to the 1990s with the 
introduction of the neo-liberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP). 
The programme entailed cutting government expenditure, liberalising exchange 
controls and removing export and import restrictions (Buka 2016: 1). Ferguson (1995) 
and Sachikonye (1995: 178) criticised the World Bank’s “amoral language of scientific 
capitalism” in African societies. The programme was implemented in a context of 
economic crisis and with no political will from the leaders (Gibbon, 1993). In the context 
of Zimbabwe, it was monopolised by the presidency and the economics ministry, and 
was not well researched by the government (Raftopoulos, 1992).  
The programme resulted in devastating socio-economic effects, which included 
inflation, decline of social service delivery, and downsizing of the civil service and job 
cuts, all leading to high unemployment and increased poverty (Alexander, 2000). The 
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economic downturn caused by the ESAP was worsened by food shortages and the 
rise in prices due to the removal of subsidies. This sparked nationwide food riots and 
strikes. The most affected were the working class. The first mass civil service strike 
was recorded in 1996. More than 235 000 workers protested against poor working 
conditions among other socio-economic problems (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 1997: 
33). The demonstrations also represented a rejection of an authoritarian state, which 
was also drifting towards a one-party state (Sutcliffe, 2012: 13). They were largely led 
by ZCTU, which co-ordinated a large majority of the country's trade unions, the 
National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and other non-governmental organisations 
such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association (ZimRights). The 1990s became “a 
decade of unprecedented industrial and social action” (Bond and Saunders, 2005: 45). 
It is also germane to note that during this period civil society organisations 
mushroomed in the country, which contributed to a stronger pro-democracy force. 
The socio-economic crisis was also exacerbated by the crash of the 
Zimbabwean dollar (ZW$) on 14 November 1997, a day referred to as “the Black 
Friday crash” (The Source, 2017: 2). Under pressure from the war veterans who 
embarked on street protests, strikes and the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU) actions, Mugabe ordered the payment of unbudgeted pay-outs. It sparked the 
next decade’s crisis, which was qualitatively and quantitatively different and 
exponentially more severe. The war veterans were compensated with a package of a 
once-off payment of ZW$50,000, ZW$2000 monthly pensions, and a promise to take 
the land reform process to its ultimate phase - including the War Veterans’ access to 
twenty per cent of acquired land for fighting in the liberation struggle. The package 
also included free health-care and education for the war veterans’ children. The value 
of the nation’s currency fell by 72 percent. The depreciation of the Zimbabwean dollar 
in turn led to a sharp upsurge in inflation. Angered by the war veterans’ demands and 
pay-outs, which worsened the economic downturn, the workers under the guidance of 
ZCTU organised numerous strikes in 1997. The biggest national strike of workers and 
businesses was in December 1997. This was followed by the 1998 food riots that broke 
out in most cities across the country due to inflation. The strikes were also spawned 
by the government’s intention to increase electricity and petrol prices, introduce 2.5 
percent in sales tax and five percent levy on wages (Asuelime and Simura, 2014: 71) 
to fund the war veterans’ pay-outs. The government responded by unleashing its state 
28 
 
agents, they tortured the organisers, including Tsvangirai who was the secretary-
general of the ZCTU. 
In 1998, the government intervened in the costly conflict in DRC. Since the 
intervention cost about USD1 million per day and the money was unbudgeted, 
economic crisis deepened (Cawthra, 2010: 14). The International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) suspended its aid to Zimbabwe. The economic decline was described by the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) as “the worst economic 
crisis of its history” (Mlambo, 2014: 8). The land question also came into play. The 
1998 new donor-funded proposal for land reform did not materialise. Very little 
research was done on it and the government was reluctant to implement it. Some 
argue that the British wanted to control the funds to avoid corruption and others argue 
that the funds did not go through because Mugabe took Kabila’s side in the DRC war. 
Mugabe wanted war veterans’ backing as he was losing support in the party, thus he 
had to meet their demands. This contributed to the grabbing of land by force, especially 
as the MDC entered the scene and ZANU (PF) lost the referendum on a draft 
constitution in February 2000. It was dubbed the third Chimurenga (struggle; 
sometimes called Jambanja, or state-sponsored lawlessness). This intensified the 
existing antagonism between the ZANU-PF led government and the liberal capitalist 
powers. The socio-economic crises were further deepened. 
The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) rose at the cusp of an unstable 
economy. The adverse effects of ESAP, which eroded the welfare of Zimbabweans 
laid a fertile ground for the formation of a broad-based opposition party (Ndlovu, 2004: 
7). The MDC managed to recruit its members from the national strikes that were 
occurring throughout the 1990s. Most of its members were drawn from the labour 
movements, civil society, students, businessmen and the workers (Raftopoulos, 2000: 
257). However, the majority of the top leadership were drawn from the ZCTU and NCA, 
a civic organisation that was formed in 1997 to support the creation of a new 
constitution for Zimbabwe. The NCA was itself a coalition of leading civil society 
organisations in Zimbabwe, so its recruits were from the wider terrain of civil society. 
Tsvangirai was the founding chairperson of the NCA, which was dominated by lawyers 
in the civil society such as the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR) and the 
academia. NCA created structures across the country and the unions were all over the 
country. This made it easy for the new opposition party to operate. Most NCA members 
like David Coltart, Welshman Ncube, and Mike Auret became part of the MDC 
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executive at its formation (The Mirror, 1999). Thus in its early years some called it 
MDC-NCA. It received massive support from the urban dwellers who suffered most 
from the economic meltdown and retrenchments. Many of its strong members also 
came from the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU). The Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU) largely composed of white farmers also joined the opposition 
party, especially after the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). This was a 
wrong move for the white farmers. Their farms were violently grabbed without 
compensation, and their workers were disenfranchised (Rutherford, 2008: 94). The 
ruling party also used it to justify that the MDC was a white-backed party seeking to 
reverse the gains of the revolution.  
ZANU-PF minimises the role of the economic downturn and its 
maladministration in the rise of the MDC. It argues that the MDC was formed as a 
result of external interferences - referring to the West (Alexander and McGregor, 2013: 
755). Moreover, much of MDC’s funding came from the West. One example is its 
sponsorship from the West through the Westminster foundation (Asuelime and 
Simura, 2014: 72), which lends support to ZANU-PF’s view. The relationship between 
ZANU-PF and the West turned sour, which pushed it to introduce the indigenisation 
and land reform policies. To suggest that external actors created the MDC it is 
necessary to show more than merely subsequent donor funding. 
The MDC was officially launched on 11 September 1999 under the leadership 
of Morgan Tsvangirai, who was the ZCTU secretary-general, deputised by Gibson 
Sibanda, the ZCTU deputy secretary and Welshman Ncube as the Secretary-General. 
It was launched at the back of the National Working People’s Convention (NPWC) of 
February 1999, which was led by the ZCTU and NCA (Dansereau, 2001: 406). Among 
other things it resolved to form a labour-led political party and challenge ZANU-PF’s 
human rights abuses and economic policies. In February 2000, the MDC together with 
other civic groups campaigned for the ‘No’ vote to the constitutional referendum, which 
would have given the President and the state more powers, including land acquisition 
without compensation. The government was defeated, which strengthened this new 
opposition party. In the 2000 elections, the MDC garnered almost half of the 
parliamentary seats (57 out of 120), mostly from the urban areas (Alexander, 2000: 
390), despite the ballot rigging, state-orchestrated violence and war veterans’ 
intimidation. This was the first time an opposition party in post-independent Zimbabwe 
achieved this significant number of seats. The rise of the MDC challenged ZANU-PF’s 
30 
 
‘divine’ leadership and marked a potential shift from ‘dominant party system’, such as 
in other southern African countries like South Africa and Botswana (Marongwe and 
Makaye, 2014: 169) to a militarised predatory state. 
 
2.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided the conceptual analysis and theoretical framework of the 
study. It has discussed the nature of ruling and opposition parties in Africa. It narrowed 
down to ESAPs and socio-economic crises in post-colonial Zimbabwe, and how they 
have led to the formation of a more vibrant opposition party. The next chapter looks at 
broad perspectives on ethnicity, leadership style, the role of the ruling party and 
influence of the West and donors in post-colonial Africa. These will be discussed in 
relation to how they could have caused the splits in the MDC. This is done to pave 









Splits in political parties have been caused by a plethora of factors. In contemporary 
Africa they have been prevalent due to the continent’s growing tendency towards 
authoritarianism, and economic challenges. This chapter critically analyses the validity 
and significance of the five factors, which have been widely cited as major causes of 
party factionalism in the MDC and generally. These are: ethnic politics, leadership 
style (including generational conflict), ruling party’s efforts to destabilise the opposition, 
relations with civil society, donors and the West, and the influence of South Africa. The 




Ethnicity is an important phenomenon in African politics. In an attempt to define 
ethnicity most social scientists have adopted two approaches - primordialism or 
essentialism and constructivism or instrumentalism. Primordialism describes ethnic 
groups as ancient kinship groups almost tied by ‘blood and belonging’ (Geertz, 2000; 
Van Evera, 2001; Van den Berghe, 1996; Smith 2000; Ignatieff, 2000), thus ethnicity 
is supposedly inherited (Schmidt, 2016: 10) This paradigm holds that each group has 
particular constitutive features such as language, religion, tradition, physical traits, 
history and culture (Hale, 2004: 460). These hold the group together and instil emotive 
power. Constructivism was coined by Ernst von Glasersfeld in 1917; now it is widely 
used in sociology, education, philosophy and psychology. It is generally described as 
a rational approach to knowledge, in contrast to realism. It emphasizes that knowledge 
is not objectively perceived but subjectively constructed. For constructivists, ethnic 
groups are artificial. They are often socially and politically constructed rather than 
natural, and they can be deconstructed as they can be created (Barth, 1969; 
Anderson, 1991, Mafeje, 1971). In support of constructivism, Chandra (2001: 7), states 
that “ethnic groups are fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic and political 
processes.”  
Most societies in Africa could be considered “multi-ethnic” (Muzondidya and 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2007: 2). By the turn of the 19th century the space now called 
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Zimbabwe was inhabited by what are now termed Shona and Ndebele-speaking 
groups, with varied inter-group relations and linguistic roots (Mazarire, 2013). The 
Shona included a number of sub-ethnic groups: the Zezuru, Karanga, Korekore, Ndau 
and Manyika. The Ndebele under the leadership of Mzilikazi settled in the south-west 
of Zimbabwe in 1840 as a small Zulu clan, which had fled Tshaka in South Africa 
during the Mfecane period. Mzilikazi tried to integrate the Shona groups, Tonga, Sotho 
and Venda through assimilation, conquest and incorporation (Raftopolous and 
Mlambo, 2009: 19). However, colonialism played a role in the construction of ethnic 
and racial identities among Africans by categorising them in geographic and cultural 
terms, reinforcing and polarising ethnic divisions by favouring certain groups against 
others and creating dictionaries that solidified local dialects (Ranger, 1985; Vail, 1989). 
This was part of the colonial state’s divide and rule politics. More so, the emergence 
of mass nationalism, which incorporated external ideologies during the colonial rule 
aided in bringing about new forms of identities and social struggles. Thus, ethnicity in 
African states has long historical roots. 
The map below shows the location of various ethnic groups in Zimbabwe. 
Africans constitute about ninety-nine percent of the total population (ZIMSTAT, 2017: 
19), the majority being the Shona (75 percent) and the Ndebele being at 20 percent. 
The former group includes the Zezuru, who predominate the centre around Harare, 
the Karanga in the South, the Kore-kore in the North, the Ndau and Manyika in the 
East. The Ndebele and Kalanga are in the West, around Bulawayo, in Matebeleland 
provinces. The Tonga are in the North-west, near Lake Kariba. The Venda, Sotho and 
Shangaan are along the Southern border. People of mixed ancestry and whites make 
up about one percent of the population. The table following the map shows the 
















Table 3.1: Distribution of Population by Province, Zimbabwe 
 
Source: ZIMSTAT, 2017 
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The problem with ethnicity in Africa is that politicians use it for political 
expediency. Political networks are based on ethnicity, consequently policy-making is 
reduced to ethnic politics, and politicians tend to support the welfare of their own group 
(Mkandawire, 2015: 569; Elischer, 2008: 176). Many scholars and activists, Sithole 
especially (1979), state that Zimbabwe has experienced politicised ethnicity not only 
during the colonial period but also since the liberation struggle. This contributed to the 
nationalist movements’ multiple layered internecine conflicts (Sithole, 1979). Ethnicity 
played an important role in the struggle for the Zimbabwe African People’s Union’s 
(ZAPU) leadership, which eventually split-up leading to the formation of the Zimbabwe 
African National Union (ZANU) in 1963. Most Shonas left ZAPU and joined ZANU. The 
nationalist parties deployed ethnicity in their efforts to mobilise the masses during the 
liberation struggle and even in the run-up to 1980 elections, (Muzondidya and Ndlovu-
Gatsheni, 2007: 4). ZANU was mainly recruiting from the Shona groups and ZAPU 
from the Ndebele side. Subsequently, ZAPU was dominated by the Ndebele and 
ZANU was dominated by the Shona. This was further evidenced by the results of the 
1980 elections. ZANU won the majority of the seats in the Shona-speaking provinces 
of the country, and ZAPU got all the twenty seats in Matebeleland provinces. 
 During the latter phase of the struggle for independence ZANU-ZAPU animosity 
increased. ZANU’s perceptions were that its military wing, the Zimbabwe African 
National Liberation Army (ZANLA) did the bulk of the fighting during the final seven 
years, while Nkomo’s well-equipped and Russian backed army waited out most of the 
war in Zambia (Martin and Johnson, 1981: 18; CIA, 2011: 1). Thus ZANU suspected 
that ZAPU was preparing for a post-independence struggle. This suspicion was further 
fuelled by Nkomo’s flirtation with South Africa during the immediate pre-independence 
period. This further deteriorated Ndebele-Shona relations and shaped events that 
followed after independence. 
Post-independence (in the mid-1980s), the two revolutionary parties had a 
serious conflict along ethnic lines. However, prior to it gun battles and other incidents 
were recorded. The notable one was at Entumbane in Bulawayo, when a ZANU-PF 
minister told the crowd at a rally that ZAPU had declared itself the enemy of ZANU-
PF. Party supporters and guerrillas clashed for two days, and it was brought to a close 
by the commanders (Alexander, 1998: 154). White soldiers played a big role. 
Suspicion of further conflict increased in both parties. This was followed by another 
violent outbreak at Entumbane, led by ZIPRA troops, which was also stopped by the 
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commanders of both sides. The government then searched for weapons at ZAPU’s 
properties and announced that it had discovered an arms cache. Nkomo and other 
ZAPU ministers were sacked from the government. Relations turned hostile. Two 
important events followed. Six foreign tourists were kidnapped and killed in 
Matebeleland and Mugabe’s residence was attacked. All this was blamed by ZANU-
PF on the dissidents and ZAPU guerrillas. The ruling party then unleashed state-
sponsored violence. It deployed the Korean-trained Fifth Brigade soldiers to 
Matebeleland and some parts of the Midlands province (Doran, 2017: 500). This 
resulted in the massacre of thousands of Ndebele civilians. The conflict ended in 1987 
with a unity accord, with ZANU PF dominating the union.  
 Ethnic politics continues to be a salient issue in the Zimbabwean political 
arena. Presently, the current President Emmerson Mnangagwa has been blamed for 
appointing a majority of the cabinet ministers from his region (Masvingo), who are 
Karanga. In the MDC, when Morgan Tsvangirai was the leader (from 1999 to 2017), it 
seemed as if the party was ethnically fragmented. Many Ndebele thought that 
Tsvangirai was an ethnic chauvinist (Newsday, 2012). Though more factors and 
explanations are put forward by a number of scholars, ethnicity – be it ‘primordial’, 
‘constructed’ or historically deep and manipulated – is one of the most crucial factors 
that led to the major splits in the opposition party. The next two chapters will attempt 
to explain how ethnicity contributed to the splits in the MDC.  
 
3.3 Leadership Style and Generational Conflict 
Some literature on the politics of development has focused on the role of leadership 
in “conceptualising, designing, implementing, and maintaining institutional change” (de 
Ver, 2008: 31). The role of leadership is of great importance in establishing appropriate 
institutions and building states. Burns (1978: 13) defines leadership as a combination 
of “personality, power relations, exercise of influence, and focus of the group 
processes.” Poulin et al (2007: 302) also concur that leadership is about what you are 
(great man theory), what you do, how you act (behavioural theory) and how you work 
with others (situational theory). One leadership style can produce a different dynamic 
than another. Political leadership can take various forms: it can be consultative or 
coercive and authoritarian (van Wyk, 2007: 17). However, good political leadership 
ought not to be exercised in the interest of the leaders, but of the public, and in line 
with democratic tenets. A number of scholars analyse leadership in Africa as 
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characterised by ‘big men’ politics; and leadership deficit as the main cause for 
malgovernance (Bratton and Masunungure, 2011: 1). 
Lack of good leadership contributed much to the MDC crisis. However, this is 
not a problem peculiar to the MDC. A number of political parties, especially in Africa 
are facing the same problem. Political leadership is perceived more as authority (raw 
power) than service or responsibility. Some authors trace the source of leadership 
challenges in Africa to colonialism (Nzau, 2010: 92; Van Wyk, 2007: 3). They argue 
that African leaders (elites) inherited alien structures, which were developed through 
coercion and centralised power. Consequently, a political culture developed based on 
authoritarianism. The major effects of poor leadership in Africa is corruption and 
absence of the rule of law (Moghalu, 2017: 175). Thus the main purpose for political 
competition has become controlling the state and its resources. This has led to the 
creation of the so-called “Big Men” syndrome, which has stalled transition to 
democracy and political development on the continent.  
Another way of looking into ‘personal rule’ is through the Marxist 'Bonapartist' 
lens (Marx, 1852) or what Herbert Marcuse terms ‘plebiscitary dictatorship’ (Kellner 
and Pierce, 2014: 119). When classes are stalemated or a revolution gets derailed 
such as in the case of Napoleon and his successors- a great leader emerges 
(Strohschneider, 2019). The bourgeois dispense with liberal democratic rule in favour 
of the great dictator if they think he will solve their problems with the emerging poor 
and working classes. Thus a dictator emerges. Antonio Gramsci moved ahead with 
this idea and called it ‘Caesarisim’ – and argued that sometimes it could be 
‘progressive’; maybe because he thought a vanguardist Communist Party could do it 
in the ‘east’, where civil society was not developed, as in Russia at the time and in the 
Third World now (Baehr and Richter, 2004). He also asserted that a crisis that led to 
Caesarism could last for a very long time and many ‘morbid symptoms’ would ensue 
during the long interregnum. 
The African political system has been referred to by Mazrui (n.d: 158) as 
patriarchal, that is, a political father figure emerges as an icon of the respected 
patriarch. This has to a great extent resulted in personality cults. Leadership in most 
political parties post-independence revolved around the first president’s personality. 
This has been the case with the MDC. It emerged in the fieldwork research that 
Tsvangirai became more popular than the party and was viewed as the only viable 
person to end Mugabe’s rule. Due to his popular support, he felt bigger than the party. 
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Thus he ended up bypassing the party’s executive committee and consequently 
making some unilateral decisions. As shall be elaborated in the next chapter, 
Tsvangirai centralised power and applied it selectively (The Guardian, 2014). His 
selection of aides and political appointments seemed to be on the basis of personal 
loyalty. This is synonymous with neopatrimonialism (Dorman, 2006: 1090). Most of his 
critics accused him of creating an informal parallel structure dubbed the ‘Kitchen 
Cabinet’, which undermined the elected leadership’s decisions (Raftopolous, 2006: 
10; Compagnon, 2011: 133). 
‘Stayism’ or ‘Handiende syndrome’ (a Shona local expression meaning I will not 
go) is the common term used to describe generational conflict in African political 
society (van Wyk, 2007: 10). Besides the autocratic leadership style, presidents and 
political party leaders have generally been old and have not been willing to retire (see 
table 3.1 and 3.2). Among the top twenty longest serving leaders in the world half are 
African. They are often removed by assassinations and coups (for example, Laurent 
Kabila, Muamar Gadaffi and Robert Mugabe) or natural death in the case of 
Tsvangirai. Some leaders even plan for their wives and children to succeed them. Most 
of them thwart or limit the participation spaces of the younger generation. This has 
curtailed the rise of youthful successors. 
 
Table 3.2 Top Ten Africa’s Longest Serving Current Leaders  
Name Years in Office Age Country 
Paul Biya        45 86 Cameroon 
Teodoro O.N Mbasogo        40 77 Equatorial Guinea 
Dennis Sassou Nguesso        35 75 Republic of the Congo 
Yoweri Museveni        33 75 Uganda 
Idriss Déby        29 67 Chad 
Isaias Afwerki        26 73 Eritrea 
Ismail Omar Guelleh        20 72 Djibouti 







Table 3.3 Previous Records of African Leaders for Years in Power 
Name Years in Power Age they left Country 
Muammar Gaddafi          42      69 Libya 
Omar Bongo          42      73  Gabon 
Jose Eduardo dos Santos          38      75 Angola 
Gnassingbe Eyadema          38      70 Togo 
Robert Mugabe          37      93 Zimbabwe 
Omar al-Bashir          30      75 Sudan 
Hastings Banda          30      96 Malawi 
Mobuto Sese Seko          32      67 DRC 
 
According to the United Nations, the median age in Africa is 19.5 years (the youngest 
population in the world and the majority on the continent), but for leadership the 
median age is 65 (Kiwuwa, 2015: 2; UNDP, 2017: 1). The median age of leaders in 
the top ten developed countries is 52 (Ebatamehi, 2018: 1). In America the citizens’ 
average age is 38.1 percent, in Britain it is 40.5 percent and 47 percent in Germany. 
In Asia, most leaders served two or fewer terms, with exception of monarchies and 
China, which has a president who will stay for as long as the Communist party rules 
and can only be removed by death or stepping down. The age gap between Africa’s 
leaders and their citizens is remarkable. This raises concern about how well the 
leaders can understand the needs of the younger generation. In Zimbabwe, over 
eighty percent of the population was born post-independence (ZIMSTAT, 2017: 5), but 
there are no political leaders younger than thirty-nine (at the time of writing in 2019). 
The youngest political leader is Nelson Chamisa who is forty years old, and by next 
election he will be 45. This leadership age gap is disconnecting the leaders and the 
led. 
Tsvangirai's political opponents – many of whom represented a younger 
generation of political actors – within the new parties consisting of members who were 
once in the MDC have accused him of autocratic leadership and called for his removal 
(LeBas, 2016: 4). In 2014, he was unilaterally suspended by a faction within the party 
– led by younger members – which accused him of creating his own cult, rigging 
internal elections, corruption, ignoring party structures and tampering with the party’s 
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constitution in order to remain in power (Newsday, 2018a; Mail and Guardian, 2018). 
These allegations will be explained further in the findings chapters. 
 
3.4 ZANU-PF’s Influence 
The ZANU-PF party dominated the Zimbabwean political arena since 1980. The 
regime it has created can be best described as a ‘hybrid regime’, which combines 
democratic and autocratic traits but, more of the latter (van Wyk, 2007: 3). Since late 
1990s, the electoral, legislature, and media arenas have been greatly controlled by 
the ruling party. Political repression is also a major characteristic of such a regime. For 
some scholars Zimbabwe has turned to be a ‘securocrat’ or militarised state, whereby 
the army, CIO and police are used to protect the incumbent regime (Mandaza, 2016; 
Tendi, 2016). To date, because of the authoritarian nature of the state, no opposition 
has been allowed to take over national power through elections. The playing field has 
always been skewed in favour of the ruling party. ZANU-PF also has access to state 
resources, which it has used to lure mostly rural voters. Various undemocratic 
methods were used to intimidate the opposition and thus curtail their influence 
(Bratton, 2014: 7). 
Post-independent Zimbabwe experienced serious political violence. It has been 
the means used most often by ZANU-PF to weaken the Zimbabwean opposition 
(Makumbe, 2006; Kriger 2005), though by 2013 techniques had changed but the 
memory of the very violent run-off presidential election in 2008 remained vivid and 
ZANU-PF used it to intimidate. According to Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2004: 5), ZANU-PF 
failed to break with the tradition of guerrilla violence, nationalist authoritarianism and 
colonial oppression. Since independence, ZANU PF treated opposition parties 
atrociously, blocking attempts to share power (Laakso 2003: 130; Raftopoulos 2010: 
716). It undermined any potentially viable opposition party through various ways, such 
as propaganda, limiting opposition media coverage, using court cases to prosecute 
opposition leaders, intimidation and violence (Bratton, 2014: 5). It has created a culture 
of hate and intolerance against any citizen seeking to participate or to replace it. On 
the other hand, this has created a culture of heroism in the opposition such as in the 
case of Tsvangirai and the MDC, which might, perversely, make the populace less 
critical of the opposition than it should; perpetuating a cycle as ZANU PF also benefited 
from its role in bringing independence. 
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Opposition parties before the formation of MDC in 1999, such as the Zimbabwe 
Unity Movement (ZUM), United Parties (UP), ZANU-Ndonga and PF-ZAPU were 
thwarted and branded as dissident parties (Kriger 2005: 37). When Edgar Tekere, a 
founding member and one-time secretary of ZANU criticised Mugabe’s attempt to 
create a one-party state he was fired from the party and his ministerial post in the 
government (Moyo, 2014: 113). He was labelled a traitor and enemy of the state. He 
formed ZUM, which became the most active opposition party in the early 1990s. His 
party experienced violence. Patrick Kombayi, who was the organising secretary of 
ZUM, was shot when he contested against ZANU-PF’s Vice President Simon 
Muzenda in the Gweru urban seat (Vivian, 2006: 4). Elias Kanengoni, a CIO director 
for Gweru was convicted of attempted murder by the courts, but Mugabe immediately 
pardoned him (Newsday, 2013a). Post 1999, the MDC became the target of state-
sponsored violence. In 2000, MDC supporters were attacked by war-veterans and 
ZANU ‘youth brigades’, who also closed off large areas of the countryside to the MDC 
(Levitsky and Way, 2012: 875). To date, ZANU-PF’s brutal response to the MDC 
remains undiminished.  
Another method used by ZANU-PF to curtail the influence of the opposition was 
censorship of the media. The visibility of opposition parties on the state media was 
limited to the bare minimum (Kriger, 2005: 2). The national television and most private 
and public radio stations are controlled by ZANU-PF. The state media is largely viewed 
as ZANU-PF’s mouth-piece. The broadcasted content is heavily censored and 
supports the incumbent regime. The opposition parties have been framed as Western 
puppets seeking to reverse the gains of the liberation struggle. Their squabbles and 
weaknesses have also been magnified. The private media, which reported more 
objective news and critical of the government were under the state’s surveillance 
(Moore, 2011: 57). Due to factionalism, which rocked the ruling party especially in the 
past twenty years, some reporters in the private media houses have been paid by both 
factions, the G-40 and Mnangagwa’s faction (Interview with RspJ, 13 July 2017). Even 
the state papers were distorted further by the factionalism in ZANU-PF. The MDC had 
no money to bribe journalists. Media outlets that criticised the ruling party received 
attacks from the state security (Freedom House, 2016). One example was the 
bombing of the Daily News print house in 2001, allegedly by state agents. Moreover, 
the reporters were arrested for criticising government’s interventions such as 
sponsoring war in DRC and the fast track land reform programme (Vivian, 2006: 3; 
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Freedom House, 2016). One example was Mark Chavanduka, who was arrested and 
tortured for the story on the dead DRC soldiers and rumours of a coup. Independent 
radio stations have been consistently denied broadcasting licenses but these have 
been granted to organisations affiliated to the government. 
Draconian laws have also hindered the development of opposition parties, 
especially the MDC. ZANU-PF government enacted repressive laws such as the 
Public Order and Security act (POSA) and Access to Information Privacy Policy Act 
(AIPPA) (Masunungure, 2009: 27). Under the two acts political rallies could be banned 
and newspapers critical to the government could be closed. Overall, the laws restricted 
citizen participation as they criminalised the activities of opposition parties 
(Raftopoulos, 2006: 29). These pieces of legislation are synonymous to the Law and 
Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) under the Rhodesian regime led by Smith. Their 
operationalisation resulted in the arrest of opposition party members. Besides these 
undemocratic laws, the judiciary itself has been marred by flaws, particularly regarding 
its independence. Thus it proved to be so difficult for the opposition to win court cases 
against the state or ZANU-PF. 
It is against this background that one cannot be astounded about ZANU-PF 
party-state apparutus’ influence in the disintegration of the MDC. There have been 
claims that some splinter parties are creations of the ruling party, supported and 
sponsored by ZANU-PF to give an impression of democratic competition and to 
dismantle the MDC (Raftopoulos, 2006: 24). Ncube’s faction was accused by some 
analysts of collusion with ZANU-PF, leading to the breakaway from Tsvangirai’s camp. 
The two splinters divided the votes, which led to the 2008 election loss. This is 
discussed in detail in the next chapter. The Biti-Mangoma faction was also accused 
by some academics of working with the ruling party to divide the MDC (The 
Zimbabwean, (25/09/17). Almost half of the research respondents indicated that there 
were ZANU-PF elements in the MDC. These allegations are investigated in chapters 
three and four. 
 
3.6 The Role of South Africa 
South African intervention in Zimbabwean politics also had an impact on the MDC. 
South Africa was sceptical about the MDC’s ability to form a stable national 
government and gain the confidence of the security sector (Raftopoulos and 
Alexander, 2006: 27). Mbeki’s government was also concerned about MDC’s link with 
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the West, which it thought would compromise its future role in the region (Raftopoulos, 
2010: 710). It was also concerned about balancing Western ambitions and Pan-
Africanism ideals by not clearly opposing Mugabe’s regime (Freeman, 2005: 156). 
Thus South Africa was blamed by some academics, civic organisations, and the MDC 
for its ‘quiet diplomacy’ towards Zimbabwe, especially under Mbeki’s government, 
between 1998 and 2007 (Landsberg, 2016: 126).  
Moore (2010) interrogates the role played by South African diplomacy in fuelling 
the Zimbabwean crisis within the context of President Thabo Mbeki’s ‘quiet diplomacy,’ 
conceived under the auspices of the National Democratic Revolution theory. He 
discusses Mbeki’s analysis of the Zimbabwean situation in his “How Will Zimbabwe 
Defeat Its Enemies”, circulated to the ANC in 2001. Moore argues that through this 
document Mbeki called for free elections in 2002 and criticised the use of violence but, 
after the elections the violence was never condemned (Moore, 2010: 760). Mbeki also 
criticises ZANU-PF for instigating racial hatred particularly against the minority white 
community and labelling of opposition forces as puppets of imperial forces (Moore, 
2010: 762). However, Mbeki and the ANC saw fit to ignore the paper’s 
recommendations. Moore, therefore, seems to argue that Mbeki had a strong hand in 
deepening the collapse of democracy in Zimbabwe through his diplomacy, because 
he never followed his own advice. 
Between 2007 and 2013 South Africa became highly involved in Zimbabwean 
politics when SADC appointed it to mediate the negotiations among the political 
parties. This was after the 11 March 2007 ‘prayer meeting’ organised by the Christian 
Alliance was brutally disrupted by the police. Leaders of the civic movement and the 
MDC as well as fifty others were beaten and arrested (Raftopoulos and Mlambo, 2009: 
227). The incident once again showed Mugabe’s repressive regime. This event, which 
received world-wide publicity pushed SADC to deal with the crisis in Zimbabwe. The 
aim was to enhance prospects for integration, stability and development of the country 
(Sachikonye, 2009: 8). However, the task was complex given the challenges. Mugabe 
was viewed as a cult hero in SADC and Africa in general (Hamauswa and Chinyere, 
2015: 7). Thus any negotiation presided by a SADC member state would never be 
unbiased toward ZANU PF and it would also be politically incorrect for the negotiator 
to have a provision that would oust Mugabe from power. In addition to this, Mugabe 
and ZANU-PF had the advantage of the strong solidarity among the liberation war 
parties in the SADC region, with ties dating back to the anti-colonial movements. As 
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well, Mbeki’s government did not want to be seen as the regional bully. Mbeki had to 
deal with these factors while also considering implementing the regional body’s 
protocol on democracy, the demands of good governance by the international 
community, and at the same time anti-imperialist messaging (Raftopoulos, 2010: 712). 
Mbeki tried to persuade both sides into an election as soon as possible. The 
two MDCs protested, pointing out that the necessary political reforms laid out after the 
March 2007 events had not been implemented. In 2007, the three political parties 
(ZANU PF, MDC-T and MDC) met in Kariba and came up with what is termed the 
Kariba Draft Constitution, which was referenced in the Global Political Agreement 
(ZESN, 2012: 2). Article six of the agreement established a 19-month constitution-
making process. The constitution was to be completed and implemented before the 
next elections but it was never adopted as the supreme law of the land. Instead, 
Mugabe unilaterally declared the 2008 election date. MDC-T won the first round but, 
with 47.3 percent and had the majority in the parliament. ZANU-PF called for a run-off 
for the presidential election, from which Tsvangirai withdrew five days before the date 
(Masunungure, 2011: 80). The 2008 murders, displacements and tortures still cast a 
shadow over the next elections, and Tsvangirai pulled out. About 200 people were 
murdered, and there were reportedly 5000 torture cases and about 36000 displaced 
(Moore, 2018: 267). This violence lost Mugabe a lot of credibility in SADC and the AU. 
This resumed the mediation and resulted in the signing of the Global Political 
Agreement (GPA) between the three major parties- ZANU-PF, MDC-T and MDC-M -- 
in September 2008 and the formation of the Transitional Inclusive Government (TIG) 
in February 2009 (Masunungure, 2011: 81). However, during the mediation period the 
opposition parties had problems with the partiality of Mbeki and the credibility of SADC 
(Hamauswa and Chinyere, 2015: 9). The majority of MDC officials accused him of 
being biased in favour of ZANU-PF. 
When Mbeki was ousted as president by September 2008, President Motlanthe 
took over for only a short period of about six months. Subsequently, his successor 
Jacob Zuma continued the mediation role focusing on the implementation of the GPA 
provisions. Expectations were high that he was going to adopt a tougher stance 
against Mugabe. However, his approach, was informed by the same key 
considerations that guided his predecessor. SADC is still dominated by ‘brother 
presidents and sister movements’ (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011:3), thus Zuma could not 
exert enough pressure and the opposition struggled to establish links with 
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governments in the region. Moreover, ZANU-PF continued its use of state’s coercive 
forces to limit the implementation of the GPA provisions that could open democratic 
spaces in the country (Raftopoulos, 2010: 14). Prior to the 2013 elections, South 
Africa’s Minister for International Relations and Cooperation Lindiwe Zulu stated in 
Maputo at a SADC meeting that the road map for elections was not ready, and 
indicated that SADC would be ready to support the MDC-T if it pulled out of the election 
(Newsday, 2013b). Mugabe realised that SADC would support the MDC if they chose 
not to run in the election, and he told Zuma to call in the ‘street girl’ or he would leave 
SADC and Zuma did (Moore, 2014a: 109). In the meantime, the MDC leaders and 
members discussed the option of boycotting the election but decided against it 
because some members of parliament were afraid of losing their seats and perks. 
Furthermore, they could not trust SADC. 
Mugabe went on to insist on holding the 31 July 2013 elections without effecting 
the GPA reforms. Zuma did nothing about this partly because Mugabe had threatened 
to pull out of SADC, thus Zuma did not want to be seen as dividing the SADC region 
(Tinhu, 2013: 1). In addition to this, Zuma was facing problems in his country 
concerning the Marikana crisis and the 2014 elections, which were close. Following 
the July 2013 elections, which Mugabe won with 61 percent of the vote and Tsvangirai 
34 percent, South Africa and its partners decided to remove Zimbabwe from their 
agenda (Raftopoulos, 2013: 19). 
It is germane to note that though the MDCs were pushing for the full 
implementation of the GPA they struggled to position themselves in a state that was 
largely shaped by the imperatives of the ruling party’s military-economic elite 
(Raftopoulos, 2010: 716). The execution of the GPA reforms was worsened by the 
increased intra-party tensions that were occurring in both parties. There was also 
growing antagonism between the two MDCs in the inclusive government. The civil 
society and MDC-T viewed Mutambara’s party as undeserving to be in the government 
(Chan and Primorac, 2013: 114). This intolerance in the opposition remains a 
disturbing characteristic in the Zimbabwe political society. 
Mbeki’s relations with the MDC’s leadership also contributed to mistrust 
between the two factions in the party. Tsvangirai felt that Mbeki was closer to the 
Ndebele leaders in the party. In his autobiography he states that Thabo Mbeki was 
“financing the Ncube group to destabilise the MDC”, which contributed to the MDC’s 
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split in 2005 (Tsvangirai, 2011: 357). Wider concerns in regards to the influence of 
South Africa in MDC’s intra-party politics are addressed in the next chapter. 
 
3.5 Civil Society, Donors, and the West 
International actors are always involved in third world politics at the national and local 
levels (Abrahamsen, 1997; 2000: 2). Ndegwa (2001) discusses how external force 
from the West, specifically from the Bretton Woods institutions, shaped democratic 
and economic reforms in Africa. In Zimbabwe, after the failure of the ESAP, and 
pressure from the war veterans, land reform was implemented. It destroyed property 
rights and thus lacked approval internationally. In reaction, the American government 
imposed economic sanctions through the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act (ZDERA). This entailed financial restrictions and travel bans on some 
ZANU-PF officials and companies (Mlambo, 2014: 246). This was to remain in place 
until the Zimbabwe regime improved in upholding basic human rights and governance. 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank suspended cooperation with 
the regime. This has shaped the politics of the ruling party, it resorted to anti-west 
campaigns and oppression of the opposition (Raftopoulos and Phimister, 2004; 
Mlambo, 2014). 
 External actors have also shaped politics in the MDC. Western governments 
indirectly supported the opposition party financially through some NGOs. Informal 
international alliances, advice and donor-funding from institutions such as Freedom 
House, the Westminster Foundation and the International Republican Institute (IRI) 
affected party leadership and strategies (Raftopoulos, 2005: 24). For example, 
Tsvangirai had an affair with an IRI communications expert – Melanie Farris. During 
the 2005 split, a number of observers and donors supported the removal of the 
secretary-general Welshman Ncube, who was leading the anti-Tsvangirai camp, as 
they saw him as a hindrance to strengthening Tsvangirai’s powers (Raftopoulos, 2006: 
24).  
Political support from the West helped the opposition party, but it also hindered 
it. In the run up to the 2008 election, Western nations supported different opposition 
leaders, Tsvangirai and Simba Makoni (Mwanaka, 2015: 98). Makoni was a former 
finance minister in Mugabe’s cabinet and ZANU-PF politburo member. In February 
2008, with the backing of some ZANU-PF big-wigs, who included the late army general 
Solomon Mujuru, Makoni formed an opposition party named New Dawn. The Swedish 
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government supported the New Dawn, and allegedly paid over $25,000 to back 
Makoni’s campaign (Financial Gazette, 2009a). The Swedes thought they were being 
fair but this angered bigger opposition parties. Official results indicated that he 
received 8.3 percent, which could have pushed Tsvangirai to beyond 51 percent, and 
ZANU-PF could have also won if it had got Makoni’s votes and if that electoral outcome 
would not have been tampered with. Some academics argue that Makoni’s move 
convinced a few ZANU-PF members to vote against Mugabe, thus the New Dawn 
probably split the ruling party’s votes (Welz, 2010: 617). ZANU-PF denounced Makoni 
as a pawn of some Western countries with an agenda to split its vote. 
During the inter-party negotiations, the West was also accused of influencing 
MDC’s positions (Hoekman, 2013: 910). The general opinion among Western 
‘democracy promoters’ was that Tsvangirai was reluctant to go into the inclusive 
government and the USA was pushing him against it but, he had already signed the 
GPA in 2008. There are disagreements with regards to the motivations for and the 
extent of the West’s influence on the MDC’s position vis a vis the GNU. The positions 
are either they wanted to propagate democracy from an optimistic point of view or they 
wanted access to change the regime from within. Thus the allegation by some analysts 
has been that the MDC had to adjust its strategies for the power-sharing government 
to suit the expectations and demands of its Western supporters such as the British, 
though also putting SADC and the requirements of the agreement into consideration 
(Hoekman, 2013: 911). Consequently, this increased tensions within the party as 
positions differed. Some were against the whole idea of working with ZANU-PF, whilst 
others were interested but with different conditions. Moreover, in the GNU, Tendai Biti 
was appointed the finance minister. Donors started to support Tendai Biti because he 
appeared to manage the economy well. This contributed to the party’s next split in 
2014. 
It should be noted that Mugabe’s regime demonised the MDC so that it would 
lose both global and national legitimacy. Since the formation of MDC, ZANU-PF 
viewed the opposition party as the brainchild of Western countries with an agenda of 
effecting regime change and reversing the gains of independence (Cameron and 
Dorman, 2009: 4). Tsvangirai also concurred that the visible section of the white 
community’s (mostly commercial farmers) support of the MDC made ZANU-PF able 
to project it as a neo-colonial puppet of the West, fronting white capitalist and colonial 
interests (Tsvangirai, 2011: 257). Tsvangirai refuted this perspective in his memoir. 
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He dismisses it as a ZANU-PF ploy to reduce the MDC’s influence, and argues that 
the MDC was not influenced in any way by the British and white Zimbabweans. 
Although Tsvangirai contested ZANU-PF’s claim, there is evidence that shows the 
involvement of the West and white Zimbabweans. A number of white Zimbabweans 
were members of the MDC, including Roy Bennett who was the party’s treasurer. In 
2008 Tsvangirai took refuge in the Dutch embassy when he was faced with a threat of 
state violence after he withdrew from the presidential election re-run (Masunungure, 
2009: 87). This buttressed ZANU PF’s claims that he had support from the West. 
The advent and growth of ‘civil society’ has also contributed to political and 
economic changes across Africa. A wide literature has analysed the link between civil 
society and opposition politics in African states (Dorman, 2002; Ake, 2000). In the case 
of the MDC, civil society – largely supported by foreign donors – may have contributed 
to its disintegration. However, it would not have survived without the civil society and 
donors in the first place. Civil society in Zimbabwe, especially those in the democracy 
and human rights field, have been strong stakeholders in the MDC since its formation. 
In the 2005 split most civic groups supported Tsvangirai because they felt that the 
senatorial elections were a waste of money and was being used by the ruling party to 
create positions for its members. In particular, the ZCTU and the NCA denounced the 
establishment of the senate (Raftopoulos and Alexander, 2006: 23). With the 2014 
split, civil society shifted positions with the turn of events. In-depth analysis of MDC’s 
relations with civil society is provided in the next chapters. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the five factors that have contributed to the MDC’s 
factionalism, leading to the splits of 2005 to 2018. These include ethnic politics, 
problems within party leadership (including generational conflict), ruling party efforts 
to destabilise the MDC, relations with civil society, donors and the West, and influence 
of South Africa. It examined the literature around these factors and related it to the 
MDC's decline and the diminishing qualities of democracy in Zimbabwe. In the 
following chapters the researcher analyses how each of these factors contributed to 
the splits that the opposition party experienced. The researcher will start with the 2005 
split fronted by Welshman Ncube, then the 2014 split led by the Biti-Mangoma faction, 
who also went on to split. Further discussion will be on other smaller breakaways that 







This chapter presents the major findings of the study. The collated data is examined 
with a view to either repudiate or support the assertions made in the preceding 
chapters. The chapter is structured along the five main objectives of the research: 
leadership style, ethnic politics, ruling party efforts to destabilise the MDC, relations 
with civil society and the influence of external political actors ranging from ‘the west’ 
to South Africa. The MDC encountered two major splits in 2005 and 2014. This chapter 
shall focus on the 2005 split, then the next chapter will focus on the 2014 split. 
 
4.2 Leadership Style  
A number of respondents believed that leadership style and personality were the key 
deficiencies explaining the problems in the MDC. In 2005, after six years of existence, 
the party broke into two rival camps. This was because there were differences over 
whether to participate in the senatorial elections.3 One faction, led by party leader, 
Morgan Tsvangirai, opposed participation in the senate poll. Tsvangirai’s argument 
was that “the electoral management system in Zimbabwe is still a recipe for political 
disasters. The system breeds illegitimate outcomes and provides for a predetermined 
result” (Zimbabwe Independent, 2005d). He branded the re-introduced senate poll a 
waste of resources that could be better spent on other national priorities, writes Shoko 
in the Herald (2005d). The other faction, led by the party secretary-general Welshman 
Ncube, wanted to participate, arguing that a boycott of the poll would further whittle 
down the MDC’s political fortunes. The protagonists called the National Executive 
Council (NEC) to vote on the matter.  
On 12 October 2005 they voted in a secret ballot: 33 voted in favour of 
participation, 31 voted against, and there were two spoilt papers. The majority of the 
                                                          
3On 30 August 2005, the Zimbabwe Parliament voted 103: 29 for the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No 
17) Bill that, among other things reintroduced the Senate, which had been abolished in 1987. ZANU PF prevailed 
using its two-thirds majority. Of the 18 absent MPs, 13 (or 72%) were from the MDC, which immediately 
suggested considerable and worrying delinquency in the party, especially its parliamentary caucus. The 66- 
member senate was to include 50 elected representatives, five from each province, ten traditional leaders and 
six presidential appointees. Some scholars argue that it was a ZANU-PF project to employ Mugabe loyalists who 
had lost previous elections. 
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NEC’s top six voted in favour of participation, (see table 4.1 below). This revealed the 
division in the top leadership. Tsvangirai felt his position threatened, and challenged 
the results.  
 
Table 4.1: How the top six voted: 
President Morgan Tsvangirai No 
Vice President Gibson Sibanda Yes 
National Chairman Isaac Matongo  No 
Secretary-General Welshman Ncube Yes 
Deputy Secretary- General Gift Chimanikire Yes  
Treasurer Fletcher Dulini Ncube Yes 
                                                                                          Source: Author 
  
Tsvangirai overruled the NEC, and declared the party was not going to take part in the 
poll, arguing that the vote was 50-50. Zamchiya, in the Standard (2005b) concurred 
with the party president on this view. He states that the two who spoiled their votes 
were undecided, thus comprehensively indicating apathy towards the Senate polls. 
The decision sparked an outrage among council members. Ncube, and his camp 
ignored Tsvangirai’s ruling, and ordered interested party senate candidates to register 
for the poll. On 24 October, 26 of them registered (People’s Voice, 2005a). Tsvangirai 
issued another ultimatum to withdraw within seven days or risk expulsion, but Ncube 
and company took no heed. They argued that the national council was the supreme 
decision-making body between congresses, and Tsvangirai did not have the authority 
to ignore its verdict. However, Tendai Biti (who was the MDC Harare East Member of 
Parliament then) criticised the Ncube faction, arguing that the council was mandated 
to implement administrative issues and not policy decisions (Herald, 2005c). In 
response, Mr Themba- Nyathi (who was the party spokesperson then) said, “the 
national council was mandated by Article 13 of the constitution to determine 
fundamental issues of the party as had happened on 12 October, when it resolved to 
participate.”  
A number of political and social media analysts accused Tsvangirai of 
dictatorship. Addressing a crowd in Victoria Falls, Tsvangirai was quoted saying “VP, 
SG, and their supporters should know that I hold the keys of the party. As long as I am 
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still the leader they have to do what I want since they are my juniors”, (Financial 
Gazette, 2005d). An independent commentator wrote in the Zimbabwe Independent 
(2005c) that Tsvangirai demonstrated that he has no respect for the principles of 
democracy and the rule of law, principles everybody believed distinguished the MDC 
from ZANU PF. “A leader who shreds his party’s constitution, and runs his party as a 
personal fiefdom cannot be trusted with the awesome instruments of the state. Who 
wants another Mugabe after 25 years?” stated the writer. Tsvangirai’s disregard of the 
outcome cast a bad light on his character and leadership qualities. According to 
Chibango (2017: 6), a leader’s popularity seems to be a major contributor to 
factionalism as he continuously disregards majority decisions and opposing opinions. 
In an in-depth interview with QrF - who left MDC-T in 2014 and formed his own party 
(28 June 2017), he stated that the main cause for the 2005 split was the behaviour of 
Tsvangirai regarding decision-making. “That people sit in a meeting, make a decision 
and then that decision is then varied outside the meeting. That I think might have been 
the underlying reason”, QrF stated. However, he also puts forward that the feeling at 
that point was that Tsvangirai probably was not the right leader given his failure to win 
the elections in 2005. Another informant argued that Tsvangirai camp lost because of 
failure of communication and argumentation, which translates into a failure of 
leadership (Interview with RspU, 13 May 2017). Nevertheless, from my perspective, 
Tsvangirai should not have forced his way if he wanted to keep the party united.  
By failing to participate in the senate elections, some analysts argued that 
Tsvangirai was tacitly contributing to the consolidation of power by ZANU PF in the 
upper house – resulting in uncontested representation. A political analyst, Innocent 
Chofamba proffered in the Daily Mirror (2005d) that the MDC should have totally 
withdrawn from the parliament altogether for it to be free of contradiction. “A policy of 
cherry-picking elections in which to participate hardly makes coherence in principle”, 
he said, adding that it would not be meaningful to attend the Lower House and boycott 
the other when in a bicameral system, the two work together. In an article published 
in the Financial Gazette (2005c) titled ‘Whichever way, it’s political hara-kiri’, the 
commentator argued that the MDC would become irrelevant outside parliament. The 
writer further observed that “only through representation can it make its views known 
and expose the incumbent’s failures, thus making a compelling case for a chance to 
rule.” Those in the pro-senate faction feared yielding ground in areas where ZANU-PF 
had no chance of winning votes. On the other hand, Tsvangirai dubbed the whole 
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confusion as a ZANU-PF project, and those in support of the election as puppets of 
the ruling party Financial Gazette (2005c). Tsvangirai’s decision demonstrated that he 
was making belated attempts to re-assert his presidential authority inside the party. 
Thus, in doing so, he felt compelled to break his party’s constitution. The writer dealt 
further with the infiltration of the ruling party in the MDC, a topic discussed later in this 
chapter. 
Frequent media commentator Takura Zhangazha wrote an incisive piece 
entitled ‘MDC: looking beyond leadership crisis’ (Standard, 2005). He argued that the 
differences on whether the MDC would or would not participate in the senate election 
were symptomatic of a serious departure by the MDC leadership from the party’s 
founding principles. RspS stated in an interview (3 July 2017) that “if you read between 
the lines and text, those who left the main MDC as led by Tsvangirai may have had 
some disdain for his leadership style so the decision to participate in the senate 
election was more an excuse than it would have been a real cause.” RspL who was 
an administrator at the MDC’s headquarters stated in another interview (27 June, 
2017) that “in the end, the faction that was refusing to get into Senate actually got into 
Senate, so you see the change and the flip-flopping was unnecessary.” Some 
members who had voted ‘No’ ended up participating the senate election. Each side 
had its own reasons, which they reckoned valid, but a deep scrutiny would show that 
it was not only about principles: it had turned personal. Tsvangirai argued that the 
senatorial elections were a waste of money, and were not going to help Zimbabwe. 
Tsvangirai’s intentions were not clear. If he wanted Zimbabwe to be pro-development 
in 2005, he should have tried to convince every citizen and not MDC supporters only.  
RspO (a professor) asserted in an interview with the author (15 February, 2017) 
that leadership aspirations were the root cause for the splits. “It was about maintaining 
jobs (positions and employment), which is an important avenue to money”, he stated. 
Thus, according to him, the blame is not only Tsvangirai’s, but all of them had 
individual aspirations. MDC national executive member QrG and the then Director-
General of the MDC – QrC - share the same view. QrG stated that “leadership deficit 
is in each and every organisation, there is nobody who is perfect. The only thing that 
would emerge is how much are you able to minimise the effects of leadership 
inadequacy.” He also adds that “these splits have been contributed to by everyone 
who participated in them, there is no one who is innocent of them. Anybody who would 
accuse somebody of having been the engineer of the splits is a deceitful character 
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who should not be believed by anyone.” QrC also admits that in politics there are 
personal clashes and individual egoism, but goes on to argue that failure to manage 
this at an earlier stage would lead to a very serious national crisis. The former Director-
General further argued that the leadership of the party failed to manage diversity and 
mobilise people towards a singular vision, so that the vision would become higher than 
personal ambition. Chibango (2017: 6) also concurs that factionalism in the MDC 
borders mainly on personal power interests. Thus, the problems were exacerbated by 
personal ambitions and assumed an ethnic complexion, as further explained in this 
chapter. 
 
4.3 Intellectualism vs ‘Ordinary’, Generational Conflict and Ideology 
Intellectualism, which I loosely translate here to those who are highly educated is a 
very important issue in Zimbabwe. It dates back to the pre-independence period. 
Mugabe's first speech as a National Democratic Party (NDP) member emphasised the 
need for educated followers of the NDP to be loyal to the leadership. He declared that 
“it will be necessary for graduates, doctors, lawyers, and all others who join the NDP 
to accept the chosen leaders even if they may not be university men” Mlambo (1971: 
146). Most leaders of liberation movements in southern Africa in the pre-independence 
era were degreed; even after independence academic qualifications were highly 
regarded for a post in the government. Mugabe himself had seven academic degrees. 
Tendi (2010: 14) discusses the involvement of intellectuals in the public sphere and 
politics. He argues that in Zimbabwe they regard themselves as philosopher kings. 
Most critical public intellectuals that have been adopted by the ruling party often use 
history to legitimise the government’s programs or defend violence against citizens. 
In the opposition party, the clash between Tsvangirai and Ncube also seemed 
to be a clash of brains. Ncube and colleagues portrayed Tsvangirai as an incapable 
and poorly educated leader. They would circulate Welshman and Morgan’s curricula 
vitarum for people to compare (The Zimbabwean, 9 Aug 2007). David Coltart (MDC 
Secretary for Legal Affairs) submitted a 125-page document with proposed 
constitutional amendments, and clause 29 of the amendments titled Qualifications for 
the President directed that presidential candidates should be people who hold a 
degree, other than an honorary one, from a recognised university (The Standard, 
2005c). This clause was later deleted by the MDC’s leadership. Tsvangirai only had 
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an honorary degree. He felt that this was designed to side-line him and pave way for 
Welshman Ncube.  
According to RspD (UZ Politics Lecturer), Tsvangirai was not capable of taking 
on someone like Robert Mugabe, and that during the GNU he displayed those 
leadership weaknesses when he was outwitted by the ZANU-PF leader. “Some have 
said because of his modest education he does not have the wherewithal to provide 
effective leadership that would be required in a society like Zimbabwe”, he offered. 
“He was also surrounded by those who have university degrees, mostly in law, so they 
didn’t feel that he was adequate intellectually in terms of strategic thinking to be able 
to lead his party, so educational deficit is something that is mentioned by his critics”, 
he added. Tsvangirai was often dubbed ‘tea boy’ because of his educational 
background, and the use of this phrase was due to the ‘radicals’ in the fifties and early 
sixties criticising the moderates who would go to ‘drink tea’ with the liberals at the 
Capricorn Society meetings: they were the ‘tea boys’. 
Those who opposed him in his party mounted a public campaign disparaging 
him as ‘inept and indecisive’, mimicking ZANU‐PF’s campaign (Herald, 2005a). RspR 
(Director of local NGO in Zimbabwe) also asserts that intellectualism is another issue 
in terms of leadership.  “Morgan needed to develop some level of sophistication like 
Mugabe, just imagine Mugabe is working with Jonathan Moyo who was one of his 
most fervent critics in the post-independence era”, he said. The Director adds, “Some 
people say when Morgan became the Prime Minister, it was the pinnacle of his rise in 
politics.” In an interview with RspT, MDC councillor (15 August, 2017), he argued that 
brain power cannot be lower because the person is not educated, referring to Ian Smith 
who was not the most educated person but could lead the country very well. He states 
that: 
It’s the calibre in you. If you go and wrestle for power from Mugabe you must be intelligent, he 
is not stupid but he is not the most educated person in the world but he is intelligent, he is gifted, 
so you can’t just walk and grab power from him. You need more intelligence, look at Mutambara 
he is very educated and where is he? He ran away. Edgar Tekere was very good in politics in 
terms of revolution, look at Mugabe and leadership of the party look at what he has done, it is 
not there out of oppression. I think it is there because he is very clever, he outwits his opponents 
very well, obviously being the opposition you cannot accept that. 
 
However, QrB (MDC MP) held a different view (interview, 29 June, 2017). He 
postulated that there is a difference between a manager and a leader. “Being a leader 
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is not about being a professor or what, at times some of these leadership things are 
inborn”, he states. He gave an example of Tendai Biti who has got degrees but has no 
grassroots support. QrC also shares this view. He argues that there are people who 
are learned who left the MDC and others who are learned who remained behind like 
Dr Mashakada, and Engineer Mudzuri. “So it was not a chasm between the learned 
and the less educated”, he adds.  
Generational conflict was not a major factor but could have influenced 
ideological differences, according to my interviewees. Sorokin (1947: 192) attributed 
the conflict between “younger and older generations” to the differential response of 
people of different ages to the same events. All of the research participants in my study 
dismissed it as a factor. RspA (Election Resource Centre researcher and MDC 
member) stated in an interview (5 July, 2017) that “in terms of generational gap, the 
MDC is largely young but there is a gap but it’s not big, it’s unlike in ZANU-PF.” QrG 
agrees that when the MDC was formed in 1999, the majority of people were not people 
of huge generational difference, Tsvangirai was 50 and the youngest public official 
was 22.  
A number of the research participants agreed that the splits in the MDC were 
manifestations of the inevitable systematic instability that comes from ideological 
inconsistencies or lack of guiding principles altogether. One of the research 
participants (RspT, 15 August, 2017) noted that “the opposition embarked on a 
mammoth task without a well-defined game plan.” QrG stated that the MDC was built 
out of ideological configurations of different players that is the labour unions, students, 
the middle class, white commercial farmers, and so forth. “So where there is a 
congregation or conglomeration of people of different backgrounds and persuasions 
definitely it’s inevitable that conflict will emerge”, he added. Thus, according to QrG, 
the movement was not one cohesive political unit, but everybody remained in their 
original ideological mind-set of where they came from. In the ruling party, Mugabe 
nurtured these differences, and it resulted in full-blown faction fighting. 
 RspA shared a similar view: he states that the MDC is a conglomeration of a 
lot of different classes and characters, which means different ideologies, or opinions, 
in terms of where they thought the country was supposed to go. “The MDC was united 
by a ‘Mugabe must go’ mantra and once that failed in a way, they then started to 
expose different characters”, he said. RspA also claims that the party was not clear 
about what they meant by ‘social democracy’ and what exactly they stood for. He 
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believes that this was the broad basis of the splits in the party. “One would also argue 
that most parties are formed as a coalition of different stakeholders, thus I do not think 
that was enough for the party to split”, he stated. 
 
4.4 Intra-party Violence  
Violence was also prevalent in the party, especially from October 2004 up to end of 
2005. This also contributed to the split (Raftopoulos, 2013). There was growing 
dissatisfaction with Tsvangirai in the party, thus he feared being removed from office 
prematurely. According to Dr Shonhe who was the MDC’s Director General, Tsvangirai 
was being trumped in debates by Ncube. In The Zimbabwean (2017b), Isaac Matongo 
(National Chairman of the MDC) said that the split was part of a “longstanding agenda 
of taking Tsvangirai out of power.” This desire of some to remove Tsvangirai from 
power and the defeat of Tsvangirai over the issue of participating in the senate election 
is said to have precipitated the use of violence against members of the party who were 
opposed to Tsvangirai. David Coltart’s book dates the start of violence between pro-
Tsvangirai youth and pro-Ncube MDC leaders to late 2001.   
On 19 October 2005, Ncube’s faction wrote a letter denouncing Tsvangirai. In 
the letter, Tsvangirai was accused of sponsoring some youths to engage in violent 
activities against senior national and provincial executive members of the party. He 
was accused of protecting Washington Gaga and Nahum Musekiwa who had been 
found guilty by the national council of master-minding violence (Sunday Mail, 2005). It 
was also alleged in The Standard (2005a) that several senior MDC members were 
stripped naked and sjamboked by the youths at Harvest House (the party’s 
headquarters). In May 2005, Priscilla Misihairabwi-Mushonga (MDC MP) was 
assaulted at Harvest House by youths aligned to Tsvangirai (Daily Mirror, 2005a). 
Mabvuku MDC legislator, Timothy Mabhawu was also assaulted by the party’s youths 
in Highfield, before the start of a rally in October 2005, on accusations that he was part 
of the MDC’S pro-senate faction (The Mirror, 2005). The recourse to violence also 
affected Professor Ncube, Ms Trudy Stevenson, Dr Toendepi Shonhe, Mr Frank 
Chamunorwa and Mr Peter Guhu among others.  
Violence in the opposition party also erupted across the country in the last 
quarter of 2005. In Mutare, Manicaland a violent event was recorded at the party’s 
headquarters. Some senior party officials bused about forty youths (thugs) from the 
capital to Mutare to try to deal with the Mutseyami-led executive for voting in favour of 
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participating in senatorial elections (Manica-Post, 2005a). In Bulawayo at White City 
Stadium, youths from the two factions also fought, resulting in thirteen being arrested 
and several injured (Daily Mirror, 2005e). The Daily Mirror (2005b) also recorded the 
violence that took place in Masvingo, which resulted in five people being arrested. In 
an interview with RspL (27 June, 2017), she revealed that at some point Chamisa 
would buy Two Keys Whiskey for the youths to incite violence. She adds that “the 
violence in the MDC is really sad, and it’s a culture.” The intra-party violence also 
spilled to South Africa, in Johannesburg, at the offices of the opposition party (City 
Press, 2005; People’s Voice, 2005b). Lungile, who was in Ncube’s camp was 
murdered in November 2005 by Tsvangirai supporters. The source said in retaliation, 
Ncube’s supporters abducted two members of the Tsvangirai camp and their 
whereabouts are still not known. This violent in-fighting made a number of people fear 
staying in the party and also made people lose trust in the leader: would he act like 
this if he was to be state president? This also links to the first point around leadership 
deficiency. Tsvangirai lacked conflict resolution capabilities that could have helped in 
soft-landing the fortunes of the MDC. He also refused to allow early incidents of intra-
party violence to be reported to the police and did not act on internal commissions’ 
recommendations – revealing other attributes of leadership. The intra-party violence 
in the MDC played to ZANU-PF’s political advantage. The ruling party used the 
incidents to de-campaign the MDC. 
 
4.5 The Kitchen Cabinet  
Literature has shown that informal institutions disrupt democratic consolidation (Lauth, 
2000: 24). Helmke and Levitsky (2006: 5) classify informal institutions by way of their 
deviance from the formal ones: “socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are 
created, communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels.” These 
authors show that informal institutions have not been eradicated by state building, 
economic development, democratisation and globalisation, as presumed by the 
modernisation theory. Clientelism, corruption, nepotism and threats of violence are still 
present, even in the ‘west’ as well. 
Tsvangirai was accused of subverting the party leadership and constitution by 
creating a parallel structure, which his critics referred to as ‘the kitchen cabinet’. This 
structure is believed to have emerged in 2001, two years after the party was formed. 
These allegations were made by four (those who voted in favour of participation) of 
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the top six members (Raftopoulos, 2006: 15). They used the phrase ‘kitchen cabinet’ 
to refer to a group of unelected officials, who were handpicked by Tsvangirai, and were 
consulted privately. The critics alleged that this parallel structure would reverse major 
decisions arrived at by the party’s national management committee. Ncube in the 
Herald (2005l) alleged that the kitchen cabinet was always present at Tsvangirai’s 
Strathaven residence. “When the cabinet disagreed with our decision, he would then 
inform me by telephone that our earlier decision was not reasonable and could not be 
allowed to stand”, he said. This group was composed of Tsvangirai’s advisors such as 
Elphas Mukonoweshuro, Gandhi Mudzingwa, Ian Makone, Jameson Timba and 
Dennis Muviri among others (The Zimbabwean, 2007). Some of his kitchen cabinet 
members were suspected ZANU-PF agents. The role of this cabinet resulted in lack 
of implementation of party policies. On the other hand, Tsvangirai was well-known for 
consulting the US often, so it was difficult to know whose advice he would take last 
(interview with RspD, 6 July 2017). 
QrF revealed in an interview (28 June, 2007) that he was part of the kitchen 
cabinet. “I was part of the Kitchen Cabinet, not baptized but I would be there when 
some of these decisions were being made or varied. So you know we would disregard 
the elected officials. So that was happening”, he said. “Obviously the way the decisions 
were being made at that point I can fully understand that it would make the official 
office bearers not happy”, he adds. QrC also conceded that the main problem was the 
kitchen cabinet in the party. “There are times, especially when Welshman was still 
there, this cabinet would change decisions made by the committee and implement 
something else”, he said. However, Tsvangirai disagreed saying that these were 




Ethnicity is a salient factor in the Zimbabwean society, especially within political 
parties. It is evident from the composition of the apex of virtually all major political 
parties, they try to accommodate two major ethnic groups, Shona and Ndebele. In an 
in-depth interview (6 July, 2017), RspD asserts that ethnicity is important and that is 
why when the first split occurred in October 2005, the Ncube faction proceeded to look 
for a Shona person who would lead and a Ndebele deputy. The infighting in the MDC 
took an ethnic dimension. The commission of inquiry, set up in 2005 to investigate the 
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disturbances in the party, revealed that senior party officials were fomenting ethnicity 
for their own selfish gains (that is to form divergent groups) (Raftopoulos, 2006: 13). 
The whole of Matebeleland and Midlands (Southwestern regions) and Manicaland 
endorsed Ncube’s position, whilst Mashonaland, which also encompasses Harare and 
Chitungwiza (North-eastern regions), endorsed Tsvangirai’s position (Herald, 2005e). 
Moyo in the Financial Gazette (2005b) said that the party was divided into 
Matebeleland MDC, and the Mashonaland MDC.  
 QrG agreed that ethnic politics has existed in the MDC for some time. “There 
is a lot of tribal hatred, especially between the people of Matebeleland and those in 
the majority Mashonaland region” he stated (11 July, 2017). This was evidenced by 
the ethnic clashes and infighting at the party’s South African branch, and similar fights 
that took place in Zimbabwe. Moreover, during the infighting, the MDC secretariat 
moved out of Harvest House in Harare and relocated to Bulawayo (Sunday News, 
2005). Three of my research participants argued that the split had nothing to do with 
ethnicity or tribalism.  
They argue that it was twisted for political reasons. QrF said, “I think we turned 
it to look like ethnicity, but it wasn’t. In fact, that split of the top six, everyone voted to 
go for the elections including the Shonas, the chairman was actually brought back 
afterwards” (see also table 4.2). He also added that “it was now damage limitation to 
say whatever he is talking about is rubbish, he is a regional fellow and he can’t think 
outside of the region.” In an interview (13 July, 2017), RspJ, argued that of those who 
voted, the people from Matebeleland were not more than the people from 
Mashonaland. Gift Chimanikire (the party’s deputy secretary) was not from 
Matebeleland but he supported participation.  
 
Table 4.2:  MDC Top Six in the National Executive in 2005  
Name Position Ethnic Background Vote 
Morgan Tsvangirai President Karanga (Shona) No 
Gift Sibanda Vice President Ndebele Yes 
Isaac Matongo National Chairman Karanga (Shona) No 
Welshman Ncube Secretary General Ndebele Yes 
Gift Chimanikire Deputy Secretary General Kore-Kore (Shona) Yes 




QrC (26 June, 2017) thought that ethnicity did not play a role, “but people used it to 
explain what they were doing.” RspH concurred that those who were coming from 
Matabeleland, the Ndebele ethnic group were just using the ethnic argument as 
justification for leaving the party. RspT contended that ethnicity can assist our 
understanding if it is put in its place but it is not the main reason why the split occurred. 
RspS asserted that ethnicity may have played a role after the splits. “It was more a 
means to galvanize support by either of the factions, the Zimbabwe popular support 
also involves appealing to your rural home, where you come from, and then in the 
process whether deliberately or not considering ethnicity as a pull factor of support”, 
he said. 
 
4.7 ZANU PF Infiltration 
The ruling party also played a role in destabilising the MDC. Opposition political parties 
have complained about being infiltrated by the ruling party, using the state Central 
Intelligence Organisation (CIO) agencies. They are skilled in systematically gathering 
data useful to the ruling party. According to RspD (6 July, 2017), infiltration is an 
important tactic, or mechanism that ZANU-PF and the state use in order to destabilise 
opposition political formations. He further expressed that infiltration is a technique that 
came about a long time ago but, it was first perfected by Vladimir Lenin in the early 
20th century during and after the Bolshevik revolution. “So infiltration is a way of 
destabilizing your rival organizations, and for Lenin it was mostly trade union 
movements and other opposition political parties”, he added. Thus, according to him 
infiltration is normal in inter-party relations. RspJ asserts that the major issue is also 
to understand the nature of the regime and the history of opposition politics in 
Zimbabwe in terms of these splits in order to understand the differences that the 
opposition is facing (13 July, 2017). He argues that such regimes are called by 
scholars like Levitsky and Way (2002) ‘competitive authoritarian regimes’, in which 
formal democratic institutions exist but are weakened. “So for them to remain in power, 
they also have to infiltrate the opposition to destabilise it”, he said.  
Jonathan Moyo wrote an article in the Zimbabwe Independent (2005a) in which 
he argued that the MDC was infiltrated by state security. This was after he was booted 
out of ZANU-PF after the Tshototsho declaration, which was dubbed a coup plot. 
“ZANU-PF is CIO and the CIO is ZANU-PF”, he wrote. He further states that naturally, 
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in such a scenario, it stands to reason that the CIO will defend and support ZANU-PF 
by infiltrating opposition ranks so as to cause confusion, which will weaken and 
ultimately kill the opposition. In an interview (5 July, 2017), RspA also concurred that 
the split was a CIO project to destroy the MDC. He added that everyone, everywhere 
in Zimbabwe is infiltrated. “There are ZANU-PF informers, government informers, 
youth brigades, and there are CIO’s who actually have proper jobs”, he states. In an 
interview with the Voice of America radio station, the late Professor Makumbe 
acknowledged the struggles in the MDC, but blamed it all on ZANU-PF (Herald, 
2005a). Zhangazha argued that some MDC leaders played squarely into the hands of 
ZANU-PF intelligence by trying to be legalistic or academic as opposed to being 
revolutionary in their conduct (Zimbabwe Independent, 2005e). Tsvangirai and Lucia 
Matibenga (Women’s chairperson), who was replaced by ZANU-PF infiltrator Teresa 
Makone, claimed that the pro-senate faction was colluding with ZANU PF members to 
weaken the opposition party, so that it could reach a unity accord, which would see 
them being rewarded with Cabinet posts (Herald, 2005s). Some thought this was true 
because the attacks the pro-senate faction and the ruling party were making on those 
opposed to participating in the senate election in the local media were without parallel. 
However, one can dispute their claim, because during this time they demonised each 
other.  
The splitting up in the MDC was also fanned by ZANU-PF through the state-
controlled media. Propaganda was spread, capitalising on the division. In the media 
and at rallies, Mugabe continuously lambasted the opposition. He dubbed them 
proxies of the West, non-governmental organisations, and foreign intelligence 
organisations bent to push forward agendas that have nothing to do with the welfare 
of the people (Herald, 2005j). He also blamed the Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA) to have been encouraged by the opposition party. 
Addressing the 64th ordinary session of the Central Committee in Esigodini in 
December 2005, Mugabe said “happily, our people can see the real character of MDC. 
It is not itself. It is somebody else’s thing.” He also added that “within their ranks are 
emerging stories of greed, narrow-mindedness and obsession with power” (Herald, 
2005h). Other ZANU-PF members argued that Tsvangirai should respect his party’s 
constitution, and that he is not presidential material.  
Contrary to the claims that ZANU-PF was behind the problems which disturbed 
the MDC, Ms Trudy Stevenson (the secretary for policy and research) stated that the 
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party had ‘pressed a self-destructive button’ (Manica-Post, 2005b). QrC argued in an 
interview (26 June, 2017) that the opposition has a tendency of explaining away, by 
using infiltration, anything that confuses them. “If they are confronted with a matter, 
which they can’t comprehend or analyse and come up with an answer, they then say 
infiltration” he said. Caesar Zvayi, argued in the state-run newspaper, The Herald 
(2005i), that ZANU-PF was not at Harvest House where Tsvangirai was beaten at 
polls, whose result he refused to accept. RspT stated in an interview that to say the 
opposition party was infiltrated is scapegoating (15 August, 2017). “If you are an 
opposition and you are infiltrated, to me it shows that you are weak and stupid, why 
don’t you also infiltrate the governing party, that will be the ideal thing to do because 
then there will be a strong opposition”, he said. QrG was of the view that to over-credit 
ZANU-PF for some of the internal weaknesses within the organisation will be to 
overstate their capacity and ability to cause confusion because ZANU-PF itself is also 
splitting. “So we cannot also allege the hand of the opposition in the splits that are also 
happening within the ruling ZANU-PF”, he said. RspL also concurred that the ruling 
party’s influence was minimal because there were tangible reasons for the split. 
However, it should be noted that infiltrators make existing issues worsen through many 
means. 
 
4.8 Civil Society and the Donor Factor  
The MDC is a civil society initiative, formed by the leadership of the Zimbabwe 
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), and 
the Zimbabwe National Students Union (ZINASU) among others. RspD (6 July, 2017) 
argued that subsequently, civil society became too embedded in the MDC and vice-
versa, such that more civil society organisations that were operating in the governance 
and human rights arena were linked to the party umbilically. They were not 
autonomous players. They did not play the important watchdog role on both the ruling 
party and opposition MDC. Thus, the party’s challenges were related indirectly and 
directly with such organisations.  
RspO stated that civil society organisations tended to take sides: they 
supported who they felt would win elections (Interview, 15 February 2017). He also 
added that in 2005 civic organisations and donors were behind Tsvangirai: they felt 
Ncube was not credible. It should be noted that some of the democracy civic 
organisations were set up by the ruling party. RspO asserted that in the October 2005 
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split, civil society organisations also split. Some went to the MDC of Welshman Ncube 
such as the Zimbabwe Institute, but the bulk remained with the main MDC. He also 
added that the split also took the regional and ethno-regional fault lines, where some 
organisations in Bulawayo were sympathetic to and supported Ncube’s MDC, while 
the Harare based or Shona based civil society tended to be with the MDC-T. Thus, 
civil society was part of the dynamics of splitting and of the factionalism that was part 
of the political life of the MDC.  
RspR, local NGO Director (14 August, 2017), had a different view. He argued 
that civil society and donors only reacted to the split. RspJ was of the view that the 
major problem was internal rather than external. RspH also agreed that it was an issue 
of insufficient internal democracy and a leadership unwilling and unable to 
accommodate dissenting views. QrG also argued that civil society did not play any 
role in terms of the conflicts that happened in the MDC. “I have got a huge experience, 
I know this party, I am one of the founders and I know of all things that took place 
there, I don’t think it caused the splits, it reacted to the splits”, he said (Interview, 11 
July, 2017). However, in regards to donor funding, one can say it had an influence: 
this can be related to greediness of the MDC leaders and the conditions attached to 
the funding.  
Donor funds were allegedly abused, with influential officials taking advantage 
of the confidentiality demanded by some donors to enrich themselves. Ncube exposed 
Tsvangirai’s financial dealings from his days in the ZCTU to the Ari Ben-Menashe saga 
(Herald, 2005f). It is suspected that Mr Tsvangirai secretly and unbeknown to his 
colleagues flew to Montreal supposedly to collect US$5 million from Ari Ben-Menashe 
(a Canadian-based Israeli political consultant). This was allegedly a set-up by 
Tsvangirai’s political opponents to expose his greediness, leading to allegations that 
he was pocketing all the foreign funding. However, he did not get the money but this 
shows that donor funds contributed to the factional fights in the opposition party. Job 
Sikhala (the party’s MP for St Mary’s - a constituency near the capital Harare – in 
2005) revealed that the infighting was more to do with the control of the party’s 
dwindling foreign sponsorship funds than differences over the senate poll, though he 
retracted the statement after a warning from the party’s leadership (Sunday Mirror, 





4.9 Sikhala’s Revelations  
As the in-fighting gripping the party continued, Job Sikhala (MDC founding member) 
indicated whilst addressing a press conference in his constituency in November 2005 
that the intra-party conflict in the MDC was a result of in-fighting over donor-funds, and 
had nothing to do with senate elections. He said that Nigeria’s President Olusegun 
Obasanjo, and Ghana’s John Kuffour gave US$250 000 each to the MDC for 
unspecified purposes (Daily Mirror, 2005c). He also claimed that the Taiwanese 
government gave the MDC an earlier instalment of US$2 million for the party’s 
activities. Investigations made by the Sunday Mirror (2005) also revealed that a 
significant number of senior officials were aware of the financial donation. They were 
of the opinion that the money was meant to secure Tsvangirai’s spirited resistance to 
the MDC’s participation in the polls. 
Under the Zimbabwean law, political parties are prohibited from receiving 
foreign funding, and Sikhala was pressured by the party leaders to recant, when the 
police launched an investigation to establish the truth. Days after, he retracted his 
statement on Ghana’s television and radio: he argued that he was merely working on 
speculation on what was causing divisions in the MDC (Financial Gazette, 2005b). 
Tsvangirai (without consultation with the disciplinary committee) suspended him on 
October 31 for bringing the name of the party into disrepute, and causing unnecessary 
diplomatic anxiety (Herald, 2005b). The suspension was, however, nullified by the high 
court. The Ncube faction then decided to suspend Tsvangirai for overturning the 
party’s constitution, and going against the national council resolution of October 12 to 
participate in the senate elections. Politics in the party became characterised by 
suspensions, and counter-suspensions. By the end of 2005 the party had split 
irrevocably. RspH claimed (Interview, 26 July, 2017) that every level-headed person 
went with Welshman Ncube, including most of the people in the executive. 
 
4.10 MDC-N and MDC- 99   
Tsvangirai retained the popular brand. To distinguish itself, his bigger faction adopted 
the prefix ‘T’ for Tsvangirai, becoming the Movement for Democratic Change- 
Tsvangirai (MDC-T). Welshman Ncube, Gibson Sibanda, and others proceeded to 
form the Movement for Democratic Change - Ncube (MDC-N), which later became 
MDC-Mutambara and MDC-Ncube again due to leadership changes. Both parties 
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continued to use the party symbol - an open hand, but the Ncube group managed to 
keep the old name through legal challenge.  
Arthur Oliver Guseni Mutambara (who was a student leader in the late 1980s, 
and well-known for being involved with setting the University of Zimbabwe Vice-
Chancellor’s car aflame) was headhunted to be the leader of this splinter group. It is 
claimed that he had helped buy Harvest House. He was elected at the party’s congress 
in February 2006, so the ‘N’ on the party’s name was replaced by ‘M’, (MDC-M). At 
the congress, Mutambara acknowledged that the MDC should not have participated 
in the senate elections (Herald, 2007). This raised questions about how an anti-senate 
leader would lead a pro-senate faction. Most people thought he was a ZANU-PF 
agent. Some would question whose interests he was trying to serve, and whether he 
was an opportunist or elitist.  Mutambara was not known by ordinary Zimbabweans 
although a few remembered him from his student days. Mutambara was Shona while 
most of the pro-senate group members who went on to form the MDC-M were Ndebele 
(see table 4.3). Thus, analysts argue that Mutambara was called in order to sanitise 
the party, which was suspiciously viewed as tribalist (Financial Gazette, 2014a). It was 
a strategic appointment to attract support from both Shona and Ndebele people. 
 
Table 4.3:  MDC-M Top Six in the National Executive in 2006  
Name Position Ethnic Background 
Arthur. G. O Mutambara President Manyika (Shona) 
Gift Sibanda Vice President Ndebele 
Welshman Ncube Secretary General Ndebele 
Priscilla Misihairambwi Deputy Secretary General Ndebele 
Paul Themba Nyathi Director of Elections Ndebele 
Fletcher Dulini Ncube Treasurer General Ndebele 
                                                  Source: Author  
In the run-up to the March 2008 elections Mutambara opted not to run for President. 
His party openly declared its support for Simba Makoni - an independent Presidential 
candidate who defected from ZANU-PF. Mutambara decided to run for the 
parliamentary elections as a Member of Parliament candidate in Zengeza West 
(Chitungwiza). He was defeated by an MDC MP and a ZANU-PF MP, coming in third 
(ZESN, 2008: 88). Tsvangirai failed to reach the 50.1 percent required for a 
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presidential election win, though his party won with a majority in the parliament. 
Tsvangirai secured 47.87 percent of the vote, and Mugabe got 43.24 percent.  Makoni, 
working together with MDC-M got 8. 31 percent, sufficient to deny Tsvangirai an 
outright win. In the parliament, MDC-T won 99 seats, ZANU-PF got 97 seats and MDC-
M secured 10 seats (ZESN, 2008: 3). If the two opposition parties were united, they 
could have possibly won with an outright majority in both the presidential and house 
of assembly elections. The impact of Ncube’s MDC on the political arena was crucial: 
they could be regarded as kingmakers. They made a post‐election pact with ZANU‐
PF in an attempt to gain speakership of the National Assembly. Thus, the split was a 
major setback to opposition politics in Zimbabwe. 
Shortly after MDC-T’s victory in the elections, Mutambara pledged his support 
to Tsvangirai. He teamed up with Mbeki, Tsvangirai and Mugabe to form the 
Government of National Unity (GNU) (The Zimbabwean, 2007). Arthur became the 
Deputy Prime Minister in the GNU. He was surrounded by controversy in the power-
sharing agreement, especially on lending support to ZANU-PF’s positions. In January 
2011, he lost the leadership of the party to Ncube, who was elected unopposed as the 
party’s President after the expiry of the term (Zimbabwe Independent, 2011). 
Therefore, he completed his term in the coalition with no political party under his 
leadership. Mutambara challenged the outcome of the congress in the courts. Though 
he was unsuccessful, this shows another tendency of clinging to power or ‘big men 
politics’, which has destroyed opposition politics in Zimbabwe, and Africa in general 
(Lansford, 2015: 1653).  
Internecine conflict and personal antagonisms persisted in this splinter group. 
When the original MDC split in 2005, Job Sikhala (nicknamed during his student 
politics as Ken Saro Wiwa - a Nigerian activist) went with the Ncube faction, where he 
became the secretary for defence and security (Okome, 2000). In the 2008 elections, 
Sikhala lost to MDC-T’s Marvellous Khumalo in the St Mary’s House of Assembly polls. 
He polled 1183 to Khumalo’s 6508 (The Chronicle, 2009). Sikhala, who had been the 
representative of the constituency since 2000 elections, argued that it was 
Mutambara’s party which was defeated by Tsvangirai’s party, not him. It seems that 
his discontent with the party he had joined was ignited by this electoral loss. In early 
2009, he was expelled together with three House of Assembly members - Martin 
Mpofu (Bulilima East), Abednico Bhebhe (Nkayi West), and Sijabuliso Mguni (Lupane 
East) (Financial Gazette, 2009c) - for indiscipline, and undermining the leadership of 
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the MDC-M. The party wrote to the speaker of the House of Assembly (Lovemore 
Moyo at the time) to eject them from parliament, which was done. This left the MDC-
M with seven elected members, which crippled the party, and consequently reduced 
party funding from the government.  
The MDC from its inception has been characterised by a series of suspensions, 
counter-suspensions and dismissals. Commenting on the dismissal from the party 
Abednico Bhebhe (MDC Organising Secretary before he was fired) stated that “the 
same people who suspended Tsvangirai during the 2005 split are the same people 
who suspended us (Sikhala, Mguni, Mpofu and himself), who shall suspend them?” 
(The Chronicle, 2013). The suspensions have been largely due to poor conflict 
resolution mechanisms, and conflict of interest. The conflict resolution procedure was 
not fully implemented, and did not achieve a positive outcome in most conflicts. 
Sikhala blamed both MDC-M and MDC-T for subscribing to ZANU PF’s school of 
thought, behaving in the same manner as the system they are trying to fight. He also 
claimed that Tsvangirai and Mutambara sold the struggle to liberate people by joining 
Mugabe to form the GNU, in which they were powerless. Thus, the rift was also 
widened by differences of opinion about a coalition with ZANU-PF in the GNU. Sikhala 
went on to write a letter to Thabo Mbeki claiming that the party was pulling out of the 
GNU (Herald, 2009). He then declared himself MDC-M President, though he was 
already fired. He refused to attend the disciplinary committee chaired by Mutambara. 
“How can I attend a hearing on a suspension, which has been orchestrated by an 
individual who is an invited guest to a political party I founded? I can’t dignify a man 
whose knowledge of the MDC is far-fetched”, said Sikhala in a newspaper interview 
(Financial Gazette, 2009b). Thus, one can deduce that the struggle had also been 
concerned with the question of political power, and that some power-hungry who 
joined caused havoc in the party. 
The division of the MDC family did not end with the formation of MDC-M. On 
the 8th of May 2010, Sikhala launched the Movement for Democratic Change-1999 
(MDC-99) at Adelaide Acres in Harare, which drew forty-two people only (The 
Standard, 2010). He accused both parties of deviating from the founding principles of 
the original party, and personalising party symbols. Thus, in Sikhala’s view, MDC-99 
was to return to the ideology and values of the original MDC formed in 1999, of which 
he was a founding member. However, the general populace viewed his party as a 
political gimmick. A political analyst in the People’s Voice (2010) said that “only insane 
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people would take Sikhala and his MDC-99 seriously.” The analyst also added that “as 
you can see he has made himself interim leader of the party he created, without going 
for elections.” The day after launching his party he was arrested for contravening 
Public Order and Security Act (POSA), which requires one to notify the regulating 
authority of a political gathering. Prior to this case, he had been arrested many times 
for crimes like suspected kidnapping, sneaking into the country without proper 
documentation, brawls, insulting the President, and many other things. This is one of 
the reasons why people did not take him seriously, and have dubbed him the clown of 
Zimbabwean politics. MDC-99 itself did not gain much popularity in its three years of 
existence. 
In November 2013, MDC-99 merged with the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA) to become one political party that would operate under the NCA banner (Herald, 
2013). NCA Chairman Professor Lovemore Madhuku had declared the NCA a political 
party after the 31 July 2013 elections. It is important to note that both parties were 
against the constitution drafted during the GNU. This probably united them. In a space 
of ten years, Sikhala had been a member of four political parties. His activities, or 
character has had a negative impact on his political career, and contributed to the 
development of divisions. Presently, he is being charged for treason, following his 
threat to unseat Mnangagwa’s government before the 2023 election. Perhaps he is 
more a ‘condensation’ of the contradictions that are symptomatic of what Mandaza 
called a ‘schizophrenic state’. 
 
4.11 South Africa and the West  
In this section the study explores the influence of external actors, like South Africa and 
Western countries. The research revealed that the MDC developed deep fissures and 
got on a path to a schism way back in 2002 when Tsvangirai lost to Mugabe in the 
presidential elections. Former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa in his quiet 
diplomacy strategy seems to have been involved in a plan to usurp power from 
Tsvangirai and place the party under the leadership of Ncube. Mbeki preferred the 
educated Ncube to be the party’s leader. Ncube entered negotiations with Mbeki, 
portraying Tsvangirai as incompetent, and as an obstacle to the development of the 
opposition party (The Zimbabwean, 2007). The deputy organising secretary of MDC, 
RspI (Interview, 8 July 2017) indicated that Mbeki might have given Ncube and 
company some hope and light to think that they were a bigger party yet they were a 
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very small faction. Mbeki was also believed to be not comfortable with an opposition 
party backed by a trade union to unseat ZANU-PF, as Fredrick Chiluba did to Kenneth 
Kaunda (Mbeki, 2008: 104). He saw this as a threat to the survival of the African 
National Congress (ANC), and its relationship with COSATU, thus he was opposed to 
Tsvangirai.  
There was also a ZANU-PF dimension to what was going on. In early 2003, 
some ZANU-PF stalwarts wanted to replace Tsvangirai, who resisted plans to 
negotiate with ZANU-PF, by Ncube, whom they perceived to be open to talks. 
Welshman was suspected to be working with the CIO since 1999 when MDC was 
formed. There were forays by Emmerson Mnangagwa and Retired General Vitalis 
Zvinavashe using Colonel Lionel Dyck to have a political deal with the ZANU-PF 
faction (Financial Gazette, 2005a). Tsvangirai got involved and agreed but Bennett 
and Coltart persuaded him to revoke his agreement. It is alleged that Ncube connived 
with South Africans and Western governments to side-line Tsvangirai and create a 
coalition with a progressive wing in ZANU-PF, which he deemed would be an 
acceptable regime. Tsvangirai (2011: 46) states that the relationship between Ncube 
and Mbeki strengthened, while between him and Mbeki became unpopular. An MDC 
insider interviewed by Banya (Financial Gazette, 2005a) pointed out that a pattern of 
developments in the party since Tsvangirai’s arrest for treason in 2002 and allegations 
for murder plot against Mugabe showed a clear determination to undermine him and 
make him irrelevant to the political process. Tsvangirai faced execution if convicted. A 
video recording of a meeting of Tsvangirai, Ari Ben Menashe and other officials in 
Montreal was leaked (Taylor and Meldrum, 2002). It suggested that the elimination or 
murder of Mugabe was discussed. George Bizos, who was Tsvangirai’s defence 
lawyer in the murder plot case argued that the Canadian political consultant Ari Ben 
Menashe was paid by ZANU-PF to entrap Tsvangirai (Thornycroft and Gedye, 2004). 
Tsvangirai’s opponents in the MDC expected he would not escape conviction in the 
courts controlled by ZANU-PF. Tsvangirai’s passport was seized for two years. Ncube 
and his group were apparently making some strides to take over the party. They had 
the opportunity to meet the international community, and become the face of the party.  
Some participants argued that behind the power struggles there was a white-
hand. RpsQ (Interview, 13 August 2017) stated that the MDC had support of western 
countries from the very beginning because “basically there was a coincidence of 
interests with the western countries; especially after 2000 they were fed up with 
69 
 
Mugabe.” RpsQ also added that there is a level of propaganda on the part of the 
Zimbabwean state and part of ZANU-PF. The MDC has always been portrayed as a 
Western-backed party. Mugabe’s address to the 43rd Ordinary Session of the ZANU-
PF committee said “the MDC is a counter-revolutionary Trojan horse contrived and 
nurtured by the very inimical forces that enslaved and oppressed our people 
yesterday” (Herald, 2005g). RpsT was of the view that when African people see 
Western hands in their country they are suspicious (Interview, 15 August, 2017). “So 
if somebody tends to abide by the rules of the West that person is weakened”, he 
stated. Commenting on the role of the West, RspQ argued that the West did not really 
play a decisive role in the splits, but recognised the de facto situation after the split 
(Interview, 6 July 2017). He added that:  
The West didn’t like the fact of Tsvangirai unilaterally going against the decision of the 
NEC of participation in senate, which seemed to confirm that Tsvangirai was as 
autocratic and unilateralist and as authoritarian as Mugabe. So the Scandinavians then 
were more sympathetic to Welshman’s breakaway than with Tsvangirai, though later 
on they seemed to again work better with the MDC-T because Welshman’s party did 
not seem to be able to fly very far. 
  
A majority of the research participants argue that South Africa and the West did not 
influence the 2005 split in the MDC. QrC (Interview, 26 June 2017) thought that “if 
someone is beaten in an election in congress, they accuse someone of being 
connected to some foreign powers they can’t deal with.” “What would South Africa 
have in terms of interests in the MDC?” he added. RspP (researcher at an international 
NGO) argued that to say external factors influenced the split is a competition for 
narratives, and it is largely speculative, an elite excuse to justify a decision (Interview, 
5 August 2018). RspS also concurred that there was no direct involvement of foreign 
governments in the split of the MDC. QrF also conceded that blaming Mbeki’s actions 
for the split is far-fetched. “When something goes wrong, people want to deal with the 
symptoms and not the real causes, it was an internal failure, as I said I was part of the 
Kitchen Cabinet, so I know”, he stated. QrG shared the same view. He stated that 
neither South Africa nor the West had any role to play in terms of the MDC’s conflicts, 
adding that “you determine what you do at your own home on the basis of the decisions 
that you make.” Yet the ‘Western Hand’ of funding for many political NGOs, and even 
the MDC, certainly indicates influence in the realm of ideas and practice that go 
beyond the serendipity of confluence. The author agrees with the majority of the 
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research participants that the influence, which South Africa and the Western 
governments had on the developments leading to the split was covert, and not overt. 
 
4.12 Conclusion 
October 12, 2004 was a decisive moment for the MDC. It was a culmination of long 
simmering “struggles within the struggle”, to borrow from Masipula Sithole’s famous 
phrase (Sithole, 1979). It was also a culmination of a seemingly insoluble double crisis 
that the MDC had been facing since 2000: a crisis of relevance and a crisis of 
consistency. The MDC had to retain maximum visibility on a national scale to remain 
relevant on the country’s political terrain. The only national institutions where it could 
do this were national elections and parliament. Therefore, participation in such 
institutions was necessary and compelling. However, participation was going to lend 
legitimacy to the very institutions, and ZANU- PF, that the opposition party was 
attempting to discredit. Failure to resolve this contradiction led to the October 12 
spectacle. Two crucial decisions were made on that day. The first was a collective 
decision by MDC’s NEC to participate in the senatorial elections. It was a cliff-hanger 
decision, but nonetheless a collective decision, and therefore collectively binding on 
everyone including the losers – and the ballot spoilers. This is consistent with the 
doctrine of collective responsibility. The second was MDC leader Morgan Tsvangirai’s 
decision to over-turn the NEC resolution. Hailing back to Ian Smith’s momentous 
claims on Rhodesia’s sovereignty, it would be called a unilateral declaration of non-
participation. It was an emotional decision: furthermore, it was autocratic and 
undemocratic. The decision vitiated the very democratic foundation of the MDC.  
A deeper analysis reveals that both decisions were right and wrong. In support 
of his decision Tsvangirai argued that the senatorial election was a ZANU-PF agenda 
designed to create jobs for its supporters, and that it failed to address the needs of the 
people. The youth and women’s league of the party defended Tsvangirai’s decisions 
stoutly. During that period, the state of governance in Zimbabwe was deplorable. 
There was high HIV/AIDS prevalence, hunger and a shrinking economy. A fair-minded 
person could not fault Tsvangirai’s argument. On the other hand, the MDC national 
council, which was the supreme organ of the party between congresses, resolved that 
the party would contest the senatorial elections. Procedurally, and from the standpoint 
of majoritarian democratic principles, the NEC decision was correct. In the 
researcher’s view, economic opportunism or the iron law of opportunism (ILO) drove 
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the decision. It was not about principles; it was largely about the politics of eating 
(Wrong, 2009). Tsvangirai’s decision was substantively right, but procedurally wrong, 
while the NEC’s decision was substantively wrong but procedurally right.  
Overall, the problem had its roots in the MDC’s constitution, which had too 
many checks and balances. This created two main centres of power: the Secretary 
General’s Office and the President’s Office. The NEC itself was chaired by the 
Secretary General. The issue of whether to contest or not in the senate election 
became the smoke-screen or catalyst: there were already disagreements between 
Morgan Tsvangirai and Welshman Ncube; though, Welshman is known for saying that 
he could never lead a party with hopes for nation-wide victory because he is Ndebele. 
An analysis of the factionalism in the MDC, which in turn resulted in the split, exposed 
the dynamics that were involved. This chapter explored the impact of a number of 
factors that led to the MDC's factionalism: leadership deficits, ethnic politics, ruling 
party efforts to destabilise the MDC, the role of civil society and donors, and the 
influence of South Africa and the West. The arguments by the research participants in 
regards to the 2005 split are almost identical to the 2014 split, as examined in detail in 







5.1 Introduction  
In 2014 the MDC-T split, Tendai Biti, Elton Mangoma and others left the party and 
formed the MDC-Renewal. This chapter examines the causes of the split and the 
motives of those who rebelled. The chapter addresses several themes, from internal 
to external factors. The MDC-Renewal team split again, requiring further examination.  
 
5.2 Electoral Loss  
Factional politics mostly play in the open after an electoral loss. Sartori, (2005: 82) 
analyses the ‘intra-party electoral system’, and argues that this is the invisible aspect 
of intra-party politics. Tsvangirai had been at the helm of the party since its formation, 
and had lost three times to Mugabe and ZANU-PF. There was a growing discontent 
with him in the party, especially after the 2013 electoral loss. According to Magaisa 
(2015: 23), Tsvangirai had overstayed his welcome and consequently weakened the 
party. RspD (Interview, 6 July 2017) concurred that after the 2013 election, the factor 
of overstaying was a major consideration among those who decided to quit and start 
their own political outfit. This factor was triggered by the electoral defeat the party had 
suffered in the 31 July 2013 elections, similar to the 2005 split (International Crisis 
Group, 2014). This theme permeates the research findings.  “Electoral loss was the 
main reason, why wait until an election loss?” stated RspP (Interview, 5 August 2017). 
RspI (Interview, 8 July 2017) noted that “it was as a result of fatigue within the party; 
they had been thoroughly thrashed by ZANU-PF in the aftermath of the glittering hope, 
which had happened in 2008.” RspT’s thoughts go like this:  
I think when one loses elections for the first time people will understand you, the first 
and the second is understandable, the third time people will begin to say perhaps one 
is tired, let someone do it. When you lose the fourth time you will be lucky to still have 
people behind you. Most people will tend to ignore you or join other parties or endorse 
what they didn’t believe in. 
 
One may argue that the issues raised against Tsvangirai could not have been 
possibly raised if the party had performed well. It could have been a genuine call by 
the Biti camp, that Tsvangirai’s leadership style had seriously weakened the party. 
Thus, the electoral defeat was translated to Tsvangirai’s ineffective leadership (Moore, 
2014: 106). He was informed by the technical team of an electoral loss eventuality but 
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was blinded by the big rallies, ambition, intellectuals’ predictions and a sense of divine 
ordination to govern (Zamchiya, 2013: 956). While in the GNU as the Prime Minister, 
Tsvangirai was criticised for playing a subservient role to Mugabe. However, RspI 
(interview, 8 July 2017) arguments reminds us that besides the ministry of finance, 
Tsvangirai’s party had been given relatively minor ministries such as public works, 
housing, and health, and Mugabe kept key ministries such as media, police, military, 
mining and foreign affairs. The prime minister had several roles enshrined in the 
constitution such as chairing the Security Council, which hardly ever met. “Tsvangirai 
came fourth in the power hierarchy, after Mugabe, Mujuru and Nkomo”, he added. 
RspA asserted (interview, 5 July 2017) that besides being side-lined by the ruling party 
in the GNU, the Prime Minister made a lot of mistakes. And he relaxed, starting to be 
part of the rulers. There was a popular frustration with Tsvangirai (The Guardian, 
2014). Even his grassroots supporters criticised him for enjoying the benefits of power 
while not pushing for political reforms. This contributed to his defeat by Mugabe, who 
portrayed himself as a revolutionary and credited himself for the positive achievements 
that were accomplished during the unity government. As Mangoma put it (interview, 
28 June 2017): 
When we were in government the failings of the Prime Minister were open for all to 
see, and so we had the situation of how much care the Prime Minister was putting to 
the party versus government versus pleasure. We would as MDC demand issues to 
be resolved and they were not being resolved. There were disagreements about 
whether we should go for elections or not, and disagreements about choice of 
candidates. To a point where there was so much imposition of candidates so there was 
unhappiness over all these things. People like me were arrested and I felt I was not 
protected. I could not be arrested as many times as I was arrested as a negotiator, and 
as a member of government without the Prime Minister whispering something to me. 
So after losing the 2013 election, there was failure to handle the trauma. 
 
Tsvangirai blamed Biti for forming a parallel structure (Interview with RspS, 3 July 
2017). In the July 2013 elections there were instances where two MDC MPs would be 
fielded in one constituency, as in Dangamvura, Mutare, where the Biti-aligned MP 
Arnold Tsunga competed with Giles Mutsekwa, who was aligned to Tsvangirai (Herald 
2014e; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2013: 20). This caused accusations 
and friction. Others accused Chamisa, who was the MDC’s organising secretary for 
elections (Interview with RspA, and Interview with RspM). Some of the senior 
members of the party felt that Tsvangirai had done too little in terms of managing party 
politics. They also felt he was no longer wielding enough power and authority to lead 
the institution. It was largely a blame game as to who caused the electoral defeats. 
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RspS (interview, 3 July 2017) reasons that the 2014 split was a culmination of unseen 
splits in the MDC when it was in the inclusive government, whereby the power game 
was being played and a fallout on contestations concerning the electoral defeat. 
RspJ (interview, 13 July 2017) was of the view that the party lost the election 
as a collective, and the party actually benefitted from Tsvangirai. “If you look at the 
2008 election, Tsvangirai was more popular than the MDC. He won 118 constituencies 
but the party had 106 parliamentary seats”, he states. He further makes reference to 
the role of Nikuv, an Israeli international company, which was paid to conduct the 
elections, and also blames all of them for failing to see earlier the role of this company. 
“After the election, Biti showed the public bank statements of the money that was sent 
to the company, so if he and his group thought Nikuv influenced the elections, how 
then could they say it was Tsvangirai?” he states. Thus, to RspJ, it was a reflection of 
fissures that had been building for a long-time. 
 
5.3 Leadership Style 
Tsvangirai’s leadership skills were frequently and widely questioned. QrC (interview, 
26 June 2017) for example, stressed that disagreements on matters of principle and 
strategy escalated into hatred, and then groupings would develop because of poor 
leadership. A number of respondents for this study conceded that the leadership 
failures and dictatorial tendencies of Tsvangirai precipitated the 2014 split. This is 
similar to Ncube and group’s criticism of Tsvangirai in the 2005 split. His critics 
accused him of autocratic leadership and were calling for his removal (LeBas, 2016: 
4). RspI in an interview (8 July 2017) argued that the weakness of Morgan to lead and 
renew the leadership led to people losing trust in him. “If you see as a leader whatever 
you are leading is cracking and breaking every other time, you should begin to ask 
yourself some critical questions”, he states. Chan (2010) praised Tsvangirai for his 
bravery, but he also lambasted him for being a weak leader and a weak decision 
maker, someone who takes a decision on the basis of who last advised him. Some 
have said he is not a capable leader to take on someone like Mugabe, and that he 
displayed those leadership weaknesses when he was outwitted by the ZANU-PF 
leader (Interview with RspD, 6 July 2017). The Mangoma and Biti camp mentioned 
that Tsvangirai was too power hungry and too egoistical. Thus, the split was more 
about protesting the leadership qualities of Tsvangirai than about any other factor. 
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Another factor, closely related to the one above was Tsvangirai’s ignorance of 
the party structures and manipulation of the party constitution. This was evidenced by 
a number of cases where candidates for primary elections were imposed by him, 
instead of being elected by party members. Moreover, he was blamed for tampering 
with the party’s constitution by removing the presidential two-term limit in order to 
remain in power (Mudimu, 2017: 2). This demonstrated his dictatorial or autocratic 
tendencies, which led to the argument that he was therefore no different from the 
ZANU-PF leader that he condemned in terms of overstaying in power (Interview with 
RspD, 6 July 2017). Zimbabwean politicians have a history of staying in power beyond 
reasonable terms. In the early years of Zimbabwe’s struggle for independence Joshua 
Nkomo signed as ‘life president’ in a letter to the then British Prime Minister Alec 
Douglas-Home (Moore, 2014: 50). RspM (interview, 27 June 2017) stated that 
“Tsvangirai has also fielded as the party’s candidate for the president’s office in the 
2018 elections, despite his ill-health, so you can see that there is clearly no adherence 
to democracy and there is no democratic leadership at all.” RspA (interview, 5 July 
2017) also supported this point, arguing that it is a challenge when one preaches 
democracy, but does not practice it. RspL (interview, 27 June 2017) posits that “when 
we formed the MDC in 1999, Mugabe had 19 years in power and we were saying he 
has outlived his usefulness, he must go. Tsvangirai is now also 19 years in power, and 
he is unwilling to go.”  
A number of journalists and scholars labelled Tsvangirai the “classical big man” 
of opposition politics (Mudimu, 2017; Chigora, 2015). There is big man syndrome (one 
centre of power); the control of political processes by one person (Interview with RspS, 
3 July 2017). In a focus group discussion, one respondent quizzed that “how do you 
explain that the name of the leader is the name of the party?” RspH (interview, 26 July 
2017) was of the view that the MDC over-invested in Morgan Tsvangirai as the face 
and brand of the MDC, thus creating a strongman. She stated that: 
The same problem that happened with ZANU-PF is what they just repeated. So now 
we have an institution, Morgan Tsvangirai’s institution, which might actually be 
stronger and bigger than the MDC institution, which creates problems because now he 
has a misplaced sense of entitlement and he feels like the party has more to gain from 
him than the other way around. 
 
This cult-like leadership has been blamed for limiting space for the younger 
generation to get to the top and was the main grievance of the Biti camp. Moreover, 
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the allegations on Tsvangirai’s kitchen cabinet never changed. The kitchen cabinet 
protected the interests of Tsvangirai, and consequently rescinded his interests and 
those of the party. 
Those who were at the lead of calling for his removal were the secretary-
general Tendai Biti, deputy national treasurer Elton Mangoma, vice-president Elias 
Mudzuri, treasurer Roy Bennett, and other younger members such as Solomon 
Madzore and Promise Mkwananzi. The group was led by the secretary-general Tendai 
Biti (New Zimbabwe, 2014). The office of the secretary-general was also instrumental 
in the split in 2005. This office was vested with more powers than any other post in the 
party and was incessantly occupied by experienced lawyers, thus it continued to be 
powerful. As the new Minister of Finance, Tendai Biti was viewed as being radical, 
more aggressive, and more well-regarded than Morgan Tsvangirai in the GNU 
(Interview with RspM, 27 June 2017). The power matrix within the MDC had changed 
with the GNU, with Biti becoming more powerful in his finance post, gaining a lot of 
ground in terms of control and influence in the MDC (Interview with RspI, 8 July 2017). 
The office of the secretary-general was then identified as a source of conflict.  
The party’s constitution was changed to bowdlerise its powers and make the office of 
the President more powerful. Tsvangirai was empowered to appoint members of the 
standing committees in addition to the elected officials (Daily News, 2016). This was 
done to avoid further disintegration, but it triggered sharp differences. A section of the 
party felt that centralising power in Tsvangirai like Mugabe’s power in ZANU-PF was 
a deviation from the democratic ethos, which the party purports to represent. 
 
5.4 Mangoma’s Letter 
Mangoma, who fronted the split, wrote a letter to Tsvangirai soon after the 2014 
elections advising him to step down and allow another person to take over (see 
Appendix A). He stated the reasons why Tsvangirai should step down, including that 
of his social life. Mangoma also proffered that Tsvangirai can become a father figure 
or founding president of the party and a trust for him would be established to protect 
his legacy. Mangoma felt that a new leader would re-energize the party. “So I strongly 
felt that there was need for a new narrative and a change of direction. And I implored 
him to hold a leadership election so that we could change direction”, he stated. 
Mangoma also added that “I felt it was my duty as a loyal cadre to be very open with 
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him, not to sing praises. He wanted someone more of a lapdog but I’ve never been 
anyone’s lapdog.” 
 Tsvangirai then arranged a meeting on the 15th of February 2014 at Harvest 
house, with the agenda to expel Mangoma and group. Prior to the meeting, many 
threats had been made. Mangoma attended the meeting and was beaten up, together 
with other members, who criticised Tsvangirai. “We knew he had militia”, Mangoma 
stated. “I was saved by his bodyguards because of the relationship I suppose we had, 
otherwise I would have died, but I still said after beating me up I am not going”, “So he 
then called for another meeting to chuck me out, this time it was basically ‘you are 
suspended, just go documentation will follow’”, he added. (The culture of violence in 
the MDC-T will be discussed in the next sections of this chapter). In the meantime, 
other people throughout the country were being dismissed, suspended and expelled 
from the party. When Mangoma was finally expelled, he grouped with other members 
who had been suspended, such as Jacob Mafume, Last Mayingahama and Promise 
Mkwananzi to form the MDC-Renewal party. Tendai Biti remained in the MDC-T, but 
was also later expelled along with Solomon Madzore, and joined the MDC-Renewal. 
This is discussed in more detail at the end of this chapter. 
 Commenting on Mangoma’s letter, Ruhanya RspJ argued that Tsvangirai was 
not elected through a letter, but through a congress, thus he could not step down 
through a letter. Theoretically RspJ’s assertion is not wrong however, in practice one 
can resign from political office in any fashion. RspJ thinks that Mangoma and group 
should have followed the due processes of the party through council vote or any 
structure with authority. RspJ concludes that the split was a matter of immaturity and 
lack of procedural ways to address the issues they faced. Thus, a number of the 
respondents were of the view that Mangoma also wanted power, which then calls into 
question the status of his account. RspA (interview, 5 July 2017) stated that the initial 
assumption was that he was speaking for Biti, but when people saw the letter they 
realised that he was speaking for himself and he also wanted the baton. RspM 
(interview, 27 June 2017) also argues that “when you begin to lose confidence, and 
think of when your turn will come, you can probably start to say the route we are taking 
is wrong.”  
However, some respondents thought that it was a noble and fair letter. RspI 
indicated in an interview (8 July 2017) that Mangoma expressed his grievances in 
earnest, in the hope that there would be renewal of party leadership, but the letter was 
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not taken lightly by Tsvangirai and his supporters. RspL thought that leadership 
renewal was a genuine call, but goes on to lambast the Mangoma faction for willing to 
bend the constitution by creating a post of a founding President, which was going to 
be enshrined in the constitution (interview, 27 June 2017). The researcher also thinks 
that it was not democratic to twist the constitution to accommodate one person, though 
they thought it was a way to preserve the struggle for democracy in Zimbabwe by 
protecting the person who had been the President in the most trying times. 
 
5.5 Violence 
As discussed in the previous chapter, violence in the Zimbabwean political culture 
dates back to the pre-colonial era. Masipula Sithole (1979) and other scholars 
document this practice during the liberation struggle. The post-independence era also 
witnessed extensive violence between ZANU-PF and ZAPU. Opposition parties, which 
emerged in the 1990s, that is ZUM and MDC, also experienced violence from the 
ruling party. However, besides the inter-party violence, the MDC also witnessed intra-
party violence. According to a number of respondents, violence in the MDC is a culture 
(Interviews with RspL, RspA, and Qrc). The 2014 MDC-T fall-out was characterised 
by widespread violence. Tsvangirai’s faction was always blamed for resorting to 
violence every time there was a difference. The Biti faction complained about 
suppression of free speech, selective application of rules and Tsvangirai’s ‘fascist’ 
clique - the Kitchen cabinet and other informal channels (Zulu, 2014:1). The group 
also criticised the use of the ‘Order of the Vanguard’ (violent youths believed by many 
to be led by Chamisa), similar to the ZANU-PF Green Bombers and Chipangano youth 
terror groups. This militia has been known for attacking anyone who does not agree 
with the party’s ‘popular’ sentiment.  
Those who suggested the need for leadership renewal received hefty criticism, 
were labelled ZANU-PF agents, and in some cases assaulted. Elton Mangoma was 
attacked at Harvest House by some MDC youth, saying he wanted to challenge 
Morgan Tsvangirai’s leadership (Sunday Mail, 2014). The current Youth assembly 
secretary-general Promise Mkwananzi and Solomon Madzore were also assaulted. 
Biti, who was believed to be behind the faction, escaped, but his house was petrol 
bombed two weeks after. According to the news reports, it was an inside job (Herald, 
2014e; Newsday, 2014a). Biti, in an interview with Tichaona Zindoga, criticised the 
recourse to violence and personalisation of the party (Herald, 2014b). “We cannot 
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create a movement to fight for democracy when we cannot apply to it ourselves, we 
should be tested by the same standards and we should pass the test”, he said. In a 
democratic institution, people should express their views and reach a consensus 
(Interview with RspI, 8 July 2017). RspL (interview, 27 June), who worked at the MDC 
headquarters for about six years, narrated how prevalent violence was in the party. 
In both 2005 and 2014 they left the people with no choice but to dissociate and I have 
met so many people that have lasting scars, some were stabbed with knives. Every 
morning you would go to work and meet a different terror group, sometimes they will 
say this one should not get in, she works for a faction. Imagine that you are afraid of 
ZANU-PF, and also the people in your party. 
 
She believes that the opposition party assimilated to the ruling party. “They have been 
staring the enemy in the face for too long; they are now replicating the actions of the 
enemy”, she said. The call for leadership renewal was apparent to everyone, though 
it was packaged by Tsvangirai’s camp as an attempted coup, which resulted in 
violence. Mangoma (interview, 28 June 2017) concluded that “the road Smith 
travelled, is the road Mugabe travelled, is the road Tsvangirai travelled.” Overall, the 
split could have probably been avoided if they had not resorted to savagery. 
 
5.6 Tsvangirai’s Private Escapades 
Tsvangirai’s opponents (in the MDC and ZANU-PF) went further to attack his personal 
life in a way to undermine his leadership and character. He failed to manage his 
personal affairs judiciously during the GNU, and especially after the death of his wife 
Susan in a car crush in 2009 (Moore, 2014: 105). It was alleged and not denied that 
he impregnated a 21 year old Loreta Nyathi, who had a baby boy in November 2010 
and was receiving US$1400 in maintenance (Sunday Independent, 2012). In April 
2012, he became engaged to Locadia Karimatsenga Tembo, a sister of a ZANU-PF 
MP Beatrice Nyamupinga, and a relative to the Mujuru family. This relationship made 
people think that the party had been infiltrated by ZANU-PF agents (The Zimbabwean, 
2012). He paid R360 000 bride price to Locadia (City Press, 2014). RspI stated that 
“Tsvangirai paid a lot of settling fees for his scandals, and it is reported that he paid 
over R300 000 to Locadia, who is now a prophetess or seer, where honestly would he 
have gotten that money?” (Interview, 8 July 2017). Others thought these were party 
funds that he was abusing to solve his personal issues; therefore they wanted 
transparency on these issues. 
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In September 2012, Tsvangirai married Elizabeth Macheka, who had two 
daughters from her former marriages. Elizabeth was a daughter of a ZANU-PF senior 
official (a politburo member and Mayor of Chitungwiza). This also raised security 
concerns, and some thought the women in his life were being sent by ZANU-PF. One 
of the respondents stated that “I don’t know why Tsvangirai would date ladies related 
to ZANU-PF, we had a lot of intelligent and beautiful women in the MDC” (Interview 
with RspL, 27 June 2017). Mangoma also concurred in an interview that there was 
some unhappiness about Tsvangirai dating the ZANU-PF women. “He tarnished the 
brand of the party after revelations of his extra-marital affairs”, he said. 
Prior to his wedding with Elizabeth, the local media was awash with headlines 
featuring Tsvangirai’s love life. Nosipho Regina Shibane, a South African woman, also 
claimed that she was engaged to Tsvangirai in 2010. Locadia also approached the 
courts to challenge Tsvangirai’s marriage to Elizabeth. She claimed that Tsvangirai 
had married her five months earlier in a traditional ceremony, and she demanded 
US$15 000 for maintenance, though the marriage had only lasted for twelve days 
(Daily Mail, 2011). Tsvangirai argued that he had only paid for damages for 
impregnating her, though she had miscarried the pregnancy. In the end, Morgan and 
Elizabeth won the case. After a year they separated, but reconciled in early 2014. 
Tsvangirai later released a written statement apologising to the public for his 
escapades, which confirmed his admission to the accusations and did not correct the 
damage he had done to the party and his character. His public life led Jonathan Moyo 
to write, “Tsvangirai approaches every issue with a shut mind and every woman with 
an open zip” (City Press, 2014).  In an article titled ‘Morgan Tsvangirai’s messy love 
life is a gift to his enemies’, Petinah Gappah (2012: 1) posits that Mugabe and his wife 
Grace started their relationship whilst they were both married, and some ministers 
have affairs too. However, Tsvangirai’s affairs were too open, multiple, concurrent, 
and also raised security concerns because the partners were not vetted, which 
demonstrated poor judgment. He exposed himself to a point where ZANU-PF and 
other stakeholders felt that he was someone who could not be entrusted with power. 
ZANU-PF used the incidents for political expediency. Southall (2013: 6) states that 
“Tsvangirai rendered himself particularly vulnerable to ZANU-PF by his sexual 
peccadilloes, exciting public ridicule and allowing Mugabe to present himself as an 
icon of marital faithfulness and stability.” The ruling party portrayed his mistakes as 
the total sum of his character. 
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5.7 Ouster of Biti 
After the expulsion of the Mangoma faction, divisions in the MDC-T top leadership 
continued concerning Tsvangirai’s succession. Those who were competing were Biti, 
Chamisa, Khupe and Mudzuri. Chamisa, who was the organising secretary, and Biti 
who was the secretary-general, had a fierce fight for the party’s top position (Newsday, 
2013c). Chamisa wanted to replace Biti as the Secretary-General and alternatively 
become the president, thus Biti was a stumbling block to his aspiration. QrC (interview, 
26 June 2017) claimed that the plan was to remove Biti from the party so that Chamisa 
becomes the Secretary-General, and then he would take over the party. According to 
RpsL (interview, 27 June 2017) Tsvangirai’s group thought Biti as the Secretary 
General was gaining more power than Tsvangirai, so they started to chase everyone 
around Biti. They wanted to leave him isolated, without much influence, but still in the 
party. She also stated that:  
The way Joyce Mujuru was ousted is exactly how we were excluded, they actually got 
the template from the MDC. They first started giving votes of no confidence to all the 
provincial chairpersons believed to be aligned to her. People that were allegedly 
aligned to the Tendai Biti faction in various provinces were given votes of no 
confidence, like Sengezo Tshabane from Mash North, Julius Magandongoma from 
Manicaland, Washy Sibanda from Mash South, Stemere in Masvingo and Shonhe who 
was believed to be the controller of the faction. After that it culminated in the Mangoma 
element. 
Biti also clashed with Tsvangirai on a number of issues. Biti opposed the suspension 
of Mangoma by Tsvangirai. He argued that the dismissal of Mangoma was 
unprocedural, because article 12 of the party’s constitution stipulated that standing 
committee members require two thirds majority vote of the national council to be 
suspended (Herald, 2014d). Moreover, Mangoma was not given a charge sheet or 
consulted before his suspension. Thus, his dismissal was unconstitutional, and a 
strategy to dismantle the Biti faction. The rift between Biti and Tsvangirai was also 
widened when Biti agreed to represent the former Governor of the Reserve bank of 
Zimbabwe, Gideon Gono, in a constitutional case filed by his former advisor 
Munyaradzi Kereke, whom he had sacked (The Guardian, 2014). Both Gono and 
Kereke were prominent ZANU-PF members, and Biti did not consult the party. 
Tsvangirai and some party members were angered because Biti was defending Gono 
against corruption charges in the ZANU-PF camp. The latter responded that he can 
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represent anyone as a lawyer. Biti was also condemned by Tsvangirai and other party 
members for endorsing ZANU-PF’s victory in the July 2013 elections, and for blaming 
the opposition’s loss on its lack of feasible and marketable policies (Herald, 2014c). 
The squabbles culminated in suspensions and counter-suspensions. 
Both factions claimed to be in control of the national council. On the 26th of April 
2014, Biti as the Secretary-General called for a meeting at the Mendel Training Centre, 
which Tsvangirai and the top leadership backing him did not attend (Zulu, 2014:1). 
Biti’s Democratic Renewal team claimed that 136 national council members out of 138 
voted to suspend Tsvangirai, Chamisa, Khupe, Moyo, Komichi and Mwonzora. 
Moreover, they reversed the suspensions of Mangoma and other party officials who 
had been dismissed by Tsvangirai. They accused Tsvangirai of remarkable leadership 
failures and transforming the party into a ‘fiefdom of the leader’ (Daily News, 2014c). 
Soon after the meeting, the Biti faction issued a statement that said: 
Tsvangirai can no longer be considered as a democrat or comrade in this struggle, is 
clearly unsuitable and has disqualified himself as a fit and proper patriot with the 
legitimacy, credibility, ability, decency or honesty of leading and executing the 
democratic struggle in Zimbabwe, (Zulu, 2014: 1). 
 
Tsvangirai and his supporters overlooked this decision, viewing it as an internal coup. 
In retaliation, on the 29th of the same month he convened a national council meeting 
at the party’s headquarters, at which 162 members were reported to have voted to 
expel Biti and ten MPs (Herald, 2014a). Tsvangirai described Biti as an opportunist, 
who was being manipulated by ZANU-PF. The fight ended up in the courts, and 
Tsvangirai won the case. 
 
5.8 Power and Succession Struggle  
The struggle for power in political parties is apparent as most politicians are in quest 
of power and authority. Incessant power struggles have negatively impacted the 
Zimbabwean political landscape. In the 2014 MDC’s split a number of respondents 
cited this insatiable appetite for power as the root cause for the wrangles. Power 
struggles continued even after the expulsion of the Biti faction. RspP (interview, 5 July 
2017) revealed that in 2015 they almost had another split after Chamisa lost the 
position of the Secretary-General to Mwonzora. Mwonzora got 2464 votes, and 
Chamisa got 1756 votes, but he did not accept defeat (Daily News, 2014d). Chamisa 
(nicknamed Cobra or Nero by some party members) fell to the status of an ordinary 
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card-carrying member. The news reports pointed that he lost because of his modus 
operandi as the organising secretary in the run-up to the 2013 elections. He was 
criticised for rigging and imposing candidates in the primary elections (Financial 
Gazette, 2014b). He was geared for the top position and the defeat came as a huge 
blow to his aspiration. It is evident from the above section that though the infighting 
stemmed from many contradictions, succession debate seems to be the main factor. 
It is my sense that chief amongst the reasons for the problems faced in the 
MDC was to do with the near absence of a succession plan. The 2005 split, and more 
importantly the 2014 split can comprehensively be explained by these lead figures’ 
struggle for the throne. Even after Tsvangirai’s death, the party was left in confusion 
because he failed to handle the succession problem, which a leader with a less cult-
like personality could have addressed. Chigora (2015: 23) also concurs that the 2014 
split was mostly ascribed to the succession tussle and undemocratic unwillingness of 
Morgan to step down. Responding to the leadership renewal question Tsvangirai 
stated: “I was elected by a constituency across the country. We are in a struggle, and 
in a struggle sometimes it is difficult to change horses in the middle” (ANN7, 2012). 
RspL (27 June 2017) stated: “the problem in the opposition is the ‘I won’t go’ 
syndrome.” Some party members who supported Tsvangirai also perpetuated this 
culture for their self-aggrandising reasons. For example, Chamisa realised that as long 
as Tsvangirai was still relevant it was better to stick with him than to split (Interview 
with RspA, 5 July 2017). In support of Tsvangirai, Chamisa made remarks at a rally, 
which were suggestive of Mugabeism in the party. He declared that:  
In a struggle there is a commander, others are lieutenants and no lieutenant should 
say they want to be a commander. If you dream while sleeping on top of a mountain 
that you want to be leader, we say no to that. He is the founding father of democracy 
in Zimbabwe, the doyen of constitutionalism. You can’t replace a person chosen by 
God. Let’s keep on feeding into River Save (Tsvangirai’s totem) so that even 
Gushungo (Mugabe’s totem) can be swept away (Newsday, 2014b). 
 
Statements like these were made to block any aspirant vying for the party president’s 
position. Contesting against Tsvangirai was dubbed as contesting against the divine 
will of God. Thus no dissenting view was to be entertained as long as Tsvangirai was 
still alive. This was the same way ZANU-PF members exhibited Mugabe. This cult-
personality and founder-syndrome created by Tsvangirai saw him winning the same 
position at all congresses uncontested. Thus, Tsvangirai’s failure to hand over power 
and creation of a cult personality contributed to the split of the party. 
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5.9 Dismissal of MPs and Appointments of VPs 
Following the expulsion of the Biti camp and the re-election of Tsvangirai for another 
five-year term as its leader at the November 2014 Congress, the party went on to ask 
the speaker of the national assembly Jacob Mudenda and senate president Edna 
Madzongwe to expel the twenty-one legislators who left the party to join Biti’s MDC 
Renewal party, (Herald, 2015a). Fourteen were elected national assembly members, 
four were senators, and three went to parliament on proportional representation on an 
MDC-T ticket. The expelled approached the courts and their expulsion was upheld, 
citing section 129 (1) (k) of Zimbabwe’s constitution. It stipulates that, “If a member of 
parliament ceases to belong to the political party, which he or she was a member when 
elected into parliament, their seat becomes vacant, and new elections must be called 
within ninety days.” MDC had ninety-one representatives in both houses of parliament, 
and was left with seventy after the twenty-one were expelled. ZANU-PF already had 
two-thirds majority (News24, 2015). The expulsion weakened the MDC’s voice in 
parliament, and expanded turmoil in the opposition politics of Zimbabwe in general.  
Despite the recall of the lawmakers, Tsvangirai’s MDC refused to participate in 
the by-elections to replace the seats, arguing that the Electoral Act must be aligned to 
the new constitution first (Abbink et.al, 2016:508). ZANU-PF won all fourteen seats, 
including one in Nkulumane, Bulawayo, thereby increasing the ruling party’s presence 
in the Matebeleland region. The small parties that participated in the by-elections lost 
by huge margins. This led some analysts to argue that Tsvangirai was playing into 
ZANU-PF’s hands (Interview with RspM, 27 June 2007). The purge of MPs and 
senators also cost the party state finance. The political party funding act stipulates that 
a political party is funded according to the number of Members of Parliament (MPs) it 
has, so more MPs mean more money for the party. RspL argued (interview, 27 June 
2007) that the MDC lost about USD 290 000 quarterly payments. The wrangles 
continued throughout 2015 with each faction claiming they were the genuine MDC. 
Tsvangirai’s faction had control of the party’s headquarters and most of the party’s 
assets. Though most parliamentarians voted on the MDC-T ticket supported the Biti 
faction, Tsvangirai had grassroots support especially in urban areas (Mail and 
Guardian, 2014).  
 The old challenges remained even after the expulsion of Biti and his faction. 
The party transformed into the leader’s ‘fiefdom’; decision-making was privatised and 
monopolised. The leader was deified through songs, personalised party symbols, and 
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attaching his surname to the party’s name. In July 2016, Tsvangirai unilaterally 
appointed Chamisa and Mudzuri as new vice presidents to join the elected Thokozani 
Khupe (The Standard, 2016). Soon after the appointments, some senior MDC-T 
leaders revealed to the public that he did not consult the national council, and that the 
issue of two VPs was rejected in the 2014 party congress. The national council as 
provided for in article 6.4.1 of the 2014 MDC constitution did not empower the council 
or the president to appoint the deputy president. The congress is the only body that 
had the power to nominate the vice president as stipulated in article 6.2.3 of the party’s 
constitution. Those who were seriously dissatisfied were Khupe, secretary general 
Douglas Mwonzora, and spokesperson Obert Gutu. Some analysts prefigured another 
split on tribal lines, whilst others saw it as a genius move to manage his succession, 
since he had announced that he had colon cancer. On the other hand, a number of 
critics described this imposition or autarchic appointment as a characteristic of a 
dictator. The appointments left the MDC-T deeply divided. According to Matyszak 
(2018a:1) “Tsvangirai muddied the waters by appointing two vice presidents.” It led to 
the recent split of Khupe from the party, to be discussed later. 
 
5.10 Ethnicity and Gender  
As explained in the previous chapter, ethnicity is a factor that looms large in the 
Zimbabwean political society. In all major parties the pattern has been: Shona 
president and Ndebele vice president or one of the vice presidents. ZANU-PF 
constitutionalised it, arising from the 1987 unity accord. It is provided in the presidium 
that there must be a Shona VP and a Ndebele VP, and always a Shona President or 
secretary of the party.  In the MDC it was believed that with the revival of the party 
after the expulsion of Ncube’s perceived pro-Ndebele faction, ethnic politics would 
dissipate. However, tensions along ethnic lines continued, despite the protestations 
by the party leaders.  
 While Mugabe created Zezuru domination in ZANU-PF, it also appeared that 
Tsvangirai was pushing for the creation of a Karanga dominated party (The Zimbabwe 
Independent, 2016). Tsvangirai was ethnically Karanga (Shona), but Manyika 
regionally (born in Buhera, Manicaland). In terms of ethnic representation after the 
2011 elective congress, the Karanga still dominated the national executive (see table 
5.1 below). Mazhuzha (2010: 34) discusses how Tsvangirai has been an ethnic 
chauvinist since the formation of the party. He reports that most MDC parliamentarians 
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for Harare (about 90 percent) were Tsvangirai’s Karanga henchmen. The incumbents 
were conveniently replaced by Karangas. Even in the TIG, Tsvangirai’s side was 
dominated by sixteen Karangas and in his offices as a Prime Minister they were also 
many, for example, his spokesman Luke Tamborinyoka.  
 
Table 5.1:  MDC Top Ten in the National Executive in 2011 
Name Position Ethnic Background 
Morgan Tsvangirai President Karanga 
Thokozani Khupe Vice President Ndebele 
Lovemore Moyo  National Chairman Ndebele 
Tendai Biti Secretary General Zezuru 
Tapiwa Mashakada Deputy Secretary General Karanga 
Roy Bennett Treasurer General Caucasian/ British 
Elton Mangoma Deputy Treasurer General Manyika 
Elias Mudzuri Organising Secretary Karanga 
Morgen Komichi Deputy Organising General Karanga 
Nelson Chamisa Secretary for Information Karanga 
      Source: Author [compiled from fieldwork] 
It is also important to note that the factionalism that occurred with the appointment of 
the two vice presidents was interpreted through ethnocentric prisms (Interview with 
Masunungure, 6 July 2017). Mudzuri and Chamisa are both Karanga, from the same 
province. Questions were posed in regards to the appointment of two additional Shona 
VPs, whether it was an indictment on Khupe’s performance, or to dilute her influence, 
and by extension dilute the influence of the Ndebele as an ethnic group (Interview with 
RspL, 27 June 2017). Thus, appointing VPs from the same province caused eruptions, 
which led some in the MDC to revolt (Zimbabwe Independent, 2016). 
 The gender dimension is also an important factor that is recognised and 
appreciated in the composition of the apex of political parties in Zimbabwe. Generally, 
in Zimbabwe, women in politics have been marginalised (Goertz and Mazur, 2008; 
Parpart, 1995). ZANU-PF has also been seized with this matter, and the women’s 
league has been agitating for a gender quota. Joyce Mujuru was criticised for being a 
proxy for Solomon Mujuru until she was ousted. In the MDC-T, Khupe, who is Ndebele 
and female, played an important role as she represented the ethnic and gender 
dimensions. Tsvangirai was accused of gender bias by appointing two more male VPs 
whilst Khupe was still there. Khupe received attacks for holding different views, until 
she split from the party. Even after the 2019 congress, men dominate in the MDC 
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presidium. Across political parties in Zimbabwe, the gender factor has contributed to 
factionalism, though it is submerged. 
 
5.11 ZANU-PF Infiltration 
Infiltration in political parties occurs everywhere, especially in the rough domain of 
African politics. Although it is not illegal, it receives heavy criticism. It erodes 
democracy, and makes people lose faith in the democratic process. ZANU-PF has 
been accused of infiltrating opposition parties to gain control. Mandaza (2016) 
provides an apt description of the securocrat state under ZANU-PF. The military-
security apparatus has been dominant, and has been used to purge political rivals and 
infiltrate the opposition. Tendi (2016) and Coltart (2016) also document the military-
security complex under the Mugabe-led ZANU-PF government, and the continuity of 
the colonial state. In the process of liberation, ZANU-PF committed crimes, the 
structures were never democratic, and they never transformed into democratic 
structures (Tsvangirai, 2017). 
Six out of twenty-two research respondents believed that given the nature of 
the dominant liberation party the possibility of infiltration was very high. QrB (interview, 
29 June 2017) argued that Mugabe and ZANU-PF were behind the dispute that led to 
the 2014 split. “The opposition has been infiltrated, how can someone like Mangoma 
think they can be President yet they do not have the numbers to win an election?” he 
added. Morgen Komichi (MDC National Chairman) alleged that ZANU-PF plant their 
agents in the MDC during primary elections (The Zimbabwean 2017a). He states that 
they use their money to win primary elections, then after winning they oppose the party 
leadership from within. Tsvangirai was also quoted arguing that the ruling party was 
working with its agents and some disgruntled party members to foment divisions (The 
Zimbabwean, 2017a). It emerged in a focus group discussion that some were given 
money and promised large tracts of land. However, this seemed not to hold water 
since it was not clear how much was given and to whom. RspL was suspicious of 
Tsvangirai. Besides dating ZANU-PF women, expelling the 21 MPs and refusing to 
contest in the by-elections to replace them, Tsvangirai was given USD70 000 by 
Mnangagwa for the treatment of his colon cancer. “You cannot eat ZANU-PF’s money 
for free”, she stated (interview, RspL). Moreover, Tsvangirai was still stuck in the USD5 
million government house, which he was given during the GNU. He could not afford to 
pay it off, so he was afraid that ZANU-PF might evict him. In light of the above, it can 
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be that infiltration was done to frustrate smaller parties, and contributed to the decline 
of trust in the opposition leader. 
Some respondents underscored the role of ZANU-PF in precipitating the split. 
RspM (interview, 27 June 2017), for example, argued that ZANU-PF could not have 
come up with a fake letter to destabilise the opposition party: the views forwarded by 
Mangoma were sensible. “Is ZANU-PF to blame for his marital problems, is ZANU-PF 
to blame for his poor education, and is ZANU-PF to blame for his poor leadership 
skills?” he stated. He further asserted that Tsvangirai was given the letter privately, 
but chose to publish it on his own. 
Overall, it is important to note that the opposition party has been vulnerable to 
infiltration due to a number of factors as already discussed. What appeared to be a 
major problem is lack of funding in some periods, because it seems like ZANU-PF has 
been using its resources to buy political influence. For example, presently, the MDC 
is not getting funds from parliament, so very view workers are getting paid. This leads 
to many getting paid for information inter alia from the ruling party. As well, the party’s 
recruitment procedures seem not to be strict. Moreover, the MDC does not enjoy 
incumbency, it is also younger than ZANU-PF, and does not have the support of the 
state apparatus, thus it has been difficult for it to contain infiltration and factionalism. 
 
5.12 Civil Society, Donors and the West 
As explained in the previous chapter, most civic societies that were operating in the 
governance and human rights field were linked to the MDC. These were mostly 
opposed to ZANU-PF to a point where they appeared to be under the hegemony of 
MDC and too imbedded in the party. RspA, one of the civil society personnel in 
Zimbabwe, commented that “we made a mistake when we aligned with the opposition, 
our people became their people, so it became difficult to separate and influence the 
party” (interview, 5 July 2017). At one time it was alleged that only civic organisations 
aligned to the MDC got donor funding (Interview with RspQ, 13 August 2017). They 
did not play that important watchdog role on both the ruling party and opposition MDC 
(Interview with RspD, 6 July 2017). They were not autonomous players, which is one 
of the weaknesses of the civil society. 
However, the strategic alliance between the MDC and the civil society 
deteriorated with the process and result of the GPA and GNU (Alexander and 
McGregor, 2013: 757). Most civic organisations were uncomfortable with the 
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opposition party going into a coalition government with ZANU-PF. Some organisations 
such as the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) and the Zimbabwe Congress of 
Trade Unions (ZCTU) pulled out of the alliance that existed since 1999, though ZCTU 
reconciled with the MDC post-GNU (Alexander and McGregor, 2013: 757). They felt 
the opposition party was enjoying the trappings of power too much, and some party 
members were getting cosy with ZANU-PF (Interview with RspR, 14 August 2017). 
These shifts significantly contributed to the split. 
In Zimbabwe, civil society, donors and Western governments are interlinked. 
MDC was primarily sponsored by donors through NGOs that were funded from the 
West. According to Asuelime and Francis (2014: 72), the party survived on 
sponsorship from the British government through the Westminster Foundation for 
democracy and the Tories, through the Zimbabwe Democracy Trust, along with 
corporations and white farmers. It received the support because there was a 
coincidence of interests with the Western countries especially after 2000; they were 
fed up with Mugabe (Interview with RspQ, 13 August 2017). By 2013, international 
donors had channelled about USD2,6 billion to the MDC, according to the official 
media (Herald, 2014a). Thus, there was a level of propaganda on the part of the 
Zimbabwean state and ZANU-PF that they were “puppets of the West” (Matyszak and 
Reeler, 2013: 11). Some donors come with conditions; it then becomes obvious for 
them to be interested in the processes of the party. 
Soon after MDC’s defeat by ZANU-PF in the 2013 elections, donors’ support 
deteriorated. They argued that the party was negatively affected by Tsvangirai’s 
personal indiscretions, and that he was not strategic and effective (Interview with 
RspD, 6 July 2017). So they also wanted leadership renewal in the party. Though 
Tsvangirai still had grassroots support, the Biti-Mangoma faction were popular with 
the donors (Interview with RspH, 26 July 2017). Treasurer General Roy Bennett, who 
was the major link between the donor community and the party also called for the 
resignation of Tsvangirai (Business Day, 2013). Mangoma was the deputy treasurer 
general, also responsible for sourcing donor funds. In light of the above, the Biti-
Mangoma faction probably briefed the donors about the failures of Tsvangirai for their 
own benefit. Moreover, Mangoma and others’ beatings played to their advantage. 
Luke Tamborinyoka, Morgan’s spokesperson stated in the Daily News (2014b) that 
after the violence the rebels (Mangoma faction) visited some donors to solicit for 
money, claiming that they were victims of the violence. The United States, Canadian 
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and Australian embassies issued statements denouncing the violent incidents in the 
MDC (Newsday, 2014c). This appeared to the ruling party members to be a 
confirmation that the party was a stooge of foreign powers. 
Furthermore, there were disagreements over the distribution of resources. The 
Biti-Mangoma faction controlled the resources of the party, which they allocated on 
factional lines. Tsvangirai was denied funds for party business (Daily News, 2014a). 
He began to call for party members to fund the party as the donors were no longer on 
his side. It was mentioned in the official media that the USA was supporting Biti, and 
had given him money (Herald, 2014f). However, from the researcher’s fieldwork there 
was no credence in the allegations. QrC (interview, 26 June 2017), who was the 
Director-General of the party stated (that the funds from all sources were coming to 
the party. After the split, the dispute for control of party funds was solved in the court. 
The Biti-Mangoma went away with some of the resources of the party. 
 
5.13 MDC-Renewal Split 
The MDC-Renewal was formed in March 2014 under the leadership of Biti, though 
fronted by Sekai Holland as the interim leader, until its congress in June 2015, where 
they confirmed Biti as the president (Zulu and Mudadigwa, 2015: 1). The party was 
also renamed as the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Before this transformation, the 
MDC-Renewal had already split into two, which led to the formation of the Renewal 
Democrats of Zimbabwe (RDZ), led by Elton Mangoma (Newsday, 2015). Mangoma 
had been suspended from the MDC-Renewal over allegations that he snatched the 
wife of Believe Tevera, a youth leader in the party. The party also accused him of 
having “unbridled ambition and employing unorthodox, illegal and uncouth means to 
fulfil his childhood ambition to be president of something or anything before nature 
takes him” (Herald, 2015a). Mangoma refuted these claims, he felt they were 
fabricated by his opponents in the party to score political points. 
In an interview, Mangoma laid the blame for the breakaway on Biti’s big-man 
politics, poor communication, unwillingness to submit to the will of the people, and that 
he dragged holding an elective congress, and violence. The day he left the party he 
was beaten by the party’s youth. “Biti mutated to what Tsvangirai and Mugabe were, 
their only difference is the names” said Mangoma, He further explained that the party 
wanted to join with Ncube’s MDC-N, but Biti felt that he would not be the leader of the 
United Movement for Democratic Change (UMDC), so there was discontent with his 
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stance. Biti then engaged in ‘elite pacts’ with Joyce Mujuru, the first female Vice-
President in Zimbabwe who had been ousted from ZANU-PF and formed the 
Zimbabwe People First (ZPF) party, which Mangoma and other party members 
rejected. Finally, they parted ways, with Mangoma forming his RDZ the following day, 
which indicated that he had long-planned his exit. 
The People’s Democratic Party led by Biti split further. On the 28th of September 
2017, the party’s general council expelled Biti, the vice-president Kucaca Phulu and 
eight senior members. The council accused them of unilaterally joining the MDC-
Alliance without consulting, which was in breach of the party’s constitution (Newsday, 
2017). Biti and the expelled group accused the secretary-general Gorden Moyo who 
announced their expulsion of pursuing tribal politics. Biti claimed that Moyo wanted to 
get into an alliance with ZAPU led by Dumiso Dabengwa (a Ndebele). Lucia 
Matibenga, who was the national chairperson was then elevated to president at the 
party’s extra-ordinary council meeting. Both factions claimed ownership of the party. 
Matibenga’s PDP became an affiliate of Mujuru’s People’s Rainbow Coalition (PRC) 
– an alliance dominated by women, whilst Biti’s PDP became an affiliate of MDC-
Alliance. Presently, Biti is the MDC’s deputy president and sits on the finance 
committee in parliament. 
 
5.14 Conclusion 
This chapter addressed several themes, including the party’s failure to win the 
country’s presidency, weak leadership, intra-party violence and inconsistencies, 
struggle for supremacy, ethnicity, the influence of ZANU-PF, and the role of civil 
society, donors and the West. Factionalism in the MDC resulted in a deteriorated 
political structure. It also damaged opposition politics in Zimbabwe, and strengthened 
the political hold of ZANU-PF. However, factionalism can be good for renewal. Now 
that all have learned their lessons they might know that they have to stick together. 
MDC-Alliance is now the proper MDC again but the leader may even be more 
autocratic than before. 
The factors surrounding the 2014 split are similar to those which led to the 2005 
split. There was a recurrence of an assumption that an opposition leader needs to be 
sophisticated. Biti’s side was a bit more elitist whilst the Tsvangirai side was a bit more 
grassroots based and driven. More so, it was the same set of characters, lawyers and 
professors. The educated ones always left the MDC to form a splinter group and those 
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who have a more populist approach to their politics usually stayed with Tsvangirai. It 
was not a split right down the middle of the party; it was again a split at the national 
executive parliamentary level. Another similarity is that both splits occurred after an 
electoral loss, and were fronted by the secretary-general.  
There was no big political principle, all parties did not proceed to benefit from 
the split. Thus, it was more about personality than anything else; everyone pursued 
their own ego. Factionalism in ZANU-PF was mostly contained by fear and greed. Fear 
for physical harm and fear for economic survival. Thus, most people did not vocalize 
their grievances as the consequences were detrimental to their lives. However, it also 
splintered with military intervention, after a long intra-party fight between Emmerson 
Mnangagwa’s faction and the G-40 faction. It is also germane to note that ZANU-PF 
enjoyed the advantage of incumbency, thus it has managed to survive after splits and 
win elections. Factionalism and splits in the MDC negatively affected its ability to grab 
power from the ‘revolutionary party’ because in all the elections the splinter parties 
played spoiler to the party’s winning prospects. The 2014 split seriously impacted on 
the electoral politics in 2018. The opposition political parties were severely weakened 
and disoriented. Though there were efforts to unite the opposition parties, successive 

















This chapter presents the major conclusions of the study. It brings together the 
generalisations that can be made about factionalism in the Movement for Democratic 
Change. It focuses on each objective of the study. Moreover, it provides 




Factionalism, which consequently led to splits has negatively affected the MDC and 
hindered the development of opposition politics in Zimbabwe.  The opposition could 
not grab power from the ruling party because the splinter parties played spoiler to the 
party’s winning prospects. Thus it strengthened the political hold of ZANU-PF. The 
factors surrounding the 2005 split are almost identical to those which led to the 2014 
split. These include ethnic politics, leadership style, the influence of ZANU-PF, 
relations with civil society and the influence of external political actors ranging from 
‘the west’ to South Africa. 
Leadership style has been the key problem in the MDC. Tsvangirai dictatorial 
tendencies fuelled the splits. A number of allegations were laid against him in regards 
to his leadership inadequacies. These included his use of violence, his involvement 
with multiple women, his indecision and use of the kitchen cabinet, corruption, by-
passing the constitution and non-adherence to other democratic principles. The 
discontent in the party was exacerbated by his long stay at the helm of the party, 
especially in the 2014 split. He had been at the helm of the party from its formation in 
1999 till he died in 2018 without a successor or succession plan. Thus his opponents 
claimed that he had assimilated to the system he was fighting. 
 Ethnicity has been a salient factor in the Zimbabwean political arena. The 
composition of the apex of both ZANU-PF and the MDC tried to accommodate two 
major ethnic groups, Shona and Ndebele. Ethnicity has been historically used by 
ZANU-PF for political expediency. The MDC also assimilated this characteristic. This 
was evident in the 2005 Ncube split and the more recent Khupe split. The factions 
used ethnicity to galvanise support. However, the Karanga (Shona) dominated 
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factions have always garnered more support as they are the largest ethnic group within 
the MDC. Ethnicity will remain a significant feature in the development of opposition 
politics in Zimbabwe. 
 The environment in which the opposition party was operating was too rough. 
The ruling party introduced stringent measures to curb the opposition’s activities. 
Moreover, it has been accused of infiltrating the MDC so that it could disintegrate it, 
split the votes and ultimately keep itself in power. This was done by the use of ‘carrot 
and stick’. The faction leaders were believed by respondents to be funded by ZANU-
PF. Most respondents underscored the role of ZANU-PF in precipitating the splits in 
the MDC. However, the violence unleashed on the MDC by the ruling party, especially 
in the run-up to the 2008 elections, had serious negative effects on the performance 
of the opposition party. It affected the voting patterns of the next elections, mostly in 
the rural areas where they were frequently reminded of it at rallies. ZANU-PF also has 
a history of treason trials of genuine opposition leaders in the country since 1980 
(Zimbabwe Independent, 16 Dec 2005). Mugabe, through the CIO, charged all 
legitimate opposition leaders with treason, starting with the late Joshua Nkomo, 
Dumiso Dabengwa and Ndabaningi Sithole, and the same applied to Tsvangirai. 
 The civil society in Zimbabwe was blamed by a number of the respondents for 
not playing the important watchdog role on both the ruling party and opposition MDC. 
Most NGOs in democracy and human rights field became too embedded in the MDC 
since the party’s formation. Thus, civil society became part of the dynamics of splitting 
and of the factionalism that was part of the political life of the MDC. However, their role 
was not central in leading to splits: most civil society organisations only reacted to 
them. They tended to take sides depending on whom they felt would win elections. 
The MDC was traditionally funded by the West through its embassies and 
donors. There was a coincidence of interests with the western countries: they were 
fed up with Mugabe, especially after 2000. Also since 1990 there was a global push 
towards democratisation by the ‘west’. The opposition party’s relations with the West 
had positive and negative effects. Though they received funding, there was a level of 
propaganda on the part of the ZANU-PF party-state. The opposition party was dubbed 
a stooge of foreign powers. In the splits, the West did not really play the decisive role, 
but recognised the de facto situation after the split. In the 2005 split they were against 
Tsvangirai’s unilateralist decision, so they were in support of Ncube. However, they 
worked again with Tsvangirai as Ncube’s faction had little grassroots support. In the 
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2014 split, they favoured Biti because of his management of the economy during the 
GNU. However, he did not fly very far, and since then support from the West 
deteriorated. 
South Africa has also been part of the dynamics in the MDC. Prior to 2005, 
former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa in his quiet diplomacy strategy seems 
to have been involved in a plan to usurp power from Tsvangirai and place the party 
under the leadership of Ncube. Mbeki’s administration also supported Simba Makoni 
of the New Dawn, who joined with Ncube’s party in the March 2008 elections. 
Tsvangirai also admits in his autobiography that he felt that Mbeki was closer to the 
Ndebele leaders in the party and was financing them to destabilise the party. In the 
2014 split, South Africa’s intervention in the party was minimal. 
 
6.3 Recommendations 
This study recommends that the MDC should establish a permanent arbitration 
committee that can minimise future conflicts. It has to be a committee of high standing 
men and women who do not hold political office in the MDC. The national executive 
committee as the decision-making body between congresses is open to manipulation. 
Coming up with an ad-hoc committee to deal with a conflict is also open to 
manipulation and makes the problem more problematic. An extra-ordinary congress 
takes time to convene and does not represent arbitration. Judiciary courts had a 
negative impact on the party. The court decisions ended up tailor-made to suit the 
ruling party’s ulterior motives to annihilate the MDC. Moreover, taking each other to 
court set a destructive precedent in opposition politics. This recommendation will need 
the MDC to introduce a constitutional change.   
 The MDC also needs a proper constitution known by its members. It emerged 
in the study that there is a lot of confusion in regards to the party’s constitution 
(Matyszak, 2018). It seems that the constitution is non-existent as no one has a copy. 
In addition, no-one is sure which constitution is in effect, the 2011 or the 2014 one. 
Thus the constitution has been abused for political expediency. 
 
6.4 Areas of Further Research 
Further research can compare factionalism between the MDC and other opposition 




6.5 Concluding Remarks 
Factionalism in political parties cannot be completely eliminated. This study has 
examined the causes of factionalism, which have led to the MDC’s splintering into 
multiple political parties. Five salient factors have been analysed. These include: 
ethnic politics; relations with civil society; the influence of external political actors 
ranging from ‘the west’ to South Africa; ruling party efforts to destabilise the MDC; and 
problems within party leadership (including gender and generational conflict). These 
have been related to the MDC's decline and the diminishing qualities of democracy, 
historically contextualised, in Zimbabwe more generally. Overall, the major problem 
was to do with the party leadership. All of the splits could have been avoided, but a 
clash of personalities in the top leadership seems to have been a problem. However, 
the question still remains: will the splintering be overcome? Currently, it appears 
stronger and power has been centralised in the president but there is a possibility that 
it will split again. There are fears of ZANU-PF’s interference through their spies or 
agents in the MDC. Furthermore, Mwonzora’s camp, which lost in the previous 




Appendix A- Elton Mangoma’s Letter to Tsvangirai 
RESTORATION OF HOPE AND CONFIDENCE: A Cause for Leadership Renewal 
1. Context 
On the onset I wish to put it on the record that I am loyal to you and the movement. I remain 
cognizant of and cherish the role you have played and shall continue to play going forward. I 
therefore respectfully submit these views and proposals in the name of transparency, honesty, 
for preservation of our collective integrity and my love for this party and this country as well as 
my utmost respect for the leadership of the party. I also respectfully submit that my views are 
meant to build this party and its leadership for us to remain relevant on the Zimbabwean menu 
of politics and for the party to be able to challenge for the highest political office in the next 
election. They are not meant to be personal attacks or to be misconstrued as a form of 
character assassination on anyone but a genuine well thought out expression of my desire to 
see a strong MDC emerging out of the incumbent crisis. 
 
2. Introduction 
It is common cause that the MDC suffered an electoral loss of catastrophic proportions, what 
we in the party are convinced is an electoral theft by ZANU PF, on July 31. It is common cause 
that this election did not meet the standards expected of a democratic free and fair election. It 
is also common cause that regardless of the electoral fraud, on our part, we as leadership, 
should be responsible and shoulder some blame for allowing that electoral fraud to take place. 
 
3. The Aftermath of the July 31 Election 
The aftermath of the election has been a state of confusion, consternation and apprehension 
on the part of the movement. The party is grieving from a crisis of leadership legitimacy, crisis 
of expectation and above all a crisis of confidence, externally and internally. My reading is that 
the manner in which Councillors voted on the 16th of September 2013 during the election of 
Mayors is manifest of the crisis of leadership and the crisis of legitimacy that is engrossing the 
party. The repercussion of the election has also been met with personal and private issues of 
the party's highest office being drawn into the public further calling into question the leadership 
credentials of the party leaving the brand of the party in disrepute. This has culminated in 
appeals, internally and externally, for leadership renewal in the party. 
 
4. The Call for Leadership Renewal 
Leadership renewal is an inexorable truth that the party will have to confront lest it is plagued 
by the same succession conundrum affecting ZANU PF. Since the outcome of the election, 
calls for leadership renewal have been made in different quotas and at different platforms. It 
is my unbending resolve that leadership renewal, at this juncture, could be the only avenue to 
restoring the credibility of the party lest it risks being confined to history. At a time when 
confidence is plummeting, there is need for the MDC to freshen up, create fresh impetus and 
rally its troops to remain united and focused. However, this impetus cannot and will not be 
created if the leadership status quo is preserved. As Zimbabwe seems to plunge deeper into 
crisis following the July 31 election, the relevance of the MDC cannot be overstressed. The 
MDC still has a significant role to play in the democratization process of Zimbabwe but cannot 
do so in its current state. With 2018 approaching, it is apparent that campaigning for the same 
commences promptly under a renewed leadership. 
 
5. The Position of the President 
There is no denial that Morgan Tsvangirai has embossed his name into the history books of 
this country. There is also no denial that he has played a pivotal role in Zimbabwe's quest for 
democracy and socio-economic transformation. However, it is my humble submission that, at 
this juncture, it is time you consider leaving the office of the president of the movement. 2014 
marks 15 years of Morgan Tsvangirai as president of the party. You have done the best that 
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you could and continuing will result in diminishing returns and eating into your legacy. The 
party is in dire need for new ideas, new thinking, a new trajectory and new stimulus. 
 
6. Way Forward 
The creation of a new trajectory for the party cannot and will not be achieved by acrimony and 
contestation but by amicably resolving and putting finality and closure to this issue of 
leadership renewal. However, the MDC needs resurgence underwritten by a strong cohesive 
party leadership, reviewed adaptive party policies and reinvigorated connection with the base 
and the broad alliance. The best way that you, as President of the party can support this 
process is to step aside and allow progress by the democratic forces. There are three possible 
pathways, with the first being highly undesirable for the party: 
Firstly, you remain in questioned leadership, which brings back the ghost of 2005-2006, 
leading to a nasty war of attrition in the party, which will reach a peak either before, or in 2016. 
Some of the questions that are part of general talk that you will then need to answer are as 
follows: -                                    
a) How will you be able to undertake the reform agenda that we failed to do when we were in 
government and you had Executive power? 
b) How will you answer the questions that we failed to care enough for our people and that we 
used our time in government for personal aggrandizement, personal wealth accumulation as 
symbolized by the current impasse on Highlands residence? 
c) How will you put closure to the issue of women in your life and ensure that these will not 
continue to erode your and the party’s brand? 
d) How will we put closure to the question of misuse of funds, and ensure that our friends 
regain confidence that donations will be channelled to the people’s project going forward? 
e) How will we make sure that trust, team spirit and mutual confidence, currently eroded 
through the misconduct of the primary elections, violence visited on staff and myself, lack of 
constitutionalism and failure to follow procedure on appointment of officers to the National 
Executive and key public offices including diplomatic posts is restored. 
Secondly, the president could declare his intention to step aside necessitating for the 
conducting of an extra-ordinary congress, while he is in charge. 
Thirdly, the president could declare his intention to leave office forthwith and an interim 
leadership, under vice president Thokozani Khupe takes over. This to me is the most ideal 
approach that will strengthen the party towards the next election. 
 
Under option 2 and 3 above, I envisage amending the constitution to create the position of 
founding president. It will give the effect that you will continue to be closely associated with 
the party and the people’s project, preserve your legacy as a democrat and a brave fighter 
against dictatorship and one-man-rule. This also enables establishing an institute for 
governance and social development, which the party will assist in fundraising for the 
establishment of the same. This is my honest assessment of the party and my submissions 
on how the party can be transformed to achieve its objective of:- 
 Acquiring state power following an electoral win in the next election. 
 Governing democratically and bringing about real transformation in Zimbabwe. 
 
7. Conclusion 
I sincerely believe any of the last two approaches, if adopted, could enable the president: 
Morgan Tsvangirai, to maintain his legacy as a person who has fought a just cause for 
democracy and the upliftment of the conditions of life for ordinary Zimbabweans. It will also 
enable the movement to make progress towards securing state power. 
I hope you will render my submissions the due consideration that they deserve. 
 
I thank you. 
 
Mr. Elton Mangoma, 
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